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Law as Craft
Brett G. Scharffs 54 Vand. L. Rev. 2245 (2001)
This Article explores the similarities between the law
and other craft traditions, such as carpentry, pottery, and
quilting. Its thesis is that law--and in particular adjudica-
tion--combine elements of what Aristotle described as practical
wisdom, or phronesis, and craft, or techne.
Craft knowledge is learned practically through experi-
ence and demonstrated through practice, and is contrasted
with other concepts, including art, science, mass production,
craftiness, and hobby. Crafts are characterized by four simul-
taneous identities. First, crafts are made by hand-one at a
time-and require not only talent and skill, but also experience
and what Karl Llewellyn called "situation sense." Second,
crafts are medium specific and are always identified with a
material and the technologies invented to manipulate that ma-
terial. Third, crafts are characterized by the use and useful-
ness of craft objects. Fourth, crafts are defined by their past.
The Article also considers how one becomes a craftsperson, fo-
cusing upon the role of rules and theory, the dialectic of cer-
tainty and uncertainty, tough love and exploitation in appren-
ticeship, and the necessity of failure and disillusionment.
The author concludes that although the craft ideal is
"old-fashioned, even quaint and mildly embarrassing," it nev-
ertheless provides a paradigm for understanding lawyerly
work that holds the promise of both enabling lawyers to be bet-
ter at their jobs, and of finding greater meaning and fulfill-
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INTRODUCTION
The Challenge is to build a life in the here and now-one worthy of ourselves, our
fellow citizens and the law itself. Easier said than done. And many of us will fail in
the attempt. Many will settle for a self-trivializing conception of lauyering.
-Bruce Ackerman'
Judge Learned Hand... once speculated whether he might have accomplished
more by constructing a boat or building a house.
-Judge Robert Satter 2
No matter how many choices the rules leave open, a judge whose task is to apply the
law will be guided in his deliberations by what might be called the ethos of his of-
fice, by a certain ideal of judicial craftsmanship, and by the habits that a devotion
to this ideal and long experience in attempting to achieve it tend to instill.
-Anthony T. Kronman
3
Law is neither an art nor a science. 4 It is a craft.5 In study-
ing particular craft traditions, such as carpentry, pottery, angling,
and quiltmaking, we can learn important lessons about the craft of
1. James K. Altman, Modern Litigators and Lawyer-Statesmen, 103 YALE LJ. 1031, 1070
(1994) (reviewing ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER (1993)) (quoting Bruce A. Acker-
man, Commencement Remarks, YALE L. REP., Spring/Summer 1982, at 6).
2. Robert Satter, Tools of the Trade. Judging, Like Carpentry, Requires Craftsmanship.
A.B.A. J., Sept. 1992, at 104, 104 (1992) (reflecting upon his "surprise [about] what carpentry
taught me about judging," and concluding that while "Judge Hand's urge to construct something
he could see and touch was understandable after a lifetime of working with his mind," in reality
"the carpenter and the judge both build edifices-only the materials they use are different').
3. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
295 (1993).
4. My emphasis in this Article will often be upon adjudication, especially in the appellate
context. As will be apparent throughout, however, I believe conceiving of the lawyer's work as a
craft is applicable in other aspects of legal practice and culture as well. For a discussion of the
distinction between craft, art, and science, see infra Part LB.1-2.
5. For my definition of "craft," see infra Part I.A.
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the law, and especially adjudication.6 Perhaps more importantly, for
those grown weary of a life in the law, the craft ideals implicit in
the law may re-ignite the spark of idealistic enthusiasm that drew
them to the law in the first place.
This is not an original idea. 7 Professor Karl Llewellyn, for
example, in response to the controversy between formalists and re-
alists, described appellate judging as a craft of law. 8 The craft that
Llewellyn had in mind centered around "the existence of some sig-
nificant body of working knowhow," which is "in some material de-
gree transmissible and transmitted to the incomer."9 Craft is "in
some material degree conscious, it is to some degree articulate in
principles and rules of art or of thumb, in practices and dodges or
contrivances which can be noticed and learned for the easing and
the furtherance of the work."10 Llewellyn also maintained that "[a]
healthy craft . . . elicits ideals, pride, and responsibility in its
craftsmen."" Craft cannot be reduced to a set of rules: "[T]he rules
6. The craft virtues discussed in this Article are in no way gender specific, and I have
drawn upon craft traditions, some of which have been traditionally male pursuits, some of which
have been traditionally female pursuits, and some of which have no gender inclinations. I am
sensitive to the difficulty of not creating misimpressions about gender neutrality given the inher-
ited terms "craftsman" and "craftsmanship." When I use these terms, no gender message is in-
tended; in order to emphasize this, I will often use the less familiar elocution, "craftsperson."
7. See, e.g., JAMES E. BOND, THE ART OF JUDGING (1987) (contrasting favorably judicial
craftsmen who look backward for guidance with judicial statesmen who look forward for inspira-
tion); William A. Bablitch, Reflections on the Art and Craft of Judging, 37 JUDGES' J., Winter
1998, at 40, 40 (1998) (advocating fundamental importance of "principled decision making" for
judges, and identifying (i) an understanding of the role of judges in a democratic society, (ii)
intellectual humility, and (iii) an awareness of one's own value judgments as three qualities of
good judges); Douglas Lind, Constitutional Adjudication as a Craft-Bound Excellence, 6 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 353, 357 (1994) (basing view of adjudication as a "craft-bound excellence [with] objec-
tive conditions of mastery reflective of the internal demands of [its] practice" upon later philoso-
phy of Wittgenstein); Linda Ross Meyer, Is Practical Reason Mindless?, 86 GEO. L.J. 647, 652
(1998) (arguing that Heidegger's understanding of thinking as handiwork, perception, and si-
lence helps illuminate the problem of practical legal reasoning). See generally Sidney A. Shapiro
& Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of Administra-
tive Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051 (1995) (offering a model of judicial behavior based upon "craft"
and "outcome" components of judicial decisionmaking).
8. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 213-35
(1960). Formalism saw adjudication as an intellectualizable process that subjected judges to the
control of the law, whereas realists questioned whether there were any right answers to legal
questions, and sought to unmask formalism as false and deceptive. Id. Both sides of this contro-
versy, Llewellyn believed, ignored "everywhere... the concept of craft, of craft-tradition, of craft-
responsibility, and of craftsmanship not as meaning merely the high artistry of God's gifted, but




11. Id. For a discussion of how the legal profession is suffering from the disintegration of
ideals that elicit pride in its members, see generally MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER
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not only fail to tell the full tale, taken literally they tell much of it
wrong; and while words can set forth such facts and needs as ideals,
craft-conscience, and morale, these things are bodied forth, they
live and work, primarily in ways and attitudes which are much
more and better felt and done than they are said."12 Craft does not
usually generate absolute "certainty," but rather "reasonable regu-
larity."13 Llewellyn had planned on writing a major work about the
"crafts of the law," but he died before such a work was completed. 14
Taking his cue from Llewellyn, Yale Law School Dean An-
thony T. Kronman has defended the once widely held, now largely
forgotten "idea that the law is a craft demanding a cultivated sub-
tlety of judgment whose possession constitutes a valuable trait of
character, as distinct from mere technical skill, and which therefore
justifies a sort of pride that the possession of such a trait affords."15
The law is a craft in other ways as well. The craftsperson's
gaze invariably combines both a backward and forward looking di-
mension. Whether carpenter, quilter or judge, he or she looks to the
past with faithfulness, seeking inspiration, guidance, and founda-
tion. But the lover of craft-or, more precisely, of a particular
craft-has another eye unflinchingly focused on the future, endeav-
oring to create something useful, comely, and lasting, something
perhaps that will survive and be cherished by generations not yet
born. Rooted in the past and concerned for the future, the craftsper-
son lives and thrives in the tension, limits, and opportunities cre-
ated by these mutual devotions. But this is not all. The craftsperson
is also rooted in a profound and moving way in the precarious pre-
sent-unhurried, often alone, or shoulder to shoulder with a mas-
LAWYERS: How THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION Is TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SocIETry
(1994) and KRONAAN, supra note 3. Not coincidentally, the idea of the law as a craft, echoing and
building upon Llewellyn, is a theme sounded by both Kroaman and Glendon.
12. LLEWELLYN, supra note 8, at 214.
13. Id. at 215-17.
14. Views differ as to the role of craft and craftsmanship in Llewellyn's thought and its rela-
tionship to legal realism. Morton Horwitz has suggested that conceptualizing adjudication as a
craft was an attempt by Llewellyn to remedy the "destabilizing consequences of Realism" by
"offer[ing] a new basis for belief in professional craft as the source of stability and predictability
in law." MORTON J. HORWITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at 250
(1992). According to Horwitz, Llewellyn retreated to a form of conservatism after a youth of
critical radicalism. See id. at 247-50. However, William Twining points out that "Llewellyn's
interest in method... (and his] fascination with 'how' questions was a constant theme through-
out his life and that there is an essential continuity in his thought and his emphasis on tradition
and craft as stabilizing factors." William Twining, The Idea of Juristic Method: A Tribute to Karl
Llewellyn, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 119, 124 (1993). Twining rejects Horwitz's view of'Llewellyn's
emphasis on craft and method as being a late, conservative, even reactionary sell-out on the
critical thrust of his earlier Realism." Id.
15. KRONMAN, supra note 3, at 295.
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ter, apprentice, or colleague, working on a single, particular project
or problem, one at a time.
The creative tension experienced by the craftsperson, from
the possibilities and constraints inherited from her forebearers, the
opportunities and contingencies imposed by the present, and the
prospects and perils of the future-this is the very tension that is
experienced by a judge. With this tripartite gaze, the judge looks to
the precedents and patterns bequeathed by her predecessors for
guidance, is concerned about the consequences of her decision on
the parties before her who stand to lose life, liberty, or property,
and must think about how today's decision or opinion will be con-
strued, used, and misused by her posterity.
As a defender of the opinion that the work of lawyers and
judges should be treated as a craft, I must acknowledge that, in
William Twining's words, this reflects a view which is "not just
quaint, but dubious and outdated." 6 In a tribute to Llewellyn,
Twining states that the ideals of craft and craftsmanship are "old-
fashioned, even quaint and mildly embarrassing."17 As one Japa-
nese commentator shrewdly observed, "Llewellyn's emphasis on
craftsmanship conjures up a nostalgic image of legal practice as a'
kind of tradition-bound cottage industry at a time when it was mov-
ing into an era of factory mass production." 18
Nevertheless, craft may be an ideal that is inspiring or con-
soling for those who are dissatisfied with their professional lives as
lawyers, those who find themselves skeptical or even cynical about
the possibility of living a meaningful life in the law. Especially for
those drawn to craft ideals in other areas of life, understanding the
craft values and virtues implicit in the practice of law may open a
door for understanding a way to conceptualize their professional life
in a way that will be similarly inspiring.
OUTLINE
Part I of this Article addresses the question: What is craft? It
first defines the term19 and then contrasts it with a number of other
ideas and ideals,20 commenting upon the link between craft and
16. Twining, supra note 14, at 150.
17. Id. at 148. Twining observes that the idea of craft is viewed as an "uncritical form of ro-
manticism." Id. at 150.
18. Id. at 148 (citing Takeo Hayakawa, Karl N. Llewellyn as a Lawman from Japan Sees
Him, 18 RUTGERs L. REv. 717, 732 (1964)).
19. See infra Part I.A.
20. See infra Part I.B.
[Vol. 54:22452250
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practical wisdom.2' Part II takes a closer look at what it means for a
social practice to be a craft, and addresses the question: Is law a
craft? Part II focuses on several defining attributes of craft, includ-
ing that crafts are made substantially by hand, 22 medium-specific,2
and defined both by their use24 of and by their relationship with the
past.25 Part II ends with a discussion of the importance of good
judgment in being a craftsperson, and in particular for the craft of
the law.26 Part III addresses the question: How does one become a
craftsperson? I discuss the role of rules and theory,2 the specter of
uncertainty, 28 how craft skills are learned and transmitted,2 and
the craftsperson's attitude towards money.30 In conclusion, I reflect
upon what we can learn about the practice of law from the study of
a variety of craft traditions.
My primary aim in this Article is to give voice to a varied
cast of master craftspersons from an assortment of well-established
craft traditions, such as pottery, carpentry, embroidery, bookbind-
ing, and quilt making, as well as spokesmen of activities that may
less frequently be thought of as crafts, such as angling and base-
ball. In listening to master craftsmen and teachers of these crafts-
some contemporary, some historic-we not only learn about these
crafts, but we begin to see how the insights and attitudes of these
craftsmen towards their crafts may have implications for the law
and, in particular, for adjudication.
As I read these accounts of craftspersons reflecting upon
their crafts, I feel competing emotions. On the one hand, I feel
hopeful that in coming to view their professional vocation as a craft,
lawyers and judges can come to share in the passion, care, and love
for their craft that these craftspersons have for their crafts. On the
other hand, I feel a sadness and concern, for viewing the law as a
craft truly does seem anachronistic, and I have considerable doubt
that there will be much change in our collective vision of the prac-
tice of law, which increasingly seems to be viewed as a business, as
opposed to a profession, much less a craft. Perhaps the most I can
hope for is a modest, subversive influence, that a few individuals
21. See infra Part I.C.
22. See infra Part IA.
23. See infra Part ll.B.
24. See infra Part II.C.
25. See infra Part ll.D.
26. See infra Part II.E.
27. See infra Part IM.A.
28. See infra Part HIL.B.
29. See infra Part 11.C.
30. See infra Part III.D.
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will find it worthwhile to conceive of their work as lawyers and
judges as a craft, and in so doing will find their professional lives
more meaningful and fulfilling than they otherwise would.
I. BEGINNING: WHAT IS CRAFT?
People seem to think carpentry is a big mystery. Smart as they are in their daily oc-
cupations, their brains brake when confronted with a carpentry problem. It doesn't
need to be that way.
-The Carpenter's Manifesto3'
A. Defining Craft
In its broadest sense craft refers to the creation of original objects through an art-
ist's disciplined manipulation of material. Historically craft was identified with
producing objects that were necessary for life.
-Paul J. Smith
32
The term "craft" has many meanings and connotations.33
Thus it is helpful to speak with some precision about what I mean
when I suggest that law is a craft, rather than an art, science, or
something else.
Black's Law Dictionary defines craft as "[a] trade or occupa-
tion of the sort requiring skill and training, particularly manual
skill combined with a knowledge of the principles of the art."3 4 Thus
craft combines both practical and theoretical knowledge. The Ox-
ford English Dictionary ("OED") notes that the word "craft" origi-
nally connoted "strength, power, might, force,"3 5 suggesting that a
craftsperson has an extraordinary degree of skill and ability with
respect to his or her craft. Craft is also defined by the OED as
meaning "[i]ntellectual power; skill; art."3 6 Related definitions in-
31. JEFFREY EHRLICH & MARC MANNHEIMER, THE CARPENTER'S MANIFESTO: A TOTAL
GUIDE THAT TAxES ALL THE MYSTERY OUT OF CARPENTRY FOR EVERYBODY 8 (1990).
32. PAUL J. SMITH, CRAFT TODAY: POETRY OF THE PHYSICAL 11 (1986).
33. Potter and teacher Seonaid Mairi Robertson notes that "[a]ny word like 'craft' used by
different groups of people in the overall senses in which they have encountered an aspect of
craftsmanship tends to become a vague, amorphous term of indefinite extent. It is necessary to
try to define the term craft in order to clarify these different meanings." SEONAID MAIRI
ROBERTSON, CRAFT AND CONTEMPORARY CULTURE 27 (1961) (emphasis omitted),
34. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 330 (5th ed. 1979). The Black's Law Dictionary definition also
includes the idea of a group of people in professional association ("Also the body of persons pursu-
ing such a calling; a guild."), as well as the related concepts of craftiness ('Guile, artful cunning,
trickiness."). Id.




elude, "[s]kill, skilfulness, art; ability in planning or performing,
ingenuity in constructing, dexterity."37 The OED also defines craft
as "[a] branch of skilled work ... [a]n art, trade or profession re-
quiring special skill and knowledge."3 8 The term "craft" is also used
to describe "[a] trade or profession as embodied in its practitioners
collectively; the members of a trade or handicraft as a body .... "39
Peter Dormer has defined "craft knowledge" as the kind of "knowl-
edge that is learned practically through experience and that is
demonstrated through practice."40
As used in this Article, the distinguishing characteristics of
craft are as follows:
" a craft is a socially situated practice combining both
practical and theoretical knowledge, and requiring both
skill and training;41
" tradition must be understood, valued, and fol-
lowed-although innovation is accepted, and even valued,
it is bounded;
• craft is a body of knowledge that is extensive and has
come down over generations, and yet cannot be reduced
to a catalogue or hierarchy of rules;42
* craft knowledge is often "tacit," 4s difficult to articulate,
and described under rubrics such as "know-how" and "ex-
perience";44
* expert craftsmen often practice their craft without con-




40. PETER DORMER, THE ART OF THE MAKER: SKILL AND ITS MEANING IN ART, CRAFT AND
DESIGN 7 (1994).
41. "Craft knowledge is harder to acquire through books than it is face to face with a skilled
practitioner and teacher." Id. at 11. Seonaid Mairi Robertson contrasts craft with "handwork,"
noting that "handwork" implies "the idea of manual dexterity, of manipulation, and usually of
hand or hand-and-eye training, almost as opposed to the training of the mind." ROBERTSON,
supra note 33, at 27. In contrast, craftsmanship involves the whole body and mind, "involved in
an expressive rhythm relating mind and material for a specific purpose in the world of men.7 Id.
42. See DORMER, supra note 40, at 11.
43. According to Peter Dormer, "Tacit knowledge is the preferred phrase for craft knowledge
among academics." Id. at 13.
44.
Craft knowledge is not easily described by language, and in many cases resists
a complete description. Writing about an action, talking about an action, and
reflecting upon the nature of an action are not the same thing as the action it-
self, nor do they provide much insight into how it feels to act and how it feels to
know for oneself how to act.
Id. at 11.
20011 2253
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" craftsmanship can be taught, but learning takes place
slowly, in apprenticeship ;46 and
* a commitment to a craft places certain constraints upon
the craftsperson, though those constraints may feel liber-
ating rather than constraining.
B. Contrasting Craft
In furthering our appreciation of what craft is, it is helpful to
contrast it with several other ideas and ideals, such as art, science,
mass production, craftiness, and hobby.
1. Art
Inspiration is the only factor that cannot be copied.
-Clement Greenberg
47
The separation of craft from art and design is one of the phenomena of late-
twentieth-century Western culture. The consequences of this split have been quite
startling. It has led to the separation of 'having ideas'from 'making objects. 'It has
also led to the idea that there exists some sort of mental attribute known as 'creativ-
ity' that precedes or can be divorced from a knowledge of how to make things. This
has led to art without craft.
-Peter Dormer 8
According to the OED, in earlier times, the term "craft" was
sometimes used synonymously with "art," although "they diverge in
their leading modern senses." 49 In the way I am using the term,
craft is distinct from art. Edward Lucie-Smith maintains that, at
45. "Craft knowledge is not something you think about if you are an expert in it: as an ex-
pert you do not think about the exercise of your craft. You do, however, think about extending
your expertise and about the goals to which you are applying it." Id.
46. "Craft knowledge is harder to acquire through books than it is face to face with a skilled
practitioner and teacher." Id. "The particular 'touch' of a violinist, pianist, draughtsman, sur-
geon, nurse or vet cannot be described, but it can be demonstrated and, to a degree, be imitated
or even learned wholly by someone else." Id. at 14.
47. Id. at 7 (quoting Clement Greenberg, After Abstract Expressionism, ART INT'L, 1962, at
24-32).
48. Peter Dormer, The Status of Craft, in THE CULTURE OF CRAFT: STATUS AND FUTURE 18,
18 (Peter Dormer ed., 1997).
49. 2 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DIcTIONARY 1128 (1978); see also D.M. Dooling, Introduction to
A WAY OF WORKING, at viii (D.M. Dooling ed., 1979) ('[i]n medieval society, painters and sculp.
tors as well as potters and weavers were members of craft guilds. A man was a carpenter, a
painter, or a stonemason; his work, his way of life, was central to his identity and recognized as
his means of centering and discovering himself. It was whole; it was his religion, his relinking
with his divine source."); Helen Rees, Patterns of Making: Thinking and Making in Industrial
Design, in THE CULTURE OF CRAFT: STATUS AND FUTURE 128 (Peter Dormer ed., 1997).
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least in Europe, from the Renaissance onwards, "[t]here was an in-
tellectual separation between the* idea of craft and that of fine art,
which eventually came to be regarded as superior."G0 Art is much
more likely to value innovation, originality, and creativity than will
craft, although each of these elements is present in craft.51 Art is
also often interested in shocking, educating, and challenging settled
understandings.5 2 Moreover, art is not concerned with the relation-
ship of form and function.53 The visual arts focus on how an object
looks, whereas crafts are also interested in how the objects feel to
the touch.54 Great art is often a radical departure from what has
gone before, and indeed, it is often only after the passage of a sig-
nificant amount of time that art is recognized, or evaluated, as be-
ing great. In contrast to art, craft is more rooted in and respectful of
tradition, and places less value upon repudiating the past.
Crafts often aspire to the status of art.55 Peter Dormer has
observed that "[c]onsidering the postwar urgency for self-expression
50. EDWARD LUCIE-SMITH, THE STORY OF CRAFT. THE CR AN'2S ROLE IN SOCErY 11
(1981). This development, Lucie-Smith maintains, "is one of the distinguishing marks of the
European Renaissance." Id.
51. See DORMER, supra note 40, at 7 ('In the West a high value is placed on individuality
and self-expression.... This emphasis on individuality has encouraged artists and studio crafts-
people to search for unique forms, images and approaches to art. There is almost a degree of
neurosis about being (and being seen to be) unique; about having something or being something
inimitable.").
52.
The commitment of the First Amendment, then, is to encourage vigorous public
debate, given that few, if any, ideas in society are settled. The NEA furthers
this goal because art often shocks or disturbs mainstream society. In short, the
government should fund art because artistic expression is speech that adds to
public debate. Conversely, a government program that funds only 'decent and
respectful' art will add nothing but surplusage to public debate; such a program
acts merely as an echo ....
Neil C. Patten, Note, The Politics of Art and the Irony of Politic" How the Supreme Court, Con-
gress, the NEA and Karen Finley Misunderstand Art and Law in National Endowment for the
Arts v. Finley, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 559, 592-93 (2000) (footnote omitted).
53. See infra Part II.C.2.a.
54. Howard Risatti, Metaphysical Implications of Function, Material, and Technique in
Craft, in SKILLED WORK: AMERICAN CRAFT IN THE RENWICK GALLERY 31, 40 (Janet Wilson ed.,
1998). Risatti explains:
[F]ine art students hone their abilities to capture optical sensations by looking
at things-the model, the still life, the landscape. Their chief concern is with
'seeing' the thing to be rendered. Although many students may use the same
model, each produces a different image because each sees the model from a dif-
ferent position in space. This would not be the case if the same model was used
to make a piece of furniture.
Id. at 41-42.
55.
The search for a 'fulfilling life' through practical activity has become a major
concern in the West this century. For example, the search is at the heart of the
sprawling arts and crafts movement where men and women have built their
lives around commercially obsolete technologies such as hand dyeing and weav-
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW [Vol. 54:2245
and individuality, it is possible to see why craft knowledge has be-
come disdained."56 When art is compared with craft, the comparison
usually involves a belittling of craft. 57 Still, not all craftspersons
wish to be viewed as artists, and some have expressed feelings of
despair at the prospect of their craft devolving into the "unfortu-
nate limbo of 'art.' "58 As the potter Carla Needleman explains,
"There is a common misconception that craft slides into art when
the object made is no longer useful for anything. The things I make
are useful, but if I don't use them, don't need to use them, does that
rob what I do of meaning?" 59
While some lawyers and judges liken their work to that of an
artist,60 others-such as Llewellyn and Kronman-are drawn to the
craft analogy. 61 According to William Twining, Karl Llewellyn ex-
plicitly saw the craftsperson as occupying a "middle brow position
between the technician and tradesman on the one hand and the sci-
entist, statesman, or artist on the other."6 2 Llewellyn's self-image of
ing, pottery, furniture making, glass blowing and the like. The 'fulfillment' ap-
pears to be dependent upon their having turned their craft into an art.
DORMER, supra note 40, at 13.
56. Id. at 7 (There is a view that craft knowledge, because it is communal (it has been cre-
ated by many people), conflicts with originality. The prejudice against craft tends to be crude:
craft, it is thought, is bound by rules, and it is assumed that rules necessarily conflict with free-
dom of thought, imagination, and expression.").
57. Peter Dormer identifies a number of prejudices about craft knowledge, and argues that
each of these prejudices is mistaken. These prejudices include: (i) "[]raft knowledge is merely
mechanical," (ii) "[c]raft knowledge can be learned as and when you need it," (iii) "[]raft knowl-
edge and 'having ideas' or 'being creative' are separate activities," (iv) "[c]raft knowledge is sepa-
rable from making aesthetic judgments," (v) "[c]raft knowledge is rule-based and rules conflict
with personal creativity," (vi) "[c]raft knowledge is about forming habits, and habits also conflict
with or inhibit creativity." Id. at 8. Although Dormer writes about the "plastic arts"-i.e., "paint-
ing, sculpture and studio craft whose content is substantially dependent on practical skill, and
whose intention is discovered through the process of making the object"-similar prejudices exist
with respect to the craft of the law. Id. at 7. John Ashbery hss suggested, "Somebody should tell
craftsmen right away that they are artists so they can stop worrying and we can go on enjoying
their work as art." Five Decades: American Craft Council, AM. CRAFT, Aug.-Sept. 1993, at 77, 90
(quoting John Ashbery (1970)).
58. CARLA NEEDLEMAN, THE WORK OF CRAFT: AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF CRAFTS AND
CRAFTSMANSHIP 25 (1979).
59. Id.
60. See generally Stewart G. Pollock, The Art of Judging, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 591 (1996).
While noting that the analogy between artists and judges, "as with any other analogy," at some
point "collapses," Justice Pollock of the New Jersey Supreme Court argues that "the analogy
provides a useful metaphor to illuminate the judicial process, particularly the work of state ap-
pellate judges." Id. at 592-93. Justice Pollock notes that "[jiudges, like artists, are products of
their time. Like judges, artists may follow the work of their predecessors. They also may reject
the past and anticipate the future." Id. at 596. Justice Pollock also maintains that "[g]reat judi-
cial opinions resemble 'high art,' and some are of museum quality." Id.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 7-15.
62. Twining, supra note 14, at 148.
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the lawyer, Twining notes, is as a "half-way artist."63 It may be that
aspiring to be an artist is inappropriate for a lawyer or judge, al-
though his work, if it lasts and becomes revered, may rise through
time to the status of art. Speaking of the status of craft, Rose Slivka
has observed: "Throughout their long history, crafts have produced
useful objects which are later considered fine art. Time has a way of
overwhelming the functional values of an object that outlives the
men who made and used it, with the power of its own objective
presence-that life-invested quality of being that transcends and
energizes. When this happens, such objects are forever honored for
their own sakes-they are art."6
2. Science
[lhf law be not a science, a university will best consult its own dignity in declining
to teach it.
-Christopher Columbus Langdell c3
Craft can also be distinguished from science. Law has often
aspired to the status of science-in the nineteenth-century sense of
"science as rational ordering based on observation."66 Pierre Schlag
notes that "[i]n the early 1800s, law was often viewed not so much
as a discipline, but as a kind of handicraft. 67 As law sought a place
in the curriculum of universities, it aspired to the status of science
as a way of legitimating its claim that it belonged in the univer-
sity.68 Thus, in the late nineteenth century, Harvard Law School
Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell advocated the view that the
law was only a legitimate subject of university study if it was a sci-
63. Id. (quoting KARL LLE\VELLYN, THE BRAMiBLE BUSH 126 (1930)). Twining maintains that
[t]he craftsman is neither a plumber nor Pericles; he is more than just a techni-
cian but only exceptionally aspires to greatness. The distinguishing mark of the
craftsman is pride in a job well-done for its own sake. Money and fame are sec-
ondary. Craftsmanship is more akin to a form of love.
Id. at 149.
64. Rose Slivka, The Persistent Object, in THE CRAF OF THE MODERN WORLD 12, 20 (Rose
Slivka ed., 1968).
65. Pierre Schlag, Law and Phrenology, 110 HARV. I REV. 877, 897 (1997) (quoting Chris-
topher Columbus Langdell, A Record of the Commemoration, November Fifth to Eighth, 1886, on
the Two Hundred and Fiftieth Anniversary of the Founding of Harvard College 85 (1887)).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 896. Schiag's interesting essay compares the efforts of phrenology and law to cast
themselves as forms of science.
68. See id. "Not only did universities have to be convinced that law was somehow an appro-
priate and reputable discipline worthy of study in its own right, but the profession of lawyers and
judges also had to be convinced that university training in law was helpful and necessary for
practice." Id.
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ence. "If it be not a science," Langdell asserted, "it is a species of
handicraft, and may best be learned by serving an apprenticeship to
one who practices it."69 Schlag notes that "Langdell was so con-
vinced that law was a science-not a craft-that, in what has be-
come an entrenched and pervasive practice, he favored hiring young
teachers who had little or no experience in the practice of law."70 In
describing law as a craft, Llewellyn was in large measure reacting
against the Langdellian conception of law as a science.
71
3. Mass Production
The evils of heartless and unloving production, under the grind of an unnecessary




Craft can also be distinguished from mass production or as-
sembly of prefabricated parts.73 While traditionally craft referred to
69. Id. at 897 (quoting Christopher Columbus Langdell, A Record of the Commemoration,
November Fifth to Eighth, 1886, on the Two Hundred and Fiftieth Anniversary of the Founding
of Harvard College 85 (1887)). Schlag notes that Langdell was "brought to the law school by a
chemist, President Eliot of Harvard University, who was already prepared to embrace" a concep-
tion of law as a science. Id.
70. Id.
71. See C.C. LANGDELL, SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1871); C.C.
LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 2d ed. 1880);
LLEWELLYN, supra note 8, at 38-45 (criticizing the "Formal Style" of adjudication and identifying
"Langdell's dazzling contract-construct [as] the American archetype of such a set of princi-
ples ...."). Langdell sought to make law scientific by borrowing the scientific method of careful
observation (e.g., of the cases); to employ inductive inferences from the observed particulars to
the general principles that "explain" them; and then to systematize the general principles into a
deductive system from which all the particulars (i.e., the decision in any case) can be decided.
This was meant to mirror the practice in the empirical sciences of observing particular instances;
inferring from those particulars the general law of nature that explains their occurrence; and
then testing and refining that law against subsequent particular experiences for its predictive
adequacy.
72. Edward S. Prior, Furniture and the Room, in ARTS AND CRAFTS ESSAYS: BY MEMBERS OF
THE ARTS AND CRAFTS EXHIBITION SOCIETY 261, 272 (William Morris ed., photo. reprint 1996)
(1893).
73. See id. Faulkner notes in his retrospective introduction, that the Arts and Crafts Move-
ment was a reaction "against the excesses of industrial capitalism." See Peter Faulkner, Intro.
duction to ARTS AND CRAFTS ESSAYS: BY MEMBERS OF THE ARTS AND CRAFTS EXHIBITION
SOCIETY, at v (William Morris ed., photo. reprint 1996) (1893).
The rapid and unplanned industrialization of Britain in the nineteenth century
had destroyed many traditional crafts and produced an unprecedented type of
society, with more and more workers passing long hours in grim factories,
working in harsh conditions to produce goods in greater profusion than ever be-
fore. But the quality of both the goods and the workers' lives was disturbing to
those not carried away ... by the excitement of this extraordinary transforma-
tion.
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everything made, whether utilitarian, ritual, or merely decorative,
with the industrial revolution "there arrived a separation between a
craft object and the thing made by a machine-an industrial prod-
uet."
7 4
Distinguishing mass production and craft does not imply an
"essential antagonism between the acceptance of the machine age
and acceptance of craftsmanship. "75 Mass production is a good
thing, and it is here to stay.76 Advantages of mass production in-
clude a decline in cost and an increase in uniformity of production.
77
But a move towards mass production makes it more difficult to sus-
tain craft traditions.78 The result of mass production "is a heteroge-
nous work force, no member of which much resembles the tradi-
tional craftsman. The importance of instilling traditional craft val-
ues in the work force therefore diminishes; so too the value of pro-
tracted training as under a system of apprenticeship."79 Viollet le
Id. Striking a similar note, potter and educator Seonaid Mairi Robertson observes that with
industrialization,
[i]n the excitement of new power, in the demands of the insatiable machines,
not only were human beings set to live and work in conditions of inhuman deg-
radation, but certain values were lost. The worst of the industrial cities of
Western Europe still struggle to rise above a century of slums, but new towns
and new types of factories are spreading fast. Material things can be knocked
down and replaced by better, but it is more difficult to recapture a squandered
virtue. There were lost to the great majority of people certain spiritual values
which were inherent in craftsmanship, in the responsibility of making good
things well for one's family or one's neighbour, and the deep inward content-
ment of their use.
ROBERTSON, supra note 33, at 15.
74. LUCIE-SMITH, supra note 50, at 11.
75. ROBERTSON, supra note 33, at 17.
76. Seonaid Mairi Robertson notes that "[t]here will be the personal choice for each of us at
some time between something mass-produced by a machine or something made by a craftsman,
and sometimes one will be more appropriate for us, sometimes the other." Id.
77. Id. In defending craft and craftsmanship, it is important to clarify that I am not calling
for a return to hand production of all goods and materials. In explaining why he should write
about, or teach, crafts in our day and age, potter and educator Seonaid Mairi Robertson begins
by noting
that this is no plea for a general return to hand-production. I believe that mass-
production by machines is the potential agent which will make possible a less-
ening of labour, and a duplication of things worth having-good houses, suffi-
cient clothing, better tools for agriculture, for water-conservation, better modes
of travel. These are not ends in themselves, but conditions of a good life, and in
getting them we dare not lose sight of what a good life is.
Id. at 16.
78. Seonaid Mairi Robertson notes that even as industrialization spreads, "(there will still
be the opportunity for the man who likes constructing or mending with his hands to work in that
way, and the choice for the exceptional individual to live by creative craftsmanship" Id. at 17.
79. Id. Judge Posner notes, "The workers are more like the different parts of a machine, or
the different cells of an organism, than they are like handicraftsmen, for they do not individually
produce an entire product" Richard A. Posner, The Material Basis of Jurisprudence, 69 IND. LJ.
1, 12 (1993).
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Duc, speaking of the goldsmith's work, laments that "[m]echanism
has destroyed the habit of intelligent personal effort on the part of
the worker, and his energies are now directed to the imitation of
the cold and arid regularity of the machine."80
In comparing the legal profession to medieval craft guilds,
Judge Richard Posner suggests that the legal profession is following
a path similar to the decline of medieval craft guilds, with an at-
tendant change from craft production to mass production: "Mass
production involves a change in the process of production from the
handcrafting of small quantities of individualized, high-quality
goods by highly trained specialists to the machine production of
large quantities of goods of average quality, often by unskilled
workers performing simple, repetitive operations under the direc-
tion of supervisors and ultimately by executives."81
As the legal profession becomes increasingly based upon a
model of mass production as opposed to craft, certain repercussions
should be expected. The French philosopher Simone Weil described
her experience working in a Renault car factory in 1936 as follows:
"In front of his machine, the worker has to annihilate his soul, his
thought, his feelings, and everything, for eight hours a day. If he is
irritated, or sad, or disgusted, he must swallow and completely
suppress his irritation, sadness, or disgust; they could slow down
his output."82 I have heard young associates describe their feelings
towards their work in almost identical terms, although most can
only dream of eight-hour workdays.
Judicial opinions, we might think, are the antithesis of mass
production, focused as they are upon the resolution of a unique and
discrete case or controversy. Judicial opinions are individual and
unique, and must be worked on carefully, one at a time. But, Judge
Posner warns, even the vaunted judicial opinion has become subject
to the pressures of mass production.83 Posner suggests that an evo-
lution has occurred in opinion writing, away from a craft ideal (to-
day represented by a "tiny and shrinking minority of old-fashioned
80. H. WILSON, SILVERWORK AND JEWELRY 5 (2d ed. 1912) (quoting VIOLLET LE DUC, ON
MEDIEVAL GOLD AND SILVER WORK).
81. Posner, supra note 79, at 12.
82. SIMONE WEIL, SEVENTY LETTERS 22 (Richard Rees trans., 1965).
83. Posner, supra note 79, at 29; see also Robert P. Smith, Jr., Explaining Judicial Lawgiv-
ers, 11 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 153, 161 (1983) C' 'In this go-go era of machine produced instant prod-
ucts, craftsmanship in all fields is fading. A religious-like calling seems required to stay at that
desk, to keep probing the texts, to keep seeking the words through which facts are perceived and
accounts rendered.' ") (quoting John D. Maguire, Address at Investiture at the District Court of
Appeal, First District, Tallahassee, Fla. (Aug. 1, 1975)).
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appellate judges who continue to write their own opinions") to a
mass production ideal ("[t]oday ...the vast majority of judicial
opinions at all appellate levels are drafted by law clerks, most of
whom are only a year or two out of law school," and the judge per-
forms a "supervisory" role). 84 This transformation, Posner main-
tains, has "enable[d] the judiciary to dispose of a vastly larger
number of cases with no marked (perhaps no) diminution of average
quality."8 5
4. Craftiness
[T]hat Crooked Wisdome, which is called CRAFT.
-Thomas Hobbesm
The term "craft" has a darker, more sinister side as well,
evidenced by such related terms as "crafty," "craftily," and "crafti-
ness."8 7 Craft may connote an "occult art," "magic," or a "skillful
contrivance, a device, artifice, or expedient.., a magical device; a
spell or enchantment."88 Other negative connotations apply to craft,
including "[s]kill or art applied to deceive or overreach; deceit,
guile, fraud, cunning" and "[a]n application of deceit; a trick, fraud,
artifice."8 9 On a related note, craftsmanship may be perverted by an
84. Posner, supra note 79, at 29.
85. Id.
86. THOMNS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN bk. I, at 48 (J.CA. Gaskin ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1996)
(1651).
87. The Oxford English Dictionary notes that "craft" is the second element in many com-
pounds, such as "handicraft" (which is close to what I mean by craft), "kingcraft," "priesteraft,"
"statecraft," "watercraft," and "witchcraft" (which are not). 2 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DIcTIONARY
1128-29 (1978).
88. Id.
89. Id. Law and lawyers are also sometimes characterized as being "crafty.," suggesting one
way that the skills of the craftsperson can be directed towards dark or sinister ends. See Paul
Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullifaction: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE
LJ. 677, 681 (1995) (encouraging jury nullification for the purpose of black self-help, and observ-
ing- "Americans seem reluctant to have an open conversation about the relationship between
race and crime. Lawmakers ignore the issue, judges run from it, and crafty defense lawyers
exploit it."); Ira H. Leesfield, Ex Parte Communications by Government Lauyers with Repre-
sented Parties, FLA. B.J., Dec. 1998, at 18, 20 (CCrafty lawyers are able to find loopholes in even
the most tightly worded statutes and holdings."); Tom H. Matheny, My Faith and My Law, 27
TEX. TECH L. REV. 1211, 1215 (1996) (nVhen I first started practicing law, practically all of the
other lawyers in the area warned me about one particular man. They said he was one of the best
lawyers in the State but that he was crafty, that he would not do the right thing, that he would
lie, that he would take advantage of you."). Concern about crafty lawyers is not merely of recent
vintage. See Jonathan Rose, Medieval Attitudes Toward the Legal Profession. The Past as Pro-
logue, 28 STETSON L. REV. 345, 352 n.31 (1998) (observing that lawyers engage "in unlawful
shifts and devises so cunningly contrived... in deceit of the King's Courts, as oftentimes the
Judges of the same were by such crafty and sinister shifts and practices invegled and beguiled
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obsession with techniques and strategies, what we sometimes call
"tricks of the trade." James Elkins notes that "[a]lthough these
strategies and tricks are contained in the notion of craftsman-
ship ... they are not the container itself-they are not craft."90
Llewellyn recognized the possibility that craft could degen-
erate into mere craftiness. "Crafty," Llewellyn observes, "reflects
abuse by the craftsman unless, as in negotiation or war, manoeu-
vers and even deception are part of the craft."91 William Twining
notes a certain ambivalence in Llewellyn's attitude toward crafti-
ness: "Llewellyn regularly proclaimed the importance of ideals and
ethics, the quest for beauty, and the quest for justice, but in his
course on advocacy he was not above teaching the tricks of the




Craft is also distinguishable from hobby. The OED defines a
hobby as "a favourite occupation or topic, pursued merely for the
amusement or interest that it affords, and which is compared to the
riding of a toy horse."93 A craftsperson, in contrast with a hobbyist,
displays a depth of commitment, perhaps even devotion, to his
craft. A hobbyist's commitment to his hobby is more likely to be re-
served for his leisure time, whereas a craftsperson's avocation may
be his vocation. 94 Crafts tend to take a long time to learn, and be-
coming proficient in a craft may take many years. Teachers of craft
discourage students from jumping from one craft to another before
(citing EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 212
(William S. Hein Co. 1986) (1642))); 1 AULUS GELLIUS, THE ATTIC NIGHTS 33 (John C. Rolfe
trans., 1927) (quoting Titus Castricius: "It is the orator's [or trial lawyer's] privilege to make
statements that are untrue, daring, crafty, deceptive and sophistical, provided they have some
semblance of truth and can by any artifice be made to insinuate themselves into the minds of the
persons who are to be influenced."). This connotation of craft is found, for example, in the Book of
Mark in the Bible, which describes those plotting to kill Jesus Christ as having "sought how they
might take him by craft, and put him to death." Mark 14:1 (King James).
90. James R. Elkins, Ethics: Professionalism, Craft, and Failure, 73 KY. L.J. 937, 965
(1985).
91. Twining, supra note 14, at 150 (citing Karl Llewellyn, Law in Our Society: A Horse-
sense Theory of the Institution of Law 505 (1950 ed., parts updated 1950-58) (unpublished course
materials, on file with the University of Chicago Law School)).
92. Id. at 149-50.
93. 5 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 317 (1978).
94. The Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary defines "hobby" as "a pursuit outside one's
regular occupation engaged in esp[ecially] for relaxation." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 551 (10th ed. 1996).
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developing a depth of skill, which may make it easier for the crafts-
person to learn the skills of a different craft.
C. Craft and Practical Wisdom
Crafts are a perilous sort of bridge between action and contemplation....
-Carla Needleman3
1. Aristotle's Distinction Between Making and Acting
A central distinction in Aristotle's practical philosophy is be-
tween practical wisdom, or phronesis, and craft, or techne.9 Practi-
cal wisdom and craft are each a subset of what Aristotle calls prac-
tical knowledge, or praktikos,97 and both stand in contrast to theo-
retical wisdom, or sophia.98 There is much that can be said about
95. NEEDLEMAN, supra note 58, at 33.
96. See ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, in A NEVARISTOTLE READER, atVL5 (J.L Ackrll
ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1987).
97. At times Aristotle uses the term praktikos broadly, meaning everything that is
"nontheoretical" At other times he restricts it to phronesis and refers to techne as "productive"
(poietike) knowledge. For a helpful introduction to the distinctions and relations between theory,
practical wisdom, and craft in Aristotle's thought, see JOSEPH DUNNE, BACK To THE ROUGH
GROUND: THRONESIS' AND 'TECHNE' IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY AND ARISTOTLE 237-63 (1993).
Sarah Broadie notes that for Aristotle, "as for Socrates and Plato, the craftsman is a favourite
paradigm of practical rationality. But what makes the carpenter a carpenter, as distinct from
someone who happens to get something right, is the former's knowledge of what he is doing and
why he takes each step." SARAH BROADIE, ETHICS WITH ARISTOTLE 181 (1991).
98. Sarah Broadie explains that for Aristotle, theoretical wisdom includes both scientific
understanding (episteme) and comprehension or intelligence (nous). BROADIE, supra note 97, at
187. Dunne observes, that following Plato, Aristotle used episteme not simply as a generic term
for knowledge, but in an honored sense denoting real knowledge as against mere opinion (doxa).
See DUNNE, supra note 97, at 237. "This logical ideal reached its highest fulfillment in philoso-
phical wisdom (sophia), which combined the power of apprehending first principles and causes
(nous) with the demonstrative power of tracing other knowledge back to them." Id. at 238. So
conceived, theoretical knowledge for Aristotle "was emphatically distinguished from any knowl-
edge which might have a practical import." Id. According to Dunne, Aristotle believed that
[t]hrough theory we do not acquire a knowledge-content which can then be ex-
ploited in the practical business of life; the spheres of theory and of practice are
incommensurable. Through theory, we are made receptive to being-which is
beyond time-and to an order and harmony which are quite beyond our own
powers of construction or interference. So little is it at the service of human
life, and so little is this of any consequence to Aristotle, that he can compla-
cently remark of the knowledge of Anaxagoras and Thales (preeminent sophoi)
that its object is "remarkable, admirable, difficult, and divine, but useless."
Id. (quoting ARISTOTLE, supra note 96, at VI.7.1141b6-7). Scientific knowledge, or episteme, in-
volves only universals (first principles which do not admit of being otherwise), whereas phronesis
is concerned with both universals and particulars. See ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, in THE BASIC
WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, at ll.1.993b19-23 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941); ARISTOTLE, supra note 96,
atVI.1.1139a6-14. The relationship between the pursuit of theory, on the one hand, and practical
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Aristotle's threefold distinction between phronesis, techne, and
sophia, most of which is beyond the scope of this Article. 99 It is
worth pausing briefly to consider this distinction, however, because
the law, and in particular adjudication, combines elements of both
practical wisdom and craft.
According to Aristotle, practical wisdom is concerned with
deliberation (bouleusis), choice (proairesis), and action (praxis); it is
a virtue of both intellect and character that enables its possessor to
make good choices with respect to practical matters. 100 Craft, in
contrast, is a virtue of one skilled in making or production (poi-
esis). 0 As Aristotle puts it in the Nicomachean Ethics, "The state
involving reason and concerned with action is different from the
state involving reason and concerned with production. Nor is one
included in the other; for action is not production and production is
not action."102 Moral virtue, but not craft, is a state that issues in
rational choice (a hexis prohairetike).103 Thus, Aristotle maintains,
while practical wisdom is a virtue of both intellect and character,
craft is a virtue of intellect only. 104
involvement in the affairs of one's community, is "one of the most notorious conundrums facing
Aristotelian scholars." DUNNE, supra note 97, at 240 (citing extensive literature). Dunno con.
cludes that it is beyond dispute that Aristotle placed "a higher value on the exercise of the theo.
retic faculty than on the exercise of phronesis." Id. at 241.
99. Among many interesting titles that address this topic, see, for example, J.L. ACKRILL,
ARISTOTLE THE PHILOSOPHER (1981); JONATHAN BARNES, ARISTOTLE (1982); BROADIE, supra note
97; DUNNE, supra note 97; W.F.R. HARDIE, ARISTOTLE'S ETHICAL THEORY (2d ed. 1980);
ANTHONY KENNY, THE ARISTOTELIAN ETHICS (1978); JONATHAN LEAR, ARISTOTLE: THE DESIRE
TO UNDERSTAND (1988); C.D.C. REEVE, PRACTICES OF REASON: ARISTOTLE'S NICOMACHEAN
ETHICS (1992); W.D. ROSS, ARISTOTLE (1966); NANCY SHERMAN, THE FABRIC OF CHARACTER:
ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF VIRTUE (1989); DAVID WIGGINS, Deliberation and Practical Reason, in
NEEDS, VALUES, TRUTH: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF VALUE 215, 215-37 (1987); J.L. Ackrill,
Aristotle on Eudaimonia, in ESSAYS ON ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS 15 (Am6lie Oksenberg Rorty ed.,
1980).
100. Book six of the Nicomachean Ethics is in large measure devoted to explaining the differ-
ence between the activity of craft and action governed by rational choice. For a helpful introduc-
tion to book six, see BROADIE, supra note 97, at 186-98. Aristotelian phronesis, according to
Dunne, involves praxis, and "has to do with the conduct of one's life and affairs primarily as a
citizen of the polis; it is activity which may leave no separately identifiable outcome behind it
and whose end, therefore, is realized in the very doing of the activity itself." DUNNE, supra note
97, at 244; see also id. at 275-79 (discussing role of virtue of character (aretai ethikai) and virtue
of intellect (aretai dianoetikaO in phronesis).
101. ARISTOTLE, supra note 96, at VI.5.1140b6-7; see also id. at III.3.1112b32-3, X.7.1177b2-
4, 12-18. For Aristotle, techne is concerned with production (poiesis), and involves "making or
fabrication; it is activity which is designed to bring about, and which terminates in, a product or
outcome that is separable from it and provides it with its end or telos." DUNNE, supra note 97, at
244.
102. ARISTOTLE, supra note 96, at VI.4.1140al-5.
103. See BROADIE, supra note 97, at 78-90, 181.
104. For my assessment of this assertion, see infra Part I.C.3.
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Action and making are further distinguishable according to
Aristotle, because "while making has an end other than itself, ac-
tion cannot, for good action (eupraxia) itself is its end."10 5 Aristotle
also observes that "[a] craft is not concerned with things that are or
come to be by necessity; or with things that are by nature, since
these things have their origin in themselves."1 06
a. Phronesis
Phronesis involves both rational choice and the process of re-
flective deliberation by which a rational choice is formed. Practical
wisdom is also a primary virtue of good citizenship, 107 and is par-
105. ARISTOTLE, supra note 96, at VI.5.114Ob6-7. Dunne argues that phronesis, unlike
techne, does not fit readily within the means-end framework familiar in practical reasoning,
because the agent is
invested in his action more completely than the producer is in his product.
Whereas the latter can stand outside his materials and allow the productive
process to be shaped by the impersonal form which he has objectively conceived,
the agent on the other hand is constituted through the actions which disclose
him both to others and to himself as the person that he is. He can never possess
an idea of himself in the way that the craftsman possesses the form of his prod-
uct; rather than his having any definite 'what' as blueprint for his actions or
his life, he becomes and discovers 'who' he is through these actions.
DUNNE, supra note 97, at 263. Broadie makes a similar point: "The defining end of medicine [a
paradigmatic Aristotelian craft] is health, and for every recognised craft the defining end is some
departmental good. Now so far as they operate as physicians, the good and the inferior physician
aim at the one end, health, but differ in their effectiveness." BROADIE, supra note 97, at 192. In
contrast, the person of practical wisdom, as well as a wicked person, are both deliberators. The
difference between the wicked man and the man of practical wisdom is not that the wicked man
is "less effective in deliberation or action, but that he has a different aim, and a wrong one." Id.
This distinction underlies the importance of moral virtue for the exercise of practical wisdom,
because according to Aristotle, whether the aim is good or bad depends on the agent's moral
qualities. See ARISTOTLE, Eudemian Ethics, in MICHAEL WOODS, ARISrOTLE'S EUDEIAN ETHICS
I, H AND VII, at II.11.1227b20-1228a2 (1982); ARISTOTLE, supra note 96, at VI.12.1144a8,
VI.13.1145a5-6. Aristotle states bluntly: "[Moral] virtue makes the aim right." ARISTOTLE, supra
note 96, at VI.12.1144a8. For another discussion of the distinction between instrumental (craft)
and intrinsic (praxis) goods in Aristotle's thought, see ROGER J. SULLIVAN, MORALITY AND THE
GOOD LIFE: A COMMENTARY ON ARISTOTLE'S NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 50-54 (1977).
106. ARISTOTLE, supra note 96, at VI.4.1140a14-15.
107. Id. at bk. VI; see also Steven J. Heyman, Aristotle on Political Justice, 77 IOWA L REV.
851, 862-63 (1992). Aristotle's retrograde views regarding sex and race are evident in his discus-
sion of good citizenship. Kronman explains that Aristotle thought some human beings are
unqualified for participation in political affairs on account of their age or sex,
and others-whom he called natural slaves-because of their native incapacity
for self-government. In fact Aristotle ascribed the capacity for citizenship to
only one small group of human beings: the adult male heads of households. All
others, he felt, were incapable of the self-rule that politics implies and so had to
be ruled despotically, outside the realm of politics, by others.
KRONMAN, supra note 3, at 37. Kronman notes that we have every reason to reject Aristotle's
"biological elitism," because "there is no reason to believe that men are any more capable of self-
rule than women" Id. at 42. But, Kronman notes, this still leaves Aristotle's "character-based
elitism" in place. See id. "[Aristotle] also assumed, more reasonably, that a person's capacity for
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ticularly important in a legal context. 108 The link between good citi-
zenship, practical wisdom, and the law was even stronger in the
Greek city-state than in our constitutional democracy, since citizens
participated as judges, and there was no distinction in Greek law
between judges and juries. 0 9 In carrying out their duties as judges,
citizens were performing one of their paradigmatic duties.
Another important characteristic of practical wisdom is that
it is not primarily concerned with rules." 0 In this sense, practical
wisdom is antifoundationalist. "I Practical reason does not propose
to provide an axiom system for making choices or deciding cases." 2
Practical wisdom may also involve difficult deliberative questions
that require mediation between values which may place very differ-
ent claims upon our allegiances, perhaps even values that are inc-
ommensurable." 3 Nevertheless, practical wisdom is deeply con-
cerned with reason-giving. Aristotle discusses at length the impor-
tance of deliberation in practical reason and choice: "We enlist
partners in deliberation on large issues when we distrust our own
ability to discern [the right answer]."" 4 Richard Posner has empha-
sized the role of reasonableness, common sense, and coherence in
self-rule depends on the character traits that he or she possesses, traits some possess to a greater
degree or in a more developed form than others." Id.; see also Brett Scharffs, The Role of Humil.
ity in Exercising Practical Wisdom, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 127, 137-38 n.27 (1998) (surveying
literature about Aristotle's attitudes towards women and minorities).
108. See generally KRONMAN, supra note 3, at 109-25; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS
OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990); Steven J. Burton, Law as Practical Reason, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 747
(1989); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Rea.
soning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 353 (1990); Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason:
Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533 (1992) (comparing practical
reason and formalism); Brian Leiter, Heidegger and the Theory of Adjudication, 106 YALE L.J.
253 (1996); Meyer, supra note 7, at 647.
109. See GEORGE A. KENNEDY, ARISTOTLE ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE, at
vii-ix (George A. Kennedy trans., 1991); GEORGE A. KENNEDY, THE ART OF PERSUASION IN
GREECE 27-28 (1963).
110. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 96, at VI.8.1142a23-30, VI.11.1143a26-1143b16; see also
LEAR, supra note 99, at 171 (observing that Aristotelian practical wisdom is not a set of rules);
WIGGINS, supra note 99, at 215-37.
111. See WIGGINS, supra note 99, at 234-36; see also Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 108, at
321; Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567 (1985);
Leiter, supra note 108, at 253; Meyer, supra note 7, at 647.
112. See WIGGINS, supra note 99, at 234-36; see also Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 108, at
321; Kronman, supra note 111; Leiter, supra note 108, at 253; Meyer, supra note 7, at 647.
113. See, e.g., INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON (Ruth
Chang ed., 1997); Brett G. Scharffs, Adjudication and the Problems of Incommensurability, 42
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1367 (2001); Symposium, Law and Incommensurability, 146 U. PA. L. REV.
1169 (1998) (collecting eighteen articles and comments about the problems of incommensurabil-
ity).
114. ARISTOTLE, supra note 96, at III.3.1112b10-12.
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his description of adjudication as involving practical reason.115 A
generation earlier, Karl Llewellyn emphasized the importance of
reckonability or predictability in the law. 16
b. Techne
Aristotle defines craft, or techne, as a "reasoned state of ca-
pacity to make."117 The efficient cause of a craft is its maker; the
material (hule), such as the stone from which a sculpture is carved
or the wood from which a house is built, "gives the maker some-
thing to work on and gives the product the solidity and durability to
exist as an artefact in the world '; the form (eidos), the idea of plan
held by the maker, is "realized in the material and gives the fin-
ished product its specific character"; and the end (telos) of the mak-
ing, its purpose, "may be looked on either as the realized form itself
or, beyond that, as the use it serves in people's lives."1 8 Thus, a
craftsperson's skill can be evaluated according to his or her ability
to realize purposes by taking ideas and transforming them into arti-
facts through the skillful use of the appropriate materials. Accord-
ing to Aristotle, being a skilled craftsman involves the habitual
ability (dunamis) of the maker to produce reliably the desired prod-
ucts. At times it appears that Aristotle treats techne as a subordi-
nate concept to phronesis-for example, when Aristotle suggests
that one cannot exercise practical wisdom without having a suffi-
cient level of technical competence. Seen in this way, techne is a
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the exercise of phrone-
sis." 9
115. See generally RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY
(1999); POSNER, supra note 108.
116. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 8, at 200-12 (discussing "reckonability" of result and situa-
tion sense).
117. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 96, at bk. VI. Dunne notes that techne "is thus quite straight-
forwardly linked to making (poiesis), i.e., the generation of'things whose source (arche) is in the
producer and not in the product.' " DUNNE, supra note 97, at 249. Thus, objects produced by
craftsmen are distinguishable from natural things (phusika), which have the source of their
generation in themselves, and from necessary things, the objects of sophia, which are ungener-
ated. See id.
118. Id.
119. ARISTOTLE, supra note 96, at VI. 12.1144a28-30.
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c. Commonalities
At times Aristotle draws a strong distinction between
phronesis and techne,120 but at other times he lumps the two con-
cepts together, often using craft examples to elucidate practical
wisdom. 121 It is beyond dispute that Aristotle saw certain important
similarities between craft and practical wisdom. For example, the
doctrine of the mean was relevant to his understandings of both
craft and practical wisdom. With respect to craft, Aristotle observes
that "people regularly comment on well-made products that nothing
could be added or subtracted, since they assume that excess or defi-
ciency ruins a good [result] while the mean preserves it."122 The
idea of the mean is also important in Aristotle's analysis of virtue
and practical wisdom. 23 It also appears that rules play a similar
role in craft and practical wisdom; the craftsperson seeks to "dis-
cover rules to be followed by the more mechanical exercise of craft,"
and the person of practical wisdom seeks to "articulate substantial
conceptions of the good of man, and such a conception, once devel-
oped, might indeed serve as a standard to guide behaviour, even if
not a rule to be applied mechanically."'124 Nevertheless, "even if
crafts have rules, in general they also involve much more than
120. For example, Aristotle says, "Making and acting are different... so that the reasoned
state of capacity to act [i.e., phronesis] is different from the reasoned state of capacity to make
[i.e., techne]." Id. at VI.4.1140a2-5. "Phronesis cannot be... techne... because action and mak-
ing are different kinds of thing." Id. at VI.5.1140bl-4. Dunne summarizes Aristotle's distinction
between techne and phronesis as follows:
Techne provides the kind of knowledge possessed by an expert in one of the spe-
cialized crafts, a person who understands the principles (logoi, aitiai) underly-
ing the production of an object or state of affairs, e.g., a house, a table, a safe
journey, or a state of being healthy. Phronesis, on the other hand, characterizes
a person who knows how to live well (eu zen). It is acquired and deployed not in
the making of any product separate from oneself but rather in one's actions
with one's fellows. It is personal knowledge in that, in the living of one's life, it
characterizes and expresses the kind of person that one is.
DUNNE, supra note 97, at 244.
121. Thus in book six of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle's primary account of practical wis-
dom, "we find that when Aristotle is analyzing ethical reasoning, the only actual example he
gives is medical-and therefore frankly technical." DUNNE, supra note 97, at 246. Dunne queries:
The fact that Aristotle not only continually and quite casually invokes the
model of techne in his discourse about the virtues but also shuns the opportu-
nity to introduce phronesis on the one occasion in the early books of the [Nice-
machean Ethics] when he is careful to reject techne as an appropriate model in
the ethical sphere raises the question of just how significant or well-founded
the distinction between techne and phronesis was in his thought.
Id. at 247.
122. ARISTOTLE, supra note 96, at II.6.1106b7-16.
123. See id. at 1.13.1102b28-1103al, II.6.1107al-2, III.12.1119b15-18, VI.1.1138b21-23.
124. BROADIE, supra note 97, at 204.
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rules .... "125 Practical wisdom, like craft, cannot be reduced to a
system of rules. Perhaps most importantly, and on a related note,
both craft and practical wisdom have a strong experiential compo-
nent. The expert, whether craftsperson or phronimos, is not bound
up by rules, but rather develops a feel for what needs to be done in
a given situation. It is not so much that rules are irrelevant to his
endeavours, but his work and activity cannot be reduced to or ex-
plained by an appeal to rules. Through long practice and experi-
ence, the craftsperson, like the person of practical wisdom, develops
a feel for how to respond to situations, each of which is unique and
different, but each of which reflects patterns found in earlier ex-
periences.12
6
The distinction between ends and means is also important in
Aristotle's discussion of both practical wisdom and craft. Aristotle
observes that in crafts "[t]he subject of investigation is sometimes
the instruments, sometimes the use of them; and similarly in the
other cases-sometimes the means, sometimes the mode of using it
or the means of bringing it about."'127 Aristotle's statement that
practical reason is sometimes about means has been widely misin-
terpreted as a claim that practical reasoning is limited to a consid-
eration of means, rather than of ends (which it is argued, are de-
termined arationally or irrationally).'2
2. Status of the Craftsperson
In suggesting that law is craft, an important qualification
must be made about the status of craft and craftsmen for Aristotle
and in ancient Greek thought in general. There is a deep ambiva-
lence in the work of Aristotle and Plato-perhaps reflective of a ten-
sion existing in Greek society as a whole-between, on the one
hand, admiration for the work and skill of the craftsperson, but on
125. Id. at 203. Broadie elaborates: "Some crafts and skills are virtually mechanical once ac-
quired (e.g., spelling ... ), but others demand ingenuity and intelligence for the effective applica-
tion of their rules. And some skills ... seem to depend on no rules at all." Id.
126. See DUNNE, supra note 97, at 275-314 (discussing phronesis as a form of experience).
127. ARISTOTLE, supra note 96, at III.3.1112b27-30.
128. Aristotle states: "Again, the function of man is achieved only in accordance with practi-
cal wisdom as well as with moral excellence; for excellence makes the aim right, and practical
wisdom the things leading to it." Id. at VI.12.1144a6-8. David Wiggins persuasively refutes the
view that this passage reflects Aristotle's position that reason pertains to means only. See
WIGGINS, supra note 99; cf. LEAR, supra note 99, at 173-74 (suggesting that Aristotle's position
can be reconciled because "[t]he same action can be viewed both as a means and as an end").
2001] 2269
VANDERBILTLAWREVIEW
the other, contempt for the craftsperson as a social inferior. 129 One
bids for the services of craftspersons, but would never associate
with them. One admires their knowledge and skill, but one some-
how does not admire them as people. This is not to say there are no
positive references to craft and craftsmen in the work of Plato and
Aristotle. For example, the creator of the world in Plato's Timaeus
is a "Demiurge," or divine craftsman, who "order[s] and arrange[s]
the physical world and bring[s] it as far as possible into conformity
with the best and most rational pattern."'180 Plato also analogizes
the exercise and development of virtue as a craft, 131 and there are
favorable references to craft in The Republic. 3 2 Nevertheless, in the
Phaedrus, the craftsman ranks seventh on the scale of reincarnated
souls. 133 For Aristotle, too, craftsmanship is an inferior virtue to
practical wisdom. As Reeve puts it, for Aristotle, "craft-knowledge
and phronesis are not simply separate endeavours having nothing
to do with one another; craft knowledge is subordinate to phrone-
Si8."134
The status of craftsmen is complicated by two additional fac-
tors. First, most craftsmen in Athens were foreigners, and as we
might expect, they were viewed as somehow inferior. Second, while
professing to be a democracy, Athens was basically an aristocratic
society; people that worked for a living and got their hands dirty
were snubbed by the wealthy elite who lived free from manual la-
129. I wish to acknowledge Dr. Daniel Graham from the Brigham Young University Philoso-
phy Department for his assistance in understanding the nature and status of craft in both the
writings of Plato and Aristotle and in Greek society at large.
130. Renford Bambrough, Demiurge, in 2 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 337 (Paul Ed-
wards ed., 1967).
131. See generally RICHARD D. PARRY, PLATO'S CRAFT OF JUSTICE (1996) (arguing that be.
coming a good person means becoming a craftsman of virtue); TERENCE IRWIN, PLATO'S MORAL
THEORY (1977). But see DAVID ROOCHNIK, OF ART AND WISDOM: PLATO'S UNDERSTANDING OF
TECHNE (1996) (critiquing this view). According to Parry,
[T]he analogy between craft and virtue [is] the key to understanding what Plato
was trying to tell us. The moral life was, just as Socrates had said, a kind of
craft performance. The craftsman of the moral life knows the materials with
which he works; he knows how to put these materials together so that the re-
sult-his life-is not only useful but even elegant. Such a life is happy-
prosperous, fortunate, flourishing-because it is the conscious construct of
someone with a craftlike knowledge.
PARRY, supra, at 1.
132. See PLATO, The Republic, in PLATO: THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES bk. I, at 340d & bk. II,
at 370d (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., Princeton Univ. Press 1985).
133. See PLATO, Phaedrus, in PLATO: THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES 248a-d (Edith Hamilton &
Huntington Cairns eds., Princeton Univ. Press 1985). As we might expect, the philosopher is
ranked highest, but the craftsman ranks only above the sophist and tyrant whom Plato holds in
the greatest of contempt.
134. ARISTOTLE, supra note 96, at VI.2.1139a35-b3, quoted in REEVE, supra note 99, at 75.
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bor. The mixed feelings towards craft and craftsmanship in Greek
society presages the ambivalence that is often expressed in contem-
porary analyses of craft, and in particular comparisons of craft with
loftier ideals. In many ways, craft continues to be the ugly stepsis-
ter of practical wisdom, theory, and art. 135
3. The Judicial Craft
One of my primary claims is that being a good lawyer, and in
particular a good judge, requires that one be both a person of prac-
tical wisdom and a craftsperson. 136 The most obvious or straight-
forward way to defend such a claim, it might seem, is to bifurcate,
on the one hand, the judge's deliberation, choice, and action in de-
ciding a case (and identifying that with practical wisdom), and on
the other hand, her writing an opinion to explain and justify that
choice (and identifying the artifact of the judicial opinion with
craft). While such a division gets it partly right, it is at the very
least an oversimplification, because judges do not make decisions
divorced from the reasons underlying them, and the opinion is often
written tentatively, before a final decision has been reached. The
dialectic between practical wisdom and craft occurs reciprocally
throughout the process of deciding a case and writing an opinion
justifying the outcome. For example, an appellate judge reads the
written briefs submitted by contending parties (which might be
viewed as the craft artifacts of the attorney advocates, but which
have as their primary purpose convincing the judge how she should
choose and act), prepares for and engages in oral arguments and
conference deliberations with other judges, and engages in a proc-
ess of drafting, editing, and building a consensus around an opinion
that will garner support of a majority of the judges on a panel. Each
step along the way involves both practical wisdom and craft.
There is an additional reason why both practical reason and
craft are necessary traits or dispositions of the good judge, as well
as others involved with the law. Although Aristotle was not entirely
correct in maintaining that craftsmanship does not involve habits of
135. This is not to say that craft and craftsmanship are without their defenders. The Ameri-
can Craft Council (the ACC) is a national, nonprofit educational organization with a self-
described mission of "fostering an environment in which craft is understood and valued." The
Council, American Craft Council Online, at http://www.craftcouncil.org.
136. I argue for the centrality of practical wisdom in Scharffs, supra note 107, at 135-48. This
Article makes the second half of the argument.
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character, but only intellectual dispositions, 137 there is a kernel of
truth in Aristotle's claim. Craftsmanship involves dispositions such
as patience, a love of deliberation, care in the use of materials and
tools, and a respectful attitude towards the past, which can accu-
rately be characterized as virtues of character. 1 8 But in spite of
this, there is a sense in which craftsmanship is an amoral ideal.139
Craft skills and craft dispositions can be used in the furtherance of
worthwhile as well as objectionable ends. 140 Practical wisdom, in
contrast, depends explicitly and categorically upon virtue of charac-
ter.141 Practical wisdom helps ensure that the craftsperson's ends
will be right. This will be of particular importance when lawyers act
as advocates, in which case they have an obligation to weigh the
"worth of the ends to which they bend their strength."142
137. Compare Aristotle's discussion of craft, see, e.g., ARISTOTLE, supra note 96, at
VI.4.1140al-22, VI.6.1141a9-16, with his discussion of practical wisdom, see, e.g., id. at
VI.2.1139a21-35, VI.13.1144b14-1145a6, VI.8.1178a16-25.
138. See infra Part II.A.2.a (discussing patience), Part II.E.1 (discussing deliberation), Part
II.B (discussing materials and tools), Part II.D (discussing a craftsperson's attitude towards the
past).
139. For example, Rob Atkinson, in a commentary on John Barth's novel, The Floating Op.
era, notes that the novers lawyer-protagonist is "quite clearly indifferent to justice: 'I don't know
what you mean, sir, when you speak of justice.' For many real lawyers, delight in craft seems a
substitute for meaningful participation in the production of justice." Rob Atkinson, Nihilism
Need Not Apply: Law and Literature in Barth's The Floating Opera, 32 ARIz. ST. L.J. 747, 770
(2000). The pursuit of justice and craft are not "inevitable correlates; instead, they turn to craft
when they despair of justice." Id. Atkinson notes that Robert Gordon's study of elite Now York
lawyers at the turn of the twentieth century found evidence of this. Id. "According to Gordon, a
common recourse for lawyers disturbed by the divorce of their work from substantive justice was
to retreat into craft values. There they could take uncomfortable refuge in technique as they saw
the public harm their work on behalf of the wealthy wrought." Id. (citing Robert Gordon, The
Ideal and the Actual in the Law: Fantasies and Practices of New York Lawyers, 1870-1970, in
THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA (G. Gawald ed., 1984)); see also
Robert E. Scott, The Lawyer as Public Citizen, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 733, 737 (2000) ("Popular mo-
rality... views the lawyer's craft-oriented and client-oriented perspective as an abandonment of
the lawyer's duty to justice. But the popular view is simplistic. It fails to recognize the unpleas-
ant reality that our society is not neatly ordered by a spontaneous and coherent system of values.
Ours is a wildly pluralistic culture in which individuals and groups struggle to achieve recogni-
tion for their private perspectives. As lawyers, we have no answers to these larger social con-
flicts, rather we can only speak for specific sides of these struggles.").
140. See, e.g., John 0. Calmore, Close Encounters of the Racial Kind: Pedagogical Reflections
and Seminar Conversations, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 903, 909 (1997) (criticizing traditional view of
lawyers as "craft-oriented, amoral technicians... who are equally adept at arguing both sides" of
a legal dispute); Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3, 21-23 (1951-52)
(embracing detached view of advocacy as a game or craft); Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's
Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
613, 614-15 (justifying the amoral role of lawyers).
141. See supra Part I.C.l.a.
142. See Leon S. Lipson, Yale Law School Commencement Address (1979), in YALE L. REP.,
Fall 1979, at 3, 4.
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A commitment to craftsmanship does not imply that one will
be a conservative or a liberal, either politically or in one's legal or
judicial philosophy. In fact, craftsmanship is not an ideal likely to
appeal to either extreme of the ideological spectrum. A conservative
critic might object that craftsmanship is too free-wheeling and un-
predictable. 14 After all, the craftsperson understands herself to be
involved in a creative activity, and advocates of a conservative judi-
cial approach wish to contrast their philosophy, which they style
"interpreting the law," with a liberal approach, which they style
"creating law."144 A conservative might object that Llewellyn was a
legal realist, and his late life emphasis on craftsmanship was just
another manifestation of the realist tendency to believe that what
the law is depends exclusively upon what the judge happens to say
it is. An advocate of a liberal judicial approach might likewise be
critical of the ideal of craftsmanship because of the limits it places
upon creativity and the deference it gives to the past. Liberal critics
of Llewellyn, for example, found his emphasis on craft near the end
of his life as an abandonment or retreat from his full-bodied real-
ism."4
Not only is such criticism of the craft ideal by both liberals
and conservatives to be expected, it is, to my mind, evidence of the
need for lawyers and judges to embrace the mores and values of
craftsmanship. Craftsmanship, as I will argue, involves certain dis-
positions and attitudes towards one's work, as well as certain skills
and capabilities. But it does not commit one to a particular ideo-
logical or jurisprudential theory. Approaching one's work with the
craft ideal as an animating aspiration does not make one a liberal
or a conservative; rather, it will incline one to be a different kind of
liberal or a different kind of conservative. For example, the conser-
143. See, e.g., Timothy L. Alger, Comment, Promises Not to Be Kept: The Illusory Newsgath-
erer's Privilege in California, 25 Loy. L.A. L REV. 155, 224 (1991) CThe great variety of state
shield laws and the absence of a federal statutory privilege have caused the nation's courts to
craft an assortment of bewildering and unpredictable balancing tests."); Recent Cases, 112 HARV.
L. REV. 731, 736 (1999) ("The Sixth Circuit crafted an opinion unconstrained by the Supreme
Coures 'cardinal principle or any other standard of statutory interpretation.).
144. See, e.g., Edwin Meese III, Address Before the D.C. Chapter of the Federalist Society
Lawyers Division, in THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRiTTEN CONSTITUTION 31, 38-40
(1986).
145. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 14, at 249-50 (discussing LUewellyn's retreat "from the
critical tradition of Realism" to a form of conservatism); Charles E. Clark & David M. Trubek.
The Creative Role of the Judge: Restraint and Freedom in the Common Law Tradition, 71 YALE
L.J. 255, 262-63 (1961); of. Twining, supra note 14, at 124 ("Llewellyn's interest in method ...
[and his] fascination [ ] with 'how' questions was a constant theme throughout his life and...




vative judicial craftsperson will be less likely to oversimplify and
misrepresent the complexities and ambiguities involved in judging.
On the other hand, the liberal judicial craftsperson will be less in-
clined to replace the collective wisdom of precedent and history
with his own vision of the right or good. Thus, in a Burkean sense
of the term, the craft ideal will be conservative in that the past
cannot be ignored and does (or should) constitute an ineliminable
constraint on future decision. In this respect-from the concept of
constitutionalism, to the doctrine of precedent--law is ineluctably
conservative.
II. THE CHARACTER AND CHARACTERISTICS OF CRAFT:
Is LAW A CRAFT?
It is not necessary, inevitable, or mandated by reason that
we view our professional life as lawyers as a kind of craft. But, I
believe, we will stand a better chance of finding meaning and ful-
fillment in our professional lives as lawyers if we view ourselves as
participants in a craft tradition, and if we seek to cultivate, de-
velop, and exhibit the attitudes and virtues of a craftsperson.
If we are to come to view the work of a lawyer as a craft, it is
unlikely to be as a result of an analytical argument that is suffi-
ciently convincing. Rather, it is likely to come from a moment of
recognition or insight, based upon a familiarity with other crafts
and their traditions. When we become familiar with actual craft
traditions and what it means to be a craftsperson within those tra-
ditions, when we examine craftsmen's attitudes toward their work,
when we consider the materials and tools and the way they are
used by workers skilled in their craft, when we consider the role of
rules and theory in particular crafts, and when we reflect upon the
craft virtues characteristic of master craftsmen-it is in doing these
things that we may have an experience, perhaps somewhat akin to
a conversion experience, inspiring us to see our work and our pro-
fessional lives in a new way.
There is at least some evidence that lawyers and judges view
their work as a kind of craft. For example, a study of the Second,
Fifth, and District of Columbia Circuit Courts of Appeal concluded
that the professional standing of judges is based in large part on
craft notions, including thorough preparation for oral arguments
and the production of intellectually satisfying opinions. 146 Paul E.
146. See generally J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL
JUDICIAL SYSTEM: A STUDY OF THE SECOND, FIFTH, AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUITS (1981).
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McGreal has argued that when the U.S. Constitution was drafted
and ratified, the Framers envisioned a craft role for judges: "Fed-
eral judges were to be learned in the law, chosen for their knowl-
edge of substantive law, their skill in applying legal method, and
their personal integrity. Integrity was the ability to subordinate
personal, selfish interests (the causes of faction) to the dictates of
judicial craft."147 In a 1921 review of Benjamin N. Cardozo's book,
The Nature of the Judicial Process, Learned Hand states flatly that
"the good judge is an artist, perhaps most like a chef. Into the com-
position of his dishes he adds so much of this or that element as will
blend the whole into a compound, delectable or at any rate tolerable
to the palates of his guests. The test of his success is the measure in
which his craftsman's skill meets with general acceptance."'148 It is
probably less frequent that lawyers, certainly those practicing in a
traditional law firm, view themselves as craftspersons. 149
When we examine thriving craft traditions from the inside,
seeking sympathetically to understand the craftsperson's attitudes
towards his own work, we begin to identify some common character-
istics of craftsmen. These traits or characteristics are imperfectly
realized in the lives of individual craftspersons. As ideals, they be-
come points of striving, rather than points of description that will
be accurate across-the-board representations of groups of people or
even particular individuals. Nevertheless, in examining a broad
array of craft traditions, we find a number of common elements.
What are the particular features of the lawyer or judge that
resemble those of the craftsperson in other crafts? What is distinc-
tive about being a craftsperson? Bruce Metcalf has argued that
craft is defined by four simultaneous identities. Each of these ele-
ments is also characteristic of the craft of adjudication, as well as of
the broader work of lawyers. "First, [a craft] must be made substan-
147. Paul E. McGreal, Ambition's Playground, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1107, 1173 (2000). This
is seen, McGreal argues, in Hamilton's comparison of legislators, who will be mere creatures of
political will, with judges, who will be guided by judgment. Id.
148. Learned Hand, The Nature of the Judicial Process, by Benjamin N. Cardozo, 35 HARV.
L. REV. 479, 479 (1921) (book review).
149. But see KRONIAN, supra note 3, at 209-25; LLEVELLYN, supra note 8, at 213-35; Mary
A. McLaughlin, Beyond the Caricature, The Benefits and Challenges of Large.Firm Practice, 52
VAND. L. REV. 1003, 1009 (1999) ("To this day, I advise young lawyers not to go right into a
prosecutor's office-even if they could get the job-but instead to apprentice at a big firm. One
does not know how to be a lawyer when one gets out of law school I believe that an apprentice-
ship of approximately three years is necessary. For me, the best training was observing excellent
lawyers practice their craft."); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Law Firms, Competition Penalties, and the
Values of Professionalism, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 38-39 (1999) (identifying "craft autonomy'




tially by hand. This is the primary root of all craft, the wellspring
and reference point for everything else in the field."' 50 Much the
same can be said of the judicial opinion; cases are decided one at a
time, by a judge or small panel of judges, working by hand, to craft
an outcome and a justification for the outcome for that particular
case. 151 This idea of adjudication being done "by hand," one case at a
time, is central to our idea of justice, and we criticize the law or our
system of justice when they fall short of this ideal.
152
Second, "[c]raft is medium-specific: it is always identified
with a material and the technologies invented to manipulate it.'
1 3
Using appropriate materials and tools in appropriate ways is re-
quired in craft. Carpentry is inseparable from wood, pottery is in-
separable from clay, and quilting is inseparable from fabric, and
each of these crafts is closely identified with the tools apropos to the
craft. Similarly, lawyers and judges are expected to be skilled in the
use of materials and tools in ways appropriate to unique situations.
The materials with which lawyers and judges work-including
sources of law such as constitutions, statutes, regulations, and
precedents; principles and ideals such as justice, mercy, fairness,
due process, and equal protection; and rules such as those govern-
ing civil procedure and evidence-cannot be separated from the le-
gal arguments of lawyers or the opinions of judges. More fundamen-
tally, the raw materials and tools used by lawyers and judges in-
clude words, skills of argument, logic, rhetoric, and persuasion. In-
deed, it is impossible to imagine lawyers or judges acting apart
from these materials and tools.
Third, "[c]raft is defined by use."'154 One way in which craft is
distinguished from fine art is that crafts have functional uses be-
150. Bruce Metcalf, Replacing the Myth of Modernism, AM. CRAFr, Feb.-Mar. 1993, at 40, 40.
151. See supra Part I.B.3 (distinguishing craft and mass production); infra Part II.A.2 (dis-
cussing volume and pace in craft).
152. For example, we decry what is sometimes described as "assembly line justice," or "one
size fits all" justice. Judge Ruggero Aldisert vividly describes the dilemma:
The national average for terminations on the merits for each active U.S. Circuit
judge is 449 cases. Divide 449 by 255 working days a year and the message be-
comes clear. The one-a-day brand was a great name for vitamins, it is not great
in describing the caseload for U.S. Circuit judges. The case you file moves along
an assembly line of more than one case every 4.9 hours. . . .Think about it,
That's the time allotted to each case .... Today there is no quiet library time.
The circuit judge is on a treadmill, and each case comes to him or her in the
midst of a gallop. With this fast food menu, are these cases receiving justice, or
a kind of jurisprudential indigestion?
Ruggero J. Aldisert, Then and Now. Danger in the Courts, FED. LAW., Jan. 1997, at 41, 41.




yond the aesthetic appreciation of the object. 155 The craftsmanship
of a lawyer or judge can never be separated from the effects of her
craft. This is particularly true in the case of a judge, whose judg-
ments carry the overwhelming coercive power of the state. The vio-
lence inherent in judicial choice is never far from the surface. 5 6
Thus, we make a mistake when we divorce the judge's actions and
craft from the violence inherent in the judge's work. 157
Fourth, "[c]raft is also defined by its past. Each of the craft
disciplines has a multicultural history that is documented mostly
by objects, many from societies that have long since disappeared."'58
The craft of law is always a backwards-looking discipline. And al-
though lawyers and judges are not solely concerned with the past,
fidelity with the past, especially by judges, must always be a felt
obligation.159 Laws and judicial opinions similarly outlast the socie-
ties whose lives they seek to order, and from these artifacts it is
possible to learn much about the civilization in question.
The following four parts of this Article discuss each of these
aspects of craftsmanship. 160 My intent is not so much to provide an
analytical argument to convince the reader that the law, and in
particular adjudication, is a craft. Rather, my hope is that by giving
voice to a large variety of craftspersons, speaking of their own craft
traditions, a lawyer or judge will begin to see similarities and con-
nections between those craft activities and his or her own.
155. See infra Part I.B.1 (discussing difference between craft and art), Part II.C.2.a (discuss-
ing role of form and function in craft).
156. Cecile Francis-Lewis, speaking of the craft of leatherwork, makes a somewhat related
point about the seriousness with which a leatherworker should approach his work.
The fact that once leather was the skin of a living animal whose life was sacri-
ficed should make us treat it with a certain respect, and fire us with the desire
to make of it a permanent memorial, by putting all our energy into the work,
and our mind to back up that energy.
CECILE FRANCIS-LEWIS, THE ART AND CRAFr OF LEATHERWORK 6 (1928).
157. See Robert M. Cover, VIolence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986) (observing
that legal interpretation "takes place in a field of pain and death).
158. Metcalf, supra note 150, at 40.
159. See infra Part II.D.4 (discussing law's tripartite gaze).
160. See infra Part lI.A (handmade quality of craft), Part fl.B (use of materials and tools),
Part H.C. (use and usefulness of craft objects), Part 1I.D (relationship of crafts to the past).
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A. Making by Hand
[A craft] must be made substantially by hand.
-Bruce Metcalf 61
[Tihere is an inherent pleasure in making. We might call this joie de faire (like joie
de vivre) to indicate that there is something important, even urgent, to be said
about the sheer enjoyment of making something exist that didn't exist before ....
-Ellen Dissanayake' 62
Here we show how all the knowledge and techniques of the previous . .. parts go to-
gether to complete actual projects ....
-The Carpenter's ManifestoM
The first defining characteristic of crafts identified by Bruce
Metcalf is that crafts involve making objects by hand. 164 The hand-
made quality of craft objects is "the primary root of all craft, the
wellspring and reference point for everything else in the field."1
Thus, craft is distinguishable from both action (which may not in-
volve making) 166 and mass production (which may not be by
hand).167 This feature of craft has a number of implications, includ-
ing for the role of talent and skill in creating craft objects, 168 con-
straints upon the pace of work and volume of output in crafts, 169 the
role of experience in developing craft skills, 170 and the difficulties
craftspersons have in articulating what they are doing when en-
gaged in their craft activity.171
161. Metcalf, supra note 150, at 40.
162. Ellen Dissanayake, The Pleasure and Meaning of Making, AM. CRAFT, Apr.-May 1995,
at 40, 40-41.
163. EHRLICH & MANNHEIMER, supra note 31, at 9.
164. Metcalf, supra note 150, at 40.
165. Id.
166. For Aristotle's discussion of the distinction between acting and making, see supra Part
I.C.1.
167. See supra Part I.B.3 (contrasting craft with mass production).
168. See infra Part II.A.1.
169. See infra Part II.A.2.
170. See infra Part II.A.3.
171. See infra Part II.AL4.
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1. Talent and Skill
An ethics of craft begins with the idea of skill, of knowing how to do something.
-James Elkins '72
0 Sir, doubt not but that angling is an art, and an art worth your learning: the
Question is rather, whether you be capable of learning it? for angling is somewhat
like poetry, men are to be born so: I mean with inclinations to it, though both may
be heightened by practice and experience: but he that hopes to be a good Angler
must not only bring an inquiring, searching, observing wit, but he must bring a
large measure of hope and patience, and a love and a propensity to the Art it.
self...
-Izaak Walton'73
One implication of crafts being made by hand is that talent
and skill are necessary conditions of becoming a craftsperson.
James Elkins notes that "[i]n each discipline there develops an ar-
ray of skills, abilities and competencies that become associated with
the craft."174 One reason some people are better at a particular craft
than others is that they have more natural talent. As Peter Dormer
observes, "Unfashionable though it is to say, some people have a
natural disposition towards practical work that the rest of us
lack."'175 But natural, or raw, talent is not sufficient for one to be or
become a craftsperson. We think of a craft as something that is
learned over a long period of time, sometimes over a period of many
years, involving hard work, discipline, and even immersion in the
craft.
Of particular importance is the skill of problem solving.
James Elkins argues that "[flrom the craft perspective, professional
competence lies in the skilled ways in which talents, knowledge and
skills are employed to resolve particular problems .... "176 John
Glick observes of his work as a potter, "You must keep on trying
until the fear of failure is forgotten. Now I try anything, and I con-
sider temporary frustration a small price to pay for the sense of ela-
tion I receive from tackling the problems directly."1
77
172. Elkins, supra note 90, at 955.
173. IZAAK WALTON, THE COMPLEAT ANGLER 53 (Modem Library ed., Random House 1939)
(1653).
174. Elkins, supra note 90, at 955.
175. DORMER, supra note 40, at 58. Elsewhere, Dormer notes, "It is not universally true that
everyone finds the acquisition of such skills a battle. Different people have different aptitudes."
Id. at 46.
176. Elkins, supra note 90, at 955.
177. John Glick, Toward Humanism in Apprenticeships, in APPRENTICESHIP IN CRAFr 25, 31
(Gerry Williams ed., 1981).
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2. Volume and Pace
No good work was ever done in a hurry ....
-Stephen WebbI78
The fact that craft objects are made by hand affects the pace
and volume of production. Speaking of the craft of furniture mak-
ing, Stephen Webb observes, "No good work was ever done in a
hurry: the craftsman may be rapid, but his rapidity is the result of
very deliberate thought, and not of hurry."179 By their nature, craft
objects are created one at a time, and each object is individual and
will reflect its own unique flaws and characteristics. T.J. Cobden-
Sanderson, speaking of the craft of book binding, notes that "[a]
well-bound beautiful book is neither of one type, nor finished so
that its highest praise is that 'had it been made by a machine it
could not have been made better.' It is individual; it is instinct with
the hand of him who made it; it is pleasant to feel, to handle, and to
see; it is the original work of an original mind working in freedom
simultaneously with hand and heart and brain to produce a thing of
use, which all time shall agree ever more and more also to call 'a
thing of beauty.' "180
Potter and teacher Seonaid Mairi Robertson emphasizes
that, ideally, crafts are created by a single individual who takes
responsibility for the craft object: "In craftsmanship, in its fullest
form, the craftsman creates the object from its inception to its fin-
ished shape, responsibly controlling the work at every point, hold-
ing the final purpose, the nature of the raw material, and the tradi-
tions of its use balanced, as it were, within the magnetic field of his
own personality. The peculiar alchemy of this evades definition."181
The decline of craft skills in the law may be a reflection of a
larger trend in industry and modern technology, where mass pro-
duction and specialization prevail. 182 Indeed, the decline of craft
values carries benefits. Consider the design and engineering of mo-
tor cars. Peter Dormer has observed that "[t]he craft knowledge in-
178. Stephen Webb, Furniture, in ARTS AND CRAFTS ESSAYS: BY MEMBERS OF THE ARTS AND
CRAFTS EXHIBITION SOCIETY 89, 90 (William Morris ed., photo. reprint 1996) (1893).
179. Id.
180. T.J. Cobden-Sanderson, Book Binding, in ARTS AND CRAFT ESSAYS: BY MEMBERS OF THE
ARTS AND CRAFTS EXHIBITION SOCIETY 134, 147-48 (William Morris ed., photo. reprint 1996)
(1893).
181. ROBERTSON, supra note 33, at 30. Again, an analogy to the law and in particular to a
judge deciding a case and crafting an opinion begs to be made.
182. Cf. DORMER, supra note 40, at 28 (making a similar observation with respect to the de-
cline of craft knowledge and its status in the arts).
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volved in the various stages of design and production may be pro-
gressively lost to individual workers whose skills are replaced by
machines which may achieve the same results to a higher standard.
Craft knowledge becomes distributed among the hardware and
software of machines and computers. However, in one form or an-
other a body of knowledge-the making of motor cars-is held in-
tact. Indeed, it may be enhanced and deepened." 83
Nevertheless, mass production poses a real threat to craft
values. One implication may be an increasing fragmentation and
specialization of craft skills.'84 Writing in the nineteenth century,
Fred Miller observed that "[t]he tendency to specialisation which
comes of the subdivision of work in these days is very detrimental
to the development of a craftsman."185 John Ruskin argued passion-
ately in the late 1800s that specialization and the division of labor
had the effect of turning workers from human beings into mere
tools.186
a. Patience
When we are silent, we are listening, remembering, paying attention to the world.
-Linda Ross Meyert"
Closely related to constraints upon volume and pace when
making by hand is the importance of patience. Peter Dormer argues
that art has "moved away from handicraft because craft knowledge
is difficult to learn and too slow to acquire for the contemporary
student or artist who wants to establish a personal style quickly in
order to respond to a fast-changing art world."'18 Much the same
might be said of scholars, critics, and theorists who bring an array
of literary, sociological, and critical perspectives to their analyses of
the law.
Aristotle noted that true craftsmen must be patient. 8 9 The
reality is that craft work cannot be rushed, and while skilled practi-
tioners are often swift, their swiftness of motion is not to be con-
fused with hurry. In fact, when we picture a craftsperson in our
minds, it is hard to imagine her rushing. Craftspersons' descrip-
183. Id. at 29.
184. See id. at 30-39.
185. FRED MILLER, THE TRAINING OF A CRAFTNiAN 33 (New York, Truslove & Comba 1898).
186. JOHN RUSKIN, The Stones of Venice, in THE NATURE OF GOTHIC 21 (Boston, Estes &
Lauriat 1892).
187. Meyer, supra note 7, at 661.
188. DORMER, supra note 40, at 26.
189. ARIsTOTLE, supra note 96, at YX4.1174a20.
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tions of their work often reflect the expenditure of time and the
painstaking attention to detail that is required. In her discussion of
Heidegger's view of thinking as a kind of craft, Linda Ross Meyer
makes a related point about the role of silence in thinking: "When
we are silent," Meyer observes, "we are listening, remembering,
paying attention to the world."190 The potter Carla Needleman is
particularly poignant on this point: "I painted a design on [a piece
of pottery]. It took me hours and I worked with a great deal of care
and concentration. Nevertheless, what I call 'impatience,' the need
to get on with it, kept the design ordinary."191 Speaking of another
craft, Needleman notes that "[t]he great pure vehicle of the knotted
rug requires of the craftsman a patience he, as a modern man, is
unlikely to have."'192 Needleman maintains that the craft requires
not the "patience of waiting," but the "patience of doing, the mani-
festation of patience in activity. . . , 193We have difficulty making
psychological peace with the demands of craft because we are "in-
fluenced more than we know by fast-food chains and the philosophy
of immediate gratification."194
b. Quality and Mindfulness
We forget what good work is like sometimes and end up accepting automobiles and
department-store furniture that self-destruct in a few years.
-The Carpenter's Manifesto 5
Mindfulness reflects an aesthetic sensibility (good taste) and an awareness of the
consequences of doing work well; it makes quality the guiding force not only in the
work, but in one's life.
-James Elkins20
190. Meyer, supra note 7, at 661. Meyer continues,
We remain silent to show respect, to await words of wisdom from the wise. We
are silent, too, to show respect for the dead, calling a halt to all our frantic and
distracted activity to focus our attention. We are silent in prayer. We are silent
in the company of those who are dearest to us, with whom we need not 'make
conversation.' On the other hand, when we 'use' language in chatter or 'small
talk,' we are often not paying attention to what we are saying. And we are not
thinking. Silence, by contrast, creates the space within which we can receive-
comfort, love, memory, ideas, awe.
Id. at 661-62.
191. NEEDLEMAN, supra note 58, at 5.
192. Id. at 65.
193. Id. at 66.
194. Id.
195. EHRLICH,& MANNHEIMER, supra note 31, at 12.
196. Elkins, supra note 90, at 956.
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James Elkins has argued that "mindfulness is at the heart of
an ethics of craft."197 "Mindfulness," he explains, "is reflected in
craft as the skill of getting something done right and doing it well,
as opposed to the mere act of completion or just getting it done."198
In law, Elkins observes, "Mindfulness means care, aware-
ness and thoughtfulness, but it is not the same thing as purpose or
competence. Purpose and competence suggest a linear dimension of
work and life, purpose helps us to get from one place to another,
from one case and one client to another. Mindfulness gives feeling
and depth to the client and case at hand."199
There is a sense in which the craftsperson's mindfulness and
attention to quality may, in our day and age, result in craft becom-
ing, or being perceived as, an elitist value. In an age of mass pro-
duction, which carries attendant benefits of uniformity and cost ef-
ficiency, objects which have been crafted by hand are often expen-
sive luxury goods. This could have wide-ranging implications for
the law.
As noted in the discussion of the difference between craft
and mass production,200 Judge Posner has observed that mass pro-
duction reduces the cost of goods; small quantities of individualized
handmade goods are replaced by the production of large quantities
of goods of average quality.20 There is a risk that lawyers may re-
serve their craftsmanship for high profile work for wealthy clients,
and resort to techniques of mass production in other less visible
work. Judges, too, are susceptible to this division of their work into
craft matters receiving a high degree of attention and other matters
receiving less. Indiana University Law School Dean Lauren K.
Robel has observed that even judges who recognize the craft aspects
of adjudication may be so pressed by a weighty case load that they
"protect professional values of craft in the cases on which profes-
sional reputations are made, reserving public process for the high-
status cases involving elite litigants."2 2 Pride and responsibility in
a job well done is reserved for high profile matters, while less visi-
197. Id. at 955.
198. Id. at 955-56.
199. Id. at 956. Mindfulness, for Elkins, appears to be closely related to the ability to exercise
judgment well. "The state of mindfulness gives us presence in the very moment at which we
engage the client, in the moment of our choice to employ our skill and our knowledge one way
rather than another." Id.
200. See supra Part I.B.3 (contrasting craft and mass production).
201. Posner, supra note 79, at 12.
202. Lauren K. Robel, Private Justice and the Federal Bench, 68 IND. LJ. 891, 904 (1993).
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ble cases can involve mass-production techniques and particle
board.
3. Experience and Situation Sense
[Craft knowledge is] knowledge that is learned practically through experience and
that is demonstrated through practice.
-Peter Dormerm
A third implication of crafts being made by hand is that ex-
perience is extremely important in developing the skills and compe-
tencies of becoming a craftsperson. Aristotle was clear in his view
that craftsmen develop their skills primarily through experience.
Carla Needleman argues that with the craft of woodworking, as
with any craft, it is necessary to "stay with the one craft, extending
oneself more and more into the universal mystery it contains and
can reveal in the order particular to the craft.120 4 This key charac-
teristic of craft knowledge is shared with practical wisdom, and is
one of the primary bases by which Aristotle distinguishes theoreti-
cal wisdom. Aristotle maintains that phronesis, or practical wisdom,
involves not just a knowledge of universals, but of particulars as
well, since it is concerned with action and action is concerned with
particulars. 20 5 Since perception "controls" particulars, phronesis
must include a kind of perception. 20 6 C.D.C. Reeve calls this kind of
perception "practical perception. ' 207 Thus, Reeve maintains, practi-
cal perception for Aristotle is not merely the perception of objects;
rather, it is a "search, partly perceptual, for the solution to a prob-
lem," which "involves finding the right universals and bringing
them together with a particular in the way that solves that prob-
lem."20 8 Craft, like practical wisdom, is concerned with universals
as well as particulars, what Aristotle calls "things that admit of be-
ing otherwise. '20 9 Thus, like the person of practical wisdom, the
203. DORMER, supra note 40, at 7.
204. NEEDLEMAN, supra note 58, at 88.
205. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 96, at VI.7.1141b14-16, VI.11.1143a28-35.
206. See id. at VII.3.1147a25-26.
207. REEVE, supra note 99, at 67.
208. Id. at 69. Ofphronesis, Reeve concludes, it is "more a kind of perception than it is a kind
of knowledge of universals," although as a "kind of perception it [sic] none the less crucially in-
volves knowledge of universals and of how to bring them to bear appropriately in particular
situations." Id. at 72-73.
209. ARISTOTLE, supra note 96, at VI.4.1140al-2, VI.5.1140b3-4.
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craftsperson must have a "trained eye," a kind of perception akin to
practical perception.210
Experience helps cultivate a trait of character that Llewellyn
described as "situation sense." Kronman attributes to Llewellyn the
idea that the "main aim of appellate judging is 'to locate and ex-
plore the significant situation-type' exemplified by the case at hand,
devise a rule 'to uncover and to implement [that situation's] immi-
nent law,' and fit the rule in question into a larger body of evolving
doctrine."21' An appellate judicial craftsperson will have the desir-
able attributes of "hesitance to upset the settled or to embark on an
uncharted sea... a desire .to move in accordance with the material
as well as within it, to carve with the grain... to reveal the latent








A fourth implication of the handmade quality of crafts is that
craftspersons are often at a loss to describe or articulate in detail
the nature and process of their work. Carla Needleman asks, "And
what is the craft of weaving? The weaver can't say and it doesn't
disturb him that he can't-weaving is weaving and that's enough
for him, it gives him enough to work with."214 Even when the crafts-
person can explain the reasons for doing things the way he is doing
them, he is never fully able to articulate all of his knowledge or rea-
sons.2
15
210. REEVE, supra note 99, at 74.
211. KRONMAN, supra note 3, at 223.
212. LLEWELLYN, supra note 8, at 222.
213. Risatti, supra note 54, at 40. Risatti notes that this quotation was shared with him in a
conversation and was of unknown origin. He also observes: "Whether or not this was meant to
belittle crafts is unknown. It is, however, a very astute observation because it goes to the heart of
the differences between the two practices." Id.
214. NEEDLEMAN, supra note 58, at 65.
215. See DORMER, supra note 40, at 49 CTeachers-whether they are teaching and demon-
strating face to face or trying to pass on knowledge through the less satisfactory medium of irit-
ing books (or giving television or video lectures)-know much more than they can articulate.").
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The difficulty of articulation is due in part to the fact that
being a good craftsperson is not reducible to following a prescribed
set of rules. 216 But it is also because much of craft knowledge is tacit
knowledge. "Tacit knowledge refers to a body of knowledge which
we have gained through experience-both through the experience of
our senses and through the experience of doing work of various
kinds. Tacit knowledge differs from propositional knowledge in that
it cannot easily be articulated or described in words. Nor can tacit
knowledge be described mathematically."217 Knowledge is not tacit
simply because it is difficult to put into words, or because it is tech-
nical or obscure. Lawyers who obfuscate through technical jargon
and pettifoggery are not exemplifying "tacit" knowledge; more likely
they are acting to preserve a professional monopoly by creating a
mystique about what they do. Janik describes tacit knowledge as
"'those aspects of experience which are wholly knowable self-
reflectively ... but by their very nature are incapable of precise ar-
ticulation.' "218
Because such knowledge is tacit, rather than easily explica-
ble, it might easily be devalued as mindless or thoughtless. One
danger associated with "tacit" knowledge is that what we "know"
might only mask our prejudices. 2 9 Speaking of the visual arts, Pe-
ter Dormer has written that "the status of craft knowledge or tacit
knowledge has declined sharply because it is held to have no intrin-
sic value."220 While this is not a new development, he argues that
over the past thirty years there has been an accelerating decline: "A
number of factors have encouraged the flight from tacit knowledge:
the development of reductionist abstract art, the widespread use of
installation, performance and other non-traditional, non-craft-based
media, and the substitution of craft knowledge with art theory as
216. See discussion of role of rules in craft infra Part III.A. 1.
217. DORMER, supra note 40, at 14. Dormer's distinction between tacit and propositional
knowledge is somewhat misleading. Both propositional knowledge (i.e., knowing that some
proposition is true) and non-propositional knowledge (i.e., knowing how to do something) can be
either explicit (i.e., one is conscious of some instance of propositional or non-propositional knowl-
edge) or tacit (i.e., one is unconscious of some instance of propositional or non-propositional
knowledge). Thus, it is probably more helpful to contrast tacit knowledge (whether propositional
or non-propositional) with explicit knowledge.
218. Id. at 21 (quoting Allan Janik, Tacit Knowledge, Working Life and Scientific Method, in
KNOWLEDGE, SKILL AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 49 (B. Goranzon & I. Josefson eds., 1988)),
219. See, e.g., DAVID HARE, MURMURING JUDGES 84-85 (1991). "Fortunately, most craft activ-
ity [whether a table, legal brief, or judicial opinion] is open to assessment and criticism."
DORMER, supra note 40, at 16.
220. DORMER, supra note 40, at 25.
[Vol. 54:22452286
LAWAS CRAFT




Much the same could be said about the status of craft knowl-
edge within the law. During the past thirty years, "[a] number of
factors have encouraged the flight from tacit knowledge: the devel-
opment of reductionist" theories such as law and economics; "the
widespread use of. . . [various] non-traditional, non-craft-based"
approaches to legal thought such as critical legal studies, feminist
theory, and critical race theory; "and the substitution of craft
knowledge with... [legal] theory as the unifying body of knowledge
taught" in Western law schools.222 Theories such as law and eco-
nomics and feminist legal theory are rooted in theoretical academic
disciplines and therefore dispense with tacit knowledge almost en-
tirely.223
Of course, the law does not have the luxury of remaining in-
articulate, even when articulation is maddeningly difficult. John
Barrett identifies skillful communication as a principal craft skill of
a judge: "[E]ffective communication [ ] is one key way that a judge
takes responsibility for her judgments.... Well-reasoned, written
... explanations may provoke attacks, but they also offer bases for
higher courts and for the audience to understand why a judge did
what she did. Quality reasoning has legs to stand on. Weaker ex-
planations, by contrast, deserve not to and usually will not with-
stand much scrutiny."224 Nevertheless, given the difficulties that
craftspersons sometimes have in articulating their work and proc-
esses, it should not come as a surprise that lawyers and judges are




223. Much the same can be said of the influence of philosophy to minimalism and conceptual-
ism in the visual arts. See id. at 27.
224. John Q. Barrett, Introduction: The Voices and Groups that Will Preserve (What We Can




B. Relation to Medium: Materials and Tools
Craft is medium-specific.
-Bruce MetcalfM
Essential to any design is the Wherewithal... the materials and tools to work with.
-The Carpenter's ManifestoO
[Ilt is by his attitude to his materials, to his tools, and his understanding of the
needs his products serve that we recognize the essential craftsman.
-Seonaid Mairi Robertson 7
What is the craft of being human? The material, myself, that I have to work with
constantly changes. It has qualities of clay, glass, metal, wood, wool; it is brittle,
flexible, malleable, obdurate. It is as if the study of being human is the ultimate
craft and all the crafts reflections of it.
-Carla Needloman2
The second defining characteristic of craft identified by
Bruce Metcalf is that crafts are medium-specific. 229 Crafts are al-
ways identified with the particular materials and tools used to ma-
nipulate them.23 0 What are the attitudes that craftsmen have to-
wards materials and tools, and what might a lawyer or judge learn
from them?
Speaking metaphorically, Karl Llewellyn notes that "[n]eat
cabinetmaking is both easier, more likely and more reckonable
when the workbench is well stocked. The invitation of the full
range, any one correct, makes simple, unembarrassed, natural, in
many cases half-automatic, the choice and use of some one which is
just the one needed to produce reasonable regularity in the particu-
lar case. ' 231 A large variety of materials and tools, and the skillful
knowledge of which is appropriate for use in what situation, em-
powers the craftsperson in her work. Knowing how to evaluate and
choose among materials and tools is one of the key ingredients of
225. Metcalf, supra note 150, at 40.
226. EHRLICH & MANNHEIMER, supra note 31, at 9.
227. ROBERTSON, supra note 33, at 36.
228. NEEDLEMAN, supra note 58, at 12.
229. Metcalf, supra note 150, at 40.
230. Id.
231. LLEWELLYN, supra note 8, at 217. For a discussion of Llewellyn's concept of reasonable
regularity, see infra Part III.B.
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what Ehrlich and Mannheimer in The Carpenters Manifesto call
the craftsman's "wherewithal."232
1. Materials and Hardware
Wood is the main ingredient in carpentry, so it pays to get good wood ....
-The Carpenter's Manifesto=
The most interesting thing about wood for me is that it has a grain, as people do.
That is, each piece of wood has a personality ....
-Carla Needleman m
Because I did not know any better I thought my outfit quite swell but in reality the
rod was heavy, cumbersome and dead and the line did not fit it. Besides, the guides
were spaced so far apart that the line kept wrapping around the bamboo between
them.
-Ray Bergman=
Hardware stores have endless amounts of gadgets and doodads, with more arriving
every day. Some of them are quite useless. Some may be just what you need. That's
one reason why you should get to know a good dealer, one who can listen to your
specific problems, reach into the dark recesses under the counter, and pull out ex-
actly what you're looking for.
-The Carpenter's Manifesto -s
A craftsperson will take great care in selecting appropriate
materials. May Morris, speaking of the craft of embroidery, notes
that the craftsperson's failure "is often due more to the use of poor
materials than to want of skill in working. It is surely folly to waste
time over work that looks shabby in a month. The worker should
use judgment and thought to procure materials, not necessarily
rich, but each good and genuine of its kind."27 If good and genuine
materials are not available, it is unlikely that a good product can be
created by even a master craftsperson. A system of justice rife with
inequities and problematic precedents will make it extremely diffi-
232. See EHRLICH & MANNHEIMER, supra note 31, at 39-135.
233. Id. at 40. Cecile Francis-Lewis makes an almost identical point with respect to the craft
of leatherwork: "Good leather is essential if one wishes to accomplish really fine work, and the
kind of leather to employ varies according to the work to be done." FRANCIS-LEWIS, supra note
156, at 17.
234. NEEDLEMAN, supra note 58, at 87.
235. RAY BERGMAN, TROUT 19 (1938).
236. EHRLICH & MANNHEIMER, supra note 31, at 52.
237. May Morris, Of Embroidery, in ARTS AND CRAFrS ESSAYS: BY M IBERS OF THE ARTS
AND CRAFrs EXHIBITION SOCIETY 212, 222-23 (William Morris ed., photo. reprint 1996) (1893).
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cult for even a skilled lawyer or an expert judicial craftsperson to
work with her materials to create an admirable object.
A craftsperson will also have an appreciation for the indi-
viduality and variety of her materials. Christopher Williams has
observed that "[w]ood is perhaps the material closest to man's own
temperament-infinite in its variety, vital and filled with imperfec-
tions. Each species, each tree, each limb, each trunk is an individ-
ual and should be so treated. The woodworker adjusts his pace to
the individual, at times asserting his strength, at times following
the needs of his materials. 238 A judge evaluating the credibility of a
witness, or seeking to find a punishment that will be appropriate
for a particular individual, must likewise have an appreciation for
the individuality and variety of the human material from which
judgments must be made. At the same time, the craftsperson un-
derstands the universality of his materials. Potter and educator
Seonaid Mairi Robertson states, "We shall better be able to bridge
the great gulfs of climate, culture, education, and tradition which
tend to separate us if we remember always that the raw materials
of our crafts, iron, wood, clay-while it is true that each batch of
clay is slightly different, each tree has its own characteristics-are
still iron, wood, clay the world over. .... 239 The raw materials of
justice, concepts like fairness, equal protection, and due process,
although exhibiting local characteristics, are likewise very similar
the world over.
Craftspersons are sensitive to the constraints upon their art-
istry imposed by their materials, and adopt an attitude of collabora-
tion with their materials. William Morris, a leader of the Arts and
Crafts Movement in the late nineteenth century, urged craftsmen to
"never forget the material you are working with, and try always to
use it for doing what it can do best: if you feel yourself hampered by
the material in which you are working, instead of being helped by
it, you have so far not learned your business, any more than a
would-be poet has, who complains of the hardship of writing in
measure and rhyme. The special limitations of the material should
be a pleasure to you, not a hindrance .... -P240 A lawyer or judge will
not find the materials of precedent and statute a hindrance to her
work, but will find them a welcome guide and resource.
238. CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS, CRAFTSMEN OF NECESSITY 53 (1974).
239. ROBERTSON, supra note 33, at 14.
240. William Morris, Textiles, in ARTS AND CRAFTS ESSAYS: BY MEMBERS OF THE ARTS AND
CRAFTs EXHIBITION SOCIETY 22, 37-38 (William Morris ed., photo. reprint 1996) (1893).
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In contrasting craft with fine art, Howard Risatti notes that
when discussing fine art, the most frequently used terms are
"painting" and "sculpture," which are "descriptive terms that refer
to the processes used in creating the artwork. '' 241 In contrast, when
discussing crafts, "[w]e tend to be more precise . . . making subtle
distinctions between materials and processes." 242 Risatti attributes
this difference to the fact that "the maker of fine art works to over-
come material, whereas the maker of applied art works in concert
with material."243 This is in part because craft objects have a func-
tion, which means that attention must be paid to form.24 4 In addi-
tion, "both form and function are intricately related to material."245
Due to their concern with function, craftspersons must have a "keen
interest in materials."246 As Risatti explains, "To make a properly
functional object, one must know and understand the physical
properties of materials in order to choose which will be most appro-
priate for a specific object."247 In contrast, a fine artist need not
have such a developed interest in materials, since the artist's "prin-
cipal concern is usually how the object looks."248 Echoing this
theme, silversmith and jewelry maker H. Wilson asserts that "[t]he
one guiding principle of all true craftsmanship is this: the forms
used in design should express naturally and simply the properties
of the particular material employed." 249 Speaking of the potter's
craft, Seonaid Mairi Robertson observes, "It is no use trying to bully
the material, or to impress it with one's own originality. One has to
know the point beyond which it cannot go."- 0
Reading these descriptions brings to mind the lawyer or
judge who feels hampered or constrained by his materials, and thus
seeks to bully the materials of precedent and statute to his own de-
sired ends, one who seeks to overcome the material rather than
work in concert with it-in short, someone who aspires to be not a
craftsperson, but an artist. A craftsperson of the law, as with every
other craftsperson, must know "the point beyond which" his materi-
als cannot go. Robertson continues: "The master craftsman, who
has served his long apprenticeship and knows his material inti-
241. Risatti, supra note 54, at 38.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 39.
244. Id. For a discussion of form and function in craft, see infra Part I.C.2.a.




249. WILSON, supra note 80, at 29.
250. ROBERTSON, supra note 33, at 23.
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mately, works always with his material, finding in that union the
deepest satisfaction. ' 2 '
2. Tools
When one of your wise authors was four years old, he watched a carpenter named
Schuster plane a board. He asked Schuster to let him try, but he couldn't get the
blasted thing to cut at all. Schuster took the plane back and said, "No, no, you're
doing it all wrong. You've got to wiggle your ears while you do it or it won't work."
Schuster wiggled his ears and the plane started to take off big shavings. Your au-
thor unfortunately didn't know how to wiggle his ears and just couldn't get the
plane to work. He was midway through college before he realized his ears probably
had nothing to do with it.
-The Carpenter's Manifesto=
Tools are not mysterious or terrifying. They are logical extensions of the human
body, just like implements used by prehistoric man. A hammer is a rock, A saw is a
more efficient cutting tool than your teeth. Early man made holes with his fingers




Craftsmanship involves the skillful use of tools. Tools serve
specific purposes; one does not use a hammer when one wants to
cut. Even good tools will work poorly if they are used on tasks for
which they were not intended, or in inappropriate ways. A single
tool is not fit for every job. And a tool that serves one purpose well
may be unsuited for other jobs. Tools can be misused; they can be-
come dull or less useful; and they must be maintained if they are to
remain in good working order. Tools can also be dangerous; people
are hurt when tools are misused.
Speaking of the craftsperson's tools must not be misunder-
stood as a denunciation of machines, for machines themselves are
tools. 254 Potter Seonaid Mairi Robertson notes that "[tihe profes-
251. Id.
252. EHRLICH & MANNHEIMER, supra note 31, at 8.
253. Id. at 64.
254. Ehrlich and Mannheimer note,
Much has been made of the old craftsmen who worked by candlelight with noth-
ing but hand tools and their fingernails. True enough, some of these people
were geniuses. Their work is fantastic. But the craftsmen of old didn't know
about electricity. Most of them would have welcomed the chance at least to try
power tools. There are people who prefer the esthetics of hand tools, who like to
feel the total control of every stroke. If you are one such, more power to you.
Technically, however, except for finely sculpted or hewn work, there are few
jobs or techniques that a power tool can't do better and more quickly than a
hand tool.
Id. at 102.
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sional craftsman does not glorify a primitive means as such; in fact,
he emphasizes his tools." 2 5 The important point is that we must
make sure that our tools are serving our ends and not the other way
around.256
A good example of a set of tools available to lawyers and
judges are canons of construction.2 7 In his book, The Common Law
Tradition, Karl Llewellyn included an appendix in which he listed a
large number of canons of construction.28 Across from each he in-
cluded a different canon, which would appear to justify an opposite
result. For example, the canon "every word and clause must be
given effect" is paired with the canon "if inadvertently inserted or if
repugnant to the rest of the statute, they may be rejected as sur-
plusage."259 This juxtaposition of canons of construction has been
construed by some commentators as evidence of Llewellyn's results-
oriented realism: a judge, they say, is free to choose whichever
canon suits his purpose, and use it deceptively or disingenuously to
create the impression of a neutral rationale for achieving his de-
sired result. 26 0 Undoubtedly there is some truth to such an interpre-
255. ROBERTSON, supra note 33, at 27. Robertson further notes that the craftsman "is very
much attached to his tools, he takes them up with as much fervour as the industrial worker often
'downs tools,' his care for and enjoyment of his tools reveals them almost as extensions of him-
self.' Id.
256. Seonaid Mairi Robertson notes that "[mien have been improving their tools since the
beginning of time." Id. at 16. "Machines," he continues, "are not the all.powerful impersonal
demons sometimes suggested, dominating our lives by some inherent power of their own .... And
yet it is true that many of us live our lives at their mercy, desperately trying to adapt our pace
and requirements to them." Id.
257. Canons of construction have been a topic of considerable interest in recent academic
analyses of law and the work of judges. See generally J.M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, The
Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963 (1998); Bruce M. Kramer, The Sisyphean
Task of Interpreting Mineral Deeds and Leases: An Encyclopedia of Canons of Construction, 24
TEX. TECH L. REV. 1 (1993); Robert J. Martineau, Craft and Technique, Not Canons and Grand
Theories: A Neo-Realist View of Statutory Construction, 62 GEO. WASH. L REV. 1 (1993) (arguing
judges use canons of construction and "grand theories" of statutory construction to provide ra-
tional explanations for their decisions although other values lie behind such decisions); Sympo-
sium, A Reevaluation of the Canons of Statutory Interpretation, 45 VAND. L REV. 529 (1992);
Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74 (2000) (distinguishing and discussing
textual or linguistic canons and substantive canons).
258. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 8, at 521.35.
259. Id. at 525. Other examples include "[a] statute cannot go beyond its text" but "[t]o effect
its purpose a statute may be implemented beyond its text," and "[ijf language is plain and unam-
biguous it must be given effect" but "[n]ot when literal interpretation would lead to absurd or
mischievous consequences or thwart manifest purpose." Id. at 522-24.
260. Two such commentators perfunctorily note that
[i]n his critique, Professor Llewellyn purported to show that the canons of
statutory construction were useless as rules for guiding decisions. His claim,
that every canon could be countered by an equal and opposite counter-canon,
transformed the canons from exalted neutral principles into "conclusory expla-
nations appended after the fact to justify results reached on other grounds."
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tation of Llewellyn's views; as noted, Llewellyn does not believe the
law generates absolute certainty, but only reasonable regularity.
26 1
But viewing the judge as unconstrained in his choice of which canon
to use ignores the heavy emphasis Llewellyn places upon the notion
of craft, especially later in his career. Just as a craftsperson will
know which tool is appropriate for a given task, so too a judge will
know, at least with reasonable regularity, which canon is appropri-
ate in a given situation. It is an unduly skeptical interpretation of
Llewellyn that concludes that his view was that a judge was simply
free to choose whichever canon suited his purpose.
C. Use and Usefulness
Craft is defined by use.
-Bruce Metcalf262
Debates about "merit" only make sense within an agreed system of values.
-Peter Dormer
263
Judging judges, like judging cases, is a handiwork.
-Linda Ross Meyer
2CA
The third distinctive feature of craft identified by Bruce
Metcalf is that crafts are defined by their use. 265 Craft objects are
not just admired for their beauty, they are subject to evaluation
based upon their functionality. 266 Howard Risatti has argued that
"[t]he role and identity of crafts in modern and postmodern society
are probably the most important issues facing the field today."267
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction and Judicial
Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 647, 647-48 (1992).
261. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 8, at 215-17. It must be acknowledged that at times Lle.
wellyn seems to make a stronger claim about legal indeterminacy. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn,
Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to
Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 395 (1950) C'There is no single right and accurate way of
reading one case, or of reading a bunch of cases.").
262. Metcalf, supra note 150, at 40.
263. DORMER, supra note 40, at 22. Dormer notes that some commentators believe that at-
tempts to assess artistic merit in Western culture in the twentieth century are now meaningless
exercises. 'There is no agreed framework of values and consequently there can be no real con-
noisseurship; there are just private opinions publicly expressed and jostling for attention." Id.
264. Meyer, supra note 7, at 666.
265. Metcalf, supra note 150, at 40.
266. See supra Part I.B.1 (contrasting craft and art); infra Part II.C.2.a (discussing role of
form and function in craft).
267. Risatti, supra note 54, at 34.
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One criticism leveled at craft is that to the extent it repre-
sents "tacit" knowledge, both in the sense of being implied without
direct expression and in the sense of being silent, then it might be
beyond our capacity to analyze and evaluate. 268 Peter Dormer has
written that "[t]here is often a temptation when considering craft
knowledge to drop the guard of scepticism and to treat with laxity
such vague and often opportunistic claims about 'intuition'; for a
tension exists between the objectivity of science and the subjectivity
of tacit knowledge. The myth prevails of the 'dumb artisan' (tacit,
taciturn) who, because he or she cannot explain what is being done,
appears to proceed unintelligently with a mixture of received tradi-
tions and intuitions. '269
Most craft objects-be they quilts, cabinets, legal briefs, or
judicial opinions-can be subject to evaluation. Craft knowledge
includes both a "public aspect," which can be subject to what Mi-
chael Polanyi calls "destructive analysis,"270 as well as a "private
aspect," knowledge which resides in individual people and is ulti-
mately ineffable. 271 In the realm of law, there is a highly developed,
public, critical dialogue about the worth and usefulness of legal,
and especially judicial, artifacts. We can differentiate good crafts-
manship from shoddy craftsmanship, in carpentry and quilt mak-
ing, as well as in the law. In the law, as in other crafts, we can dis-
tinguish craftsmanship from mass production and mere assembly.
We can evaluate pieces of work (pots, cabinets, opening arguments,
judicial opinions) as better and worse, even if we cannot reduce our
reasons for doing so to rules or axioms.
I will briefly discuss three ways in which the use and useful-
ness of craft objects can be evaluated: first, in relation to plans,
drawings, and visualizations;272 second, in terms of outcome and
process;2 73 and third, in terms of their structural fitness and integ-
rity.274
268. See DORMER, supra note 40, at 13-14.
269. Id. at 14-15.
270. Id. at 16 (quoting MICHAELPOLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE 50-51 (1983)).
271. Id. at 18. Speaking of the "private aspect' of craft knowledge, Dormer says, "There are
no means of describing that knowledge adequately--even to oneselt Id.
272. See infra Part 11.C.1.
273. See infra Part 1I.C.2.
274. See infra Part 1.C.3.
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1. Drawing and Visualizing
You can learn to draw-it's no mystery. Good plans, no matter how primitively
drawn, are essential. It's amazing how many ways a project can go wrong when you
have no plan to work from.
-The Carpenter's Manifesto75
Composition has to be there-it must sing!
-Nancy Crow270
The first step in a carpentry project begins in your head. Maybe you visualize a
bookcase for your boxes of books, or a partition for privacy-you detect a dim shim-
mer of a design, but you can't fully focus the shape and its parts. Making a few
sketches will help you solidify the shape.
-The Carpenter's Manifesto
J 2
One of the most prized skills of the craftsperson is the ability
to design, visualize, and compose. True craftsmanship is not only
about means, but about ends as well. Aristotle distinguishes practi-
cal wisdom from cleverness, noting that being clever may be suffi-
cient for achieving one's ends, but only one possessed of practical
wisdom can have confidence that her ends are right.278 Something
similar can be said of craftsmanship. Peter Dormer notes that
"[c]raft knowledge not only enables you to achieve your goal, it also
enables you to imagine what your goal might look like. It becomes
not merely the means of achieving the goal but the means of visual-
izing it in the first place. 279 And as Fred Miller argued, "Design
cannot be taught, though much may be learned from the study of
the methods of those who have worked before us."
280
In the Gorgias, Plato distinguishes craft (techne) and knack
(empeiria, tribe).28' Ernest J. Weinrib has explained that for Plato,
"[t]he distinguishing feature of craftsmanship is that the crafted
object embodies an idea antecedently conceived in the craftsman's
mind. The craftsman uses this idea as the model on which he keeps
his mind's eye as he executes his work. The idea acts as the princi-
ple of order that integrates all the elements of the work into a co-
275. EHRLICH & MANNHEIMER, supra note 31, at 9.
276. Nancy Crow, Quilting: The Development of Art Quilts, FIBERARTS, Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 44,
47.
277. EHRLICH & MfANNHEIMER, supra note 31, at 22.
278. ARISTOTLE, supra note 96, at VI.12.1144a19-27, III.5.1114bl-25.
279. DORMER, supra note 40, at 19-20.
280. MILLER, supra note 185, at 1.
281. PLATO, Gorgias, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 229 (Edith Hamilton & Hunt-
ington Cairns eds., 12th prtg. 1985).
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herent structure."2 2 Thus, one way of measuring or judging a work
of craft is by how well it measures up to the idea that inspired it.
On Aristotle's formulation, "craftsmanship is a process composed of
two stages, intellection and production, with intellection consisting
of the eidos [the craftsman's idea] in the soul of the craftsman."
283
As Ehrlich and Mannheimer put it in The Carpenter's Manifesto, "If
you can draw what you want to build, a lot of your work is done.
Drawing is the process of working out the design. All the other
steps in carpentry are simplified by a good plan."2"
The ability to draw and visualize is closely related to the
skill of composition. Quilter Nancy Crow explains that "[n]o matter
what the final shape, configuration, or techniques used, the compo-
sition cannot be ignored; yet, many so-called art quilts show a com-
plete lack of understanding of composition. They appear awkward,
their composition ponderous, labored, uninteresting, and inarticu-
late. In the best of the old quilts, composition is always there and
often very strong. It has never ceased to amaze me that so many
quiltmakers can take well-designed traditional blocks and rear-
range them on a background or with sashing or borders until those
once strong designs have become totally insipid."2s
Craft objects may be judged or assessed in terms of how well
they are designed, composed, or planned, as well as how well the
material object achieves or embodies the design, composition, or
plan. As Weinrib explains, "In this continuous sweep of activity
from intellectual conception to material embodiment, intellect re-
mains sovereign, since any deviation from the governing idea marks
a defect in the product."26 In contrast, a "knack is based on empiri-
cal experience rather than reason. The exercise of a knack does not
reflect an ordering idea, but a mere familiarity with what happens
to have worked in the past."2
7
282. Ernest J. Weinrib, Law as Myth. Reflections on Plato's Gorgias, 74 IOWA L. REV. 787.
795 (1989) (footnote omitted).
283. Id. (citing ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSIcS, at VIl.7.1032b).
284. EHRLICH & MANNHEIMER, supra note 31, at 22.
285. Crow, supra note 276, at 46.
286. Weinrib, supra note 282, at 795.
287. Id.
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2. Outcome and Process
Work must exhibit taste as well as skill, and harmony between means and end, by
which I mean that every craftsman should so work that the utmost is made of the
particular quality inherent in each craft.
-Fred Miller=
Closely related to the concern with visualization and compo-
sition is the craftsperson's interest in both outcome and process.
With respect to outcome, the craftsperson cares about the conse-
quences of his work. A cabinetmaker concerns himself with how a
cabinet will be used, and measures his success in part according to
how well the piece of furniture suits its intended purpose. A crafts-
person concerns himself with how his work will be used and
whether it will last. The craftsperson is also concerned with proc-
ess, with whether the proper methods were employed-knowing
"how" to work is a key component of the craftsperson's knowledge.
The interplay between outcome and process is apparent in
the craftsperson's attitude and responsiveness to the imperfections
and slight variations in his materials. Seonaid Mairi Robertson,
speaking of the potter's craft, notes that a potter "cannot adopt an
attitude of rigidity, of demanding a strictly preconceived effect"
when decorating a pot: "This attitude of attentive responsiveness, of
accepting and using the accidental within the limits of the general
conception, is one that separates the craftsman from the techni-
cian."289 We would expect that this capacity for attentive respon-
siveness will develop over time as the craftsperson gains experience
with his craft, be it pottery or the law.
Carla Needleman warns that for a craftsperson, an over-
wrought concern for creating a successful outcome might increase
the likelihood of failure: "I am not suggesting that the attitude to-
ward results is the only attitude conditioning the way a craftsman
works .... I do suggest that the desire to succeed is the progenitor
of real failure and that this attitude is a far more subtly pervasive
force than we realize. ' 290 Something similar is true of law. If a law-
yer is overly concerned with results, with the outcomes of his or her
arguments, this is the progenitor of real failure; sources of author-
ity such as statutes and precedents may be treated cavalierly,
288. MILLER, supra note 185, at 35.
289. ROBERTSON, supra note 33, at 24.
290. NEEDLEMAN, supra note 58, at 6.
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twisted to fit a predetermined outcome or conclusion. This failure
may even be more dramatic when it involves a judge. After all, to
some extent we expect lawyers to take their outcomes as given and
construct the most persuasive arguments available in support of
those outcomes. In contrast, we expect judges to reason to their
conclusions, rather than backwards from them.
Care must be taken that our designs remain somewhat ten-
tative, for when they are executed "under the hand by the contact of
tools and material," it may be that we are "coerc[ing] the material
into the preconceived form."291 W.R. Lethaby notes that "any one
who has watched the process of throwing a pot on the wheel, of
blowing glass, or of beating up metal out of the sheet, will have no-
ticed how dozens of vitally beautiful forms are produced on the way
to the final dulness predestined by the drawing."' 92 Lethaby sug-
gests that prior work should be consulted as a vast encyclopedia of
methods and experience, "without intention to copy specific types,
but to gather ideas generally applicable." 293 Lethaby could, I think,
just as easily be speaking of lawyers and judges. Lawyers, and es-
pecially judges, must be willing to adjust their ends and conclusions
when the materials of fact and precedent can only by force fit the
form of their predilections or preliminary conclusions.
a. Function and Form
Because we tend to refer to the various crafts according to their materials-clay,
glass, wood, fiber, and metal-we sometimes forget that it was once common to
think of crafts in terms of function ....
-Howard Risatti m
Craft products can also be evaluated both in terms of form
and function. Form relates to the aesthetics of the production, at-
tention to detail, the quality of the finish, the integrity of the object,
and in general to the quality of the construction. Function relates to
how well the object suits its intended use, whether the materials
are of an appropriate type and quality, innovation, quality of repli-
cation of its model, and how well the object holds up over time.
Speaking of the craft of furniture making, Hasley Ricardo observes,
"Now, all furniture that has any permanent value has been de-
signed and wrought to meet the ends it had to serve, and the care-
291. W.R. Lethaby, Preface to H. WILSON, SILVERWORK AND JEWELRY 9-10 (2d ed. 1912).
292. Id. at 10.
293. Id.
294. Risatti, supra note 54, at 34 (emphasis omitted).
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ful elaboration of it gave its maker scope for his pleasure and occa-
sion for his pride."
295
Howard Risatti notes that "[b]ecause we tend to refer to the
various crafts according to their materials-clay, glass, wood, fiber,
and metal-we sometimes forget that it was once common to think
of crafts in terms of function, which led to their being known as the
applied arts. Many people in the field consider this term pejorative,
especially in relation to the fine arts, whose practitioners empha-
size the uselessness of fine art as an essential feature of its aes-
thetic quality."296 One reason fine artists have come "to insist upon
the nonfunctionality of their work" is "to differentiate it from com-
mercially oriented objects. Otherwise, the fine arts would be in
danger of being swallowed up by them."297 According to Risatti, "In
self-defense, fine art has generally disavowed any connection with
function .... "298
Crafts, although tempted to follow art in distancing them-
selves from function, do so only at their peril. Risatti notes that in
consequence of the fine arts' condescending attitude towards the
applied arts, "crafts people often feel compelled to emulate fine art-
ists. Sometimes this is done simply by dismissing or ignoring criti-
cal discussions about function in relation to their work; at other
times, their work essentially abandons the craft tradition for what
seems like sculpture in craft materials. By taking either course,
crafts people give up a great deal, perhaps too much." 299 Risatti goes
so far as to assert that "to stay within the crafts field and ignore
function . . . is to abandon the field's single most important ele-
ment."300 Function is crucial, Risatti explains, because "it gives
crafts their identity, an identity that not only links the physical
form of traditional objects to sources in nature but also becomes the
raison d'etre that links them to the human body."3 01
295. Halsey Ricardo, Of the Room and Furniture, in ARTS AND CRAFTS ESSAYS: BY MEMBERS
OF THE ARTS AND CRAFTS EXHIBITION SOCIETY 274, 278 (William Morris ed., photo. reprint 1996)
(1893). Ricardo elaborates: "The value of furniture depends on the directness of its response to
the requirements that called it into being, and to the nature of the conditions that evoked it." Id.
at 279.
296. Risatti, supra note 54, at 34.
297. Id. at 46.
298. Id. at 47.






In Finishing we explain the various types of protective finishes for your work, and
how to apply them so they'll last.
-The Carpenter's Manifesto-
A good finish, properly applied to a well-prepared surface, protects your projects
from water, warping, nicks, and scratches.
-The Carpenter's ManifestoU
Another way in which the quality of crafts is evaluated is ac-
cording to how well they are finished. One hallmark of good crafts-
manship is attention-often painstaking attention-to detail. Judi-
cial opinions, appellate briefs, and registration statements for the
sale of securities are but a few examples of legal artifacts that are
evaluated according to how well they are finished.304 The fascina-
tion and loathing directed at The Bluebook, as well as the power
wielded by one skilled in its use, is one manifestation of the impor-
tance of finishing in the legal profession. 305 A successful lawyer I
know often tells young attorneys that the secret to being a good
lawyer rests in understanding a single, simple, seemingly paradoxi-
cal truth: The first ninety percent takes ninety percent of the time,
and the last ten percent takes ninety percent of the time. This is
often true for the work of the carpenter and quilter; it is also true
for work of the lawyer and judge.
The pressure pushing lawyers and judges away from prop-
erly finishing their work are multiple and mutually reinforcing.
Craftsmanship takes time, and clients understandably do not often
want to pay, nor do they often appreciate, the work necessary to
302. EHRLCH & MANNHEIMER, supra note 31, at 9.
303. Id. at 294.
304. Michael Nava, Lawyers as Writers, VT. B.J. & L. DIG., Aug. 1996, at 13.
305. See THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION (Columbia Law Review Assn et
al. eds., 17th ed. 2000). The Bluebook has had, in its seventeen or more editions, almost seventy-
five years to acquire a certain reverential following. See Carol M. Bast & Susan Harrell, Has the
Bluebook Met Its Match? The ALWD Citation Manual, 92 LAW LIBR. J. 337, 339 (2000). In our
contemporary legal culture, this means that "[fQailure to conform [with Bluebook citation form]
may signal lack of knowledge or attention to detail... [and a] loss of credibility." Id. at 338. Yet,
while facility with The Bluebook has become a badge of polish and excellence, The Bluebook itself
has been called "a maze, a thicket, a mutant mass of legalisms run rampant." James D. Gordon
III, Oh No! A New Bluebook!, 90 MXCI. L. REV. 1698, 1704 (1992). Judge Posner perhaps best
captured the irony of Bluebook adherence when he stated that "[the vacuity and tendentious-
ness of so much legal reasoning are concealed by the awesome scrupulousness with which [the]
set of intricate rules governing the form of citations is observed." Richard A. Posner, Goodbye to
the Bluebook, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 1343, 1344 (1986).
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finish a job in a craftsmanlike way.30 6 Judges face heavy case loads,
and parties understandably want a prompt resolution to their
cases. 307 The high cost of finishing is one reality that may be trans-
forming legal craftsmanship into a luxury good that can be afforded
only by the wealthy. The demands of multiple clients and projects,
deadlines, and the complexity of legal documents also make it diffi-
cult to give craftsmanlike attention to the finishing details of one's
work. Clients whom one has not heard from in months or even
years often seem to expect their matter to receive your immediate
and undivided attention as soon as they call. Technological innova-
tion, from photocopiers, facsimile machines, computers, overnight
mail, and e-mail have had a tremendous impact on client expecta-
tions of how quickly a job can be done.30 8 One source of attorney dis-
306. See, e.g., Alberta L. Cook, Hourly Billing: A Thing of the Past?, in BEYOND THE BILLABLE
HOUR: AN ANTHOLOGY OF ALTERNATIVE BILLING METHODS 31, 31 (Richard C. Reed ed., 1989);
Martha Middleton & Vicki Quade, Saving a Buck. Corporations Hunt Ways to Cut Legal Costs,
A.B.A_ J., May 1982, at 523, 523; Richard C. Reed, Value Billing, LEGAL ECON., Sept. 1988, at 20,
22.
307. See Harry T. Edwards, The Rising Work Load and Perceived "Bureaucracy" of the Fed-
eral Courts: A Causation-Based Approach to the Search for Appropriate Remedies, 68 IOWA L.
REV. 871, 879 (1983) CIn the face of an onslaught of cases, we have seen significant increases in
the number of federal judges and in the size of their personal staffs, the creation of new central
legal staffs to screen cases and otherwise assist in the decision-making process, expanding roll-
ance on 'subjudges'-for example, special masters and magistrates-and the emergence of cen-
tralized administrative structures like the Judicial Conference and the Administrative Office.
These changes, many observers fear, threaten to displace our traditional conception of the judg-
ing function, characterized as it is by solitary craftsmanship and collegial arbitration." (footnotes
omitted)); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 396-97 (1982) ("Since 1938,
the case load of the federal courts has increased significantly. Several factors explain this
growth. First, the population, and with it the number of disputants willing to go to court, has
grown. Second, Congress has created and the courts have articulated a multitude of now rights
and legally cognizable wrongs. Third, more lawyers are now available, and some of them offer
legal services to litigants who previously could not obtain such services. Finally, Congress has
provided for the payment of attorneys' fees to various classes of victorious plaintiffs and has
thereby created new incentives to litigate." (footnotes omitted)).
308. Anthony T. Kronman, Professionalism, 2 J. INST. STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 89, 98 (1999)
('Technology has... foreshortened the temporal horizons of lawyers. The phone (now portable),
the fax (now ubiquitous) and the computer (now able to generate documents and revisions in
documents at the speed of light) have together had the effect of accelerating the practice of law to
the point where many lawyers today complain that their clients expect an instantaneous reply to
every question and give them no time to think. The result is a fragmentation of experience, and
the narrowing of one's temporal frame of reference, an inward state of mind that is outwardly
reflected in the growing tendency of lawyers to move from one firm to the next with dizzying
speed."); Molly Warner Lien, Technocentrism and the Soul of the Common Law Lawyer, 48 AM.
U. L. REv. 85, 88-89 (1998) C'[J]ust as television created 'sound bite' jounalism and discourse,
technology seems to generate 'law-byte' reasoning and hypertext analysis. Lawyers and law
students increasingly focus on accessing, managing, and linking information, and devote loss
time and energy to careful analysis or critical evaluation of legal rules. While technology unques-
tionably gives lawyers the ability to marshal bits of information instantly from a host of cases,
and to dispatch them into memoranda and briefs like well-drilled soldiers in a war of logic, the
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satisfaction may be the cumulative effect of such pressures that
thwart good craftsmanship. When one is rushed, harried, or bar-
raged with a constant stream of phone calls, e-mails, crises, and
deadlines, it is difficult to pay the kind of attention that a crafts-
person must pay to her work. Nevertheless, one way we can evalu-
ate the quality of a legal work product is according to how well it is
finished. And one factor that we might expect to correlate with an
attorney's satisfaction with her professional life is whether one is
able to give the attention to detail and finishing that craftsmanship
requires.
3. Structure: Why Things Stand Up and How to Make Them Strong
"Structure". . . explains the simple principles on which all construction, no matter
how complex, is based.
-The Carpenter's Manifesto=9
Structure is the guts of carpentry. It's the soul of your work, the built-in strength
that withstands everyday stresses.
-The Carpenter's Manifesto=
Our own tendency is to overstructure, to make things stronger than they need be.
That's our prejudice. We feel the small amount of extra work and materials is well
worth it in the long run.
-The Carpenter's Manifesto3"
Another basis of evaluation, both of crafts such as woodwork-
ing and the law, is how structurally sound they are. For a chair,
this means being both steady and able to bear weight, while simul-
taneously being comfortable and aesthetically pleasing. Legal ar-
guments are also subject to evaluation based upon similar struc-
tural criteria. Good legal arguments follow a familiar structure of
clearly identifying the issue presented, articulating the applicable
rule, applying the rule to the facts, and stating clear and limited
speed of deployment inevitably discourages lawyers from taking the time to analyze the wisdom,
correctness and applicability of legal arguments." (footnotes omitted)).
309. EHRLICH & MANNHEIMER, supra note 31, at 9.
310. Id. at 12. Ehrlich and Mannheimer continue, "The concepts of structure ... are basic
and relatively easy to grasp. Once you understand them, you'll be able to design and build more
efficiently, more economically. And what you build will be strong and long-lasting." Id.
311. Id. The authors continue, "What if six people sit down on your bed during a party-will
it collapse? In that sense it's always better to overstructure. It certainly can't hurt." Id. But, the
authors warn, "don't get carried away. If you're planning to do a lot of rough carpentry and you
need a temporary work table, just build a minimal structure. As long as it doesn't collapse, ies all
you need. Figure your present requirements and whether they might change in the future." Id.
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conclusions. 312 That there are great variations within this general
structure does not undermine the basic structural principles. Legal
arguments become structurally weak when they are unclear or ob-
tuse, or when they fail to avoid formal and informal fallacies of rea-
soning.313 A legal precedent, like a chair, should not be expected to
bear more weight than it was designed to carry.314
Linda Ross Meyer asks, "But how do we know that judges
are doing a good job? Just as we know how to appreciate a Cardozo
or a Harlan. Good judges let us 'see' the law in a way that 'fits.'
Their account of what the relevant precedents are, though perhaps
at first disconcerting or contrary to the dogmatic doctrine of tradi-
tion, ultimately 'rings true' and 'looks right.' Judging judges, like
judging cases, is a handiwork."3 15
a. Coherence
Weaving is the great classic symbol of the coming together and intermeshing of
separate threads to make a new integrity.
-Carla Needleman
3 6
What is weaving, then? It must not be farfetched to say that weaving is the attempt
to bind together Law and Life-that the craft is that aim, although the practitio.
ners of the craft would of course vary considerably in how they visualize what they
are doing and why.
-Carla Needleman
3 1 7
It is difficult to overstate the importance of coherence and
integrity to the craft of law. Ronald Dworkin, for example, builds
his entire jurisprudential theory upon the concept of integrity. 18
312. "IRAC is to legal analysis what 'Force = Mass x Velocity' is to Newtonian physics."
James Ottavio Castagnera, Why the Nation Needs More Lawyers, 22 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 19, 26
(1996).
313. See generally RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS: A GUIDE TO CLEAR LEGAL
THINKING (3d ed. 1997) (cataloguing and discussing formal and informal logical fallacies in legal
reasoning).
314. See Kronman, supra note 308, at 98 ('The growing volume of law and the multiplication
of decisions interpreting it has weakened the precedential value of each single judgement, since
one can now often find many conflicting answers to the very same question, and this weakening
of precedent has cut the practice of law off from its normative base in the past.").
315. Meyer, supra note 7, at 666.
316. NEEDLEMAN, supra note 58, at 61.
317. Id. at 62.
318. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE 176-275 (1986). Dworkin defends the view "that
integrity is the key to the best constructive interpretation of our distinct legal practices and
particularly of the way our judges decide hard cases at law." Id. at 216. Dworkin states that
"[t]he adjudicative principle of integrity instructs judges to identify legal rights and duties, so far
as possible, on the assumption that they were all created by a single author-the community
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One basis for evaluating the work of a single judge is how well his
decisions fit together with each other. A similar evaluation can be
made with respect to a particular federal circuit or a state supreme
court's jurisprudence. On a broader scale, if our legal system treats
relevantly similar situations in inconsistent ways, it can legiti-
mately be criticized for a lack of integrity or coherence. Thus, one of
the primary functions of the Supreme Court is to resolve important
disparities between jurisdictions.
b. Workability
One categorical distinction between art and craft is that
craft objects have utilitarian functions while art divorces form and
function.319 Furniture is used, quilts keep us warm, and pottery
holds food and carries water. One way in which such crafts are
evaluated is in how well they perform their intended function. A
pitcher, for example, is praised if the spout and handle are appro-
priately balanced, and if one can pour easily without spilling. Legal
artifacts can also be evaluated according to their workability or
functionality. One frequent criticism of judicial opinions is that
they give inadequate guidance for the future. Whether highly tech-
nical statutory provisions or multifaceted judicial balancing tests,
legal rules which give insufficient guidance can be criticized for
their lack of workability. Another related aspect of workability is
the unintended consequences, or the uses, to which a legal rule or
precedent may be placed in the future. Chief Justice Warren Bur-
ger, for example, crafted what became the notorious Lemon test of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, a rule that he later denounced
for the rigid manner in which it was applied.320
personified-expressing a coherent conception of justice and fairness." Id. at 225. Law as integ-
rity posits that "propositions of law are true if they figure in or follow from the principles ofjus-
ice, fairness, and procedural due process that provide the best constructive interpretation of the
community's legal practice." Id.
319. See supra Part I.B.1 (contrasting art and craft).
320. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 89 (1985) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("The Court's ex-
tended treatment of the 'test' of [Lemon], suggests a naive preoccupation with an easy, bright-
line approach for addressing constitutional issues. We have repeatedly cautioned that Lemon did
not establish a rigid caliper capable of resolving every Establishment Clause issue, but that it
sought only to provide 'signposts' .... In any event, our responsibility is not to apply tidy formu-
las by rote. .. ."); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1973).
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D. Relation to the Past
Craft is also defined by its past.
-Bruce Metcalf
21
The fourth defining feature of craft identified by Bruce
Metcalf involves the unique posture crafts have in relation to the
past. 22 I will discuss four features of craft's relationship with its
past. First, attentiveness and responsiveness to the past is due in
part to the fact that craftsmen are always participants in a shared
tradition. 323 Second, the craftsperson's relationship with the past
tends to engender certain attitudes in the craftsperson towards her
work, including feelings of both pride and humility.324 Third, the
craftsperson's relationship with the past has implications for the
craftsperson's creativity, and inclines him to favor incrementalism
over radical innovation.3 25 Fourth, craft has what I call a tripartite
gaze, involving the past, present, and future.3 26
1. Participation in Shared Enterprise
There is something else, something I've hesitated about mentioning until now, not
because it isn't important but rather because I didn't know and still don't know ex-
actly how to place its importance. I don't work at pottery alone but at a small studio
with like-minded people .... We have not chosen to work in the same place and
mostly at the same time for the sake of convenience but, I would have to say, for the
sake of inconvenience.
-Carla Needleman 327
The exquisite jewelry of Egypt, Etruria, and Greece, work so fine as almost to ap-
pear miraculous, was the outcome of centuries of development. What remains to us
is the sum of an infinite series of small improvements in work and method, added
by one generation of craftsmen after another. Each worker brought his fraction of




321. Metcalf, supra note 150, at 40.
322. Id.
323. See infra Part II.D.1.
324. See infra Part II.D.2.
325. See infra Part II.D.3.
326. See infra Part II.D.4.
327. NEEDLEMAN, supra note 58, at 41.
328. WILSON, supra note 80, at 25.
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One distinctive feature of being a craftsperson is that one is
a participant in a shared enterprise, strongly rooted in tradition,
and often poised perilously a single generation from oblivion. Thus,
craftspersons often exhibit not only a familiarity with the tradition,
and an appropriate and skillful use of its materials and tools, but
also a commitment to the elevation and sustenance of the tradition
itself. Potter and educator Seonaid Mairi Robertson observes that
"[c]rafts are such a fundamentally human activity that they are
more basic than any one language, and I have found a bond with
craftsmen of all the countries where I journeyed."32 Woodworker
Sam Maloof has said, "[U]nless the knowledge which the experi-
enced craftsman has gained through the years is shared, it will die.
If we are selfish, and self-centered, and do not share, then all the
work we have done in the past is for naught. You must give not only
the reflection of your image through your work, but also whatever
wisdom and knowledge you have gained over the years."
330
Crafts are usually learned in community with others.
Craftspersons often gather together, where, even when pursuing
their own projects, they can learn from and challenge each other.
Aristotle notes that when a craftsman is engaged in his work, he
often benefits from consultation with others; in practical matters,
we are more likely to trust deliberations that are communal than
deliberations that are solitary.331 James Elkins has suggested that
"[i]n craft professions such as law, a sense of community emerges
from the notion that one 'belongs' to the profession and 'practices'
its discipline." 3
2
Craftsmen often work together in a small workshop, where
there might be some division of labor.333 Being a part of a shared
enterprise does not mean that practitioners will necessarily agree,
either about methods or outcomes. Craft admits variety. Carla Nee-
dleman's description of a group of potters working together could
329. ROBERTSON, supra note 33, at 13.
330. Sam Maloof A Conversation, in APPRENTICESHIP IN CRAFr 145, 147 (Gerry Williams ed.,
1981).
331. Aristotle contrasts human friendship, involving shared discussion and thought, with the
life of cattle, which involves merely grazing in the same field. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 96, at
IX9.1170blI-12. Aristotle maintains that even when the activity is contemplation, an activity
that is "loved for its own sake" and from which "nothing arises ... apart from the contemplat-
ing," the wise man who contemplates truth "can perhaps do so better if he has fellow-workers."
Id. at Y.7.1177a33-1177b2.
332. Elkins, supra note 90, at 953. Elkins continues, "This sense of community is bounded by
common knowledge and skills, and by a shared understanding that comes from undergoing a rite
of passage with others." Id.
333. For an interesting discussion of the small workshop in the exercise and development of
craft, see ROBERTSON, supra note 33, at 107-13.
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just as easily be a description of a group of judges on a federal cir-
cuit or supreme court. Needleman explains: "I said that we are like-
minded, choosing the word with special care, and yet there is
probably no particular in which we would all agree."33 4 Potters, as
well as judges, often disagree with each other adamantly: "We dis-
agree, richly and often, and do not often have many kind words to
say about one another's finished pots-quite the opposite."3 35 For
judges, the disagreement is not only rich and frequent, but very
public, reflected in majority and dissenting opinions in particular
cases. Needleman adds, "We come from different backgrounds and
we are not, in the usual sense, friends-we don't meet socially."36
Again, this description fits precisely a group of judges working to-
gether. And yet, Needleman continues, "For me personally our as-
sociation, enduring some years, is of the utmost value."3 37 Needle-
man then reflects upon why this might be so: "I have my points of
view, acquired over a length of time, through struggle with the clay
and with myself, certain understandings I've come to, and I am
convinced of their validity."338 A nearby colleague, "on the other
hand ... has come to quite other conclusions, as reflected more in
the way he goes about his work than in his words-we are mostly
too busy to talk much-and I respect him, the quality of his seri-
ousness and the effort he has been making to understand. It puts
my conclusions in question and points up the far greater reality and
worth of the struggle, which we share, than the conclusions we
don't share."3
3 9
Historically, crafts were organized into guilds, which regu-
lated the terms of entry into the craft in a way not unlike the pro-
fessional bar regulates the terms of entry into the legal profession.
Judge Richard Posner has compared medieval craft guilds to the
legal profession, criticizing the negative effects of each operating as
a cartel.3 0 While arguing that the best explanation for the medieval
334. NEEDLEMAN, supra note 58, at 41.




339. Id. Needleman also notes another aspect, "I work differently with other people around
me than when I am alone. There is a certain tension, not all bad, in knowing that someone else
can come to an unpleasant judgment about me because of the way I work." Id.
340. See Posner, supra note 79, at 1-3 (comparing the cartel of the medieval craft guilds with
the modern legal profession). Posner notes that few cartels "have a mystique or an ideology, as
restricted professions in general and the legal profession in particular have; for that we must go
to the medieval craft guilds, early cartels that in periods both of prosperity and of decline resem-
ble the corresponding phases of the legal profession." Id. at 7.
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craft guilds is "that they were devices for maximizing the net earn-
ings of their members," Posner notes that "the efforts that the
guilds bent to this end fostered both a particular personal morality
and a particular institutional mystique."341 This personal morality
"emphasized such values as loyalty, equality, conformity, personal
responsibility, and patient craftsmanship, implying scrupulous at-
tention to detail and to quality."342 Posner also charts the decline of
the craft guilds, which did not survive "the transition to mass pro-
duction."343 Posner maintains that a similar transition from guild
production to mass production is taking place in the legal profes-
sion, with a concomitant decline in craft values.34
2. Pride and Humility
I believe it is not by the limited scale of his tools, nor by the medium or methods of
his work, nor by his having the whole job in his hands, but by his understanding of
the needs his products serve, and by his attitude to his material, that we recognize
the essential craftsman-an attitude involving humility, sensitiveness, and the in-
tuitive sense of going with, rather than against, the grain of life.
-Seonaid Mairi Robertson=
A second feature of craft's relationship with its past is that it
tends to engender certain attitudes and feelings in the craftsperson.
William Twining notes that the "distinguishing mark of the crafts-
man is pride in a job well-done for its own sake .... Craftsmanship
is more akin to a form of love." 346 Addressing the reader in an intro-
duction to his book on craft and contemporary culture, potter and
educator Seonaid Mairi Robertson expresses the "wish that I could
hand you a jug which I [have] made, and invite you to pour your
milk from it; invite you to get the satisfaction of gripping its sturdy
handle, of feeling your body respond easily to the change of balance
as the shapeless mass of milk, firmly contained within, is canalized
into a smooth jet flowing clean from the lip., 347 It is easy to detect
the underlying pride in work well done and the love of his craft in
Robertson's words.
341. Id. at 11.
342. Id. Posner calls "this mutually reinforcing combination of morality and mystique the
ideology of guild production," and observes that the "possession of an ideology distinguishes
medieval craft guilds from conventional modern cartels." Id.
343. Id. at 11-12.
344. See id. at 13-23.
345. ROBERTSON, supra note 33, at 31.
346. Twining, supra note 14, at 149.
347. ROBERTSON, supra note 33, at 13.
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In describing the remarkable craftsmanship of pottery from
the Sung dynasty in China, Seonaid Mairi Robertson quotes Dr.
Yanagi, a Japanese scholar, who noted that these works were pro-
duced by the " 'humblest layer of society,' " and yet they could be
produced " 'without the least trace of difficulty.' "348 Dr. Yanagi
stated that " '[n]one of these people were to be compared with the
self-conscious, learned individualists of to-day, with all their aes-
thetic theories and scientific knowledge. Yet these humble crafts-
men were able to produce works of consummate art which have be-
come models for this refined posterity.' ",349 One remarkable aspect
of these Sung wares is " 'that they were not manifestations of the
individuality of their makers. In them personality is submerged so
that the article itself has come to the fore. Sung potters were work-
ing in a world where the question 'Who made it?' did not count.' ",350
Dr. Yanagi believed that " '[t]hese potters forgot themselves while
working. The beauty of their product was rooted in the submissive
reliance on tradition. Tradition, as everybody knows, is not the
work of individuals, but the accumulation of the experience and
wisdom of long generations of our forefathers, an aggregate power
which in all cases is above the individuals.' "351
Speaking of the law, Thomas Shaffer suggests that "crafts-
manship is a way to avoid hubris."352 Striking a similar note, James
Elkins distinguishes an "ethic of professionalism," which is often
associated with arrogance, with an "ethic of craftsmanship," which
suggests the need for humility: "While we may see ourselves as do-
ing socially significant work, as devoting our lives to worthy goals
like justice, or ensuring that every man and woman shall have ac-
cess to the courts, are we not also like the simple potter or weaver
who tries to make objects that have a functional beauty?"353
348. Id. at 32 (quoting Dr. Yanagi from speeches given by him at the International Confer-
ence of Potters and Weavers, Dartington Hall, 1952).
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 32-33.
352. Thomas L. Shaffer, On Being a Professional Elder, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 624, 632
(1987). Shaffer explains, "'When you are good at what you do, and you know it, and you know
that others trust you to do what you do, you are not hubristic; you are, rather, trained in the skill
for recognizing virtues in those who pursue other crafts." Id.
353. Elkins, supra note 90, at 965.
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3. Creativity and Incrementalism
A third feature of craft's relationship with its past is a com-
mon attitude toward creativity and incrementalism that tends to be
found in craftspersons.
a. Creativity
Through [craft] simple and learned people alike can have the experience of creating.
There is a sense in which God alone creates. But He has created in us the creative
spirit, and if we do not use it in ourselves, and nurture it in children, to be em-
ployed on the world in which we live, we stifle the part of us which is nearest to the
divine.
-Seonaid Mairi Robertsonu
When craft is compared unfavorably with art, it is often on
the basis that craft does not admit of innovation and creativity. For
example, R.G. Collingwood wrote, "[It is perfectly obvious that art
proper cannot be any kind of craft.... The craftsman's skill is his
.knowledge of the means necessary to realize a given end . . .35
Collingwood dismisses the possibility of creativity in craft by de-
claring its ends given. 356 Peter Dormer also suggests that "[a]n em-
phasis upon individuality in art has also aided the decline of craft,"
because the "acquisition of craft knowledge entails learning rules
and imitating other people's work."3 7 While in reality this does not
necessarily entail a stifling of individuality, there is a strong as-
sumption that "craft knowledge is 'other people's rules' and that
these are an infringement of self-expression." 358
It is true that craft is more rooted in tradition and more de-
voted to carrying forward in faithfulness to a tradition than is art.
Nevertheless, as Seonaid Mairi Robertson has observed, "Mhe
great bulk of the world's traditional craftsmen have felt free to
make modifications, to evolve slightly different forms or patterns,
so long as these served the practical purpose."359 Even traditional
354. ROBERTSON, supra note 33, at 158.
355. R.G. COLLINGWOOD, THE PRINCIPLES OF ART 26, 28 (photo. reprint 1977) (1938).
356. Craftsperson Seonaid Mairi Robertson takes issue with CoUingwood's limitation of craft,
noting, "I believe the craftsman should be concerned with the end, the product and its effect on
the lives of others, not only with the 'means necessary' to achieving it." ROBERTSON, supra note
33, at 28.
357. DORMER, supra note 40, at 26.
358. Id.
359. ROBERTSON, supra note 33, at 28. Robertson acknowledges that "[ilt is true that the
weight of custom and tradition have for long periods been very powerful, and sometimes only the
slightest modifications were made over centuries. But the craftsmen-if they ever were made
conscious of this-would probably have claimed that the best form had been evolved for this
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crafts admit of recombination and adaptation; in the words of Wal-
ter Crane, it is in "our interpretation and use of them, and in the
power of variation and expression, that modern invention and
predilection tell.'360 Seonaid Mairi Robertson maintains that "vital-
ity is the most universal characteristic of real craft."36'
Some craftspersons are openly derisive of the ideal, or even
the possibility of, unbounded creativity. Somers Clarke, a glass
blower and member of the Arts and Crafts Movement in the late
1800s, observed that "[n]ovelty rather than improvement is the rock
on which our craftsmen are but too often wrecked."3 62 W.G. Paulson
Townsend, speaking of the craft of embroidery, noted that "[tihere
are a number of tricks practised by students revelling in ignorant,
or shall we call it eccentric, genius; sometimes called 'original-
ity'. . . . These students find no pleasure in the works [of the mas-
ters], or even the time-honoured examples in our museums; how-
ever, this cranky design will do some good, it will wear itself out,
and in doing so enhance the beauties in good healthy work.1
363
particular object, and would, very properly, have therefore asked why they should change it." Id.
One can easily imagine a lawyer or judge giving a similar rationale for why certain settled rules
of law remain undisturbed.
360. WALTER CRANE, THE BASES OF DESIGN 211 (London, George Bell & Sons 1898).
361. ROBERTSON, supra note 33, at 29. In making this point about the vitality of craft,
Robertson contrasts craft objects with mass-produced goods, and maintains that "the greatest
danger of objects produced in enormous numbers through complicated processes by many people
is that they are very apt to become moribund in the process." Id. Again, an analogy to legal work
suggests itself; consider the massive commercial contract. The craftsperson, in contrast, "knows
that vitality... stands firm even at the cost of poverty, of scorn, of the accusation of being out of
touch with the developments of his age." Id. at 30.
362. Somers Clarke, Table Glass, in ARTS AND CRAFTS ESSAYS: BY MEMBERS OF THE ARTS
AND CRAFTS EXHIBITION SOCIETY 106, 110 n.1 (William Morris ed., photo. reprint 1996) (1893).
363. W.G. PAULSON TOWNSEND, EMBROIDERY OR THE CRAFT OF THE NEEDLE 32 (London,




Also ye shall not be too ravenous in taking of your [catch] as too much at one time,
which ye may lightly do if ye do in every point as this present treatise showeth you
in every point, which should lightly be occasion to destroy your own disports and
other men's also, as when ye have a sufficient [portion] ye should covet no more as
at that time. Also ye shall busy yourself to nourish the [sport] in all that ye may
and to destroy all such things as be devourers of it. And all those that do after this
rule shall have the blessing of God and Saint Peter, which He them grant that with
His precious blood us bought.
-Dame Juliana Berners:1A
Never throw with a long line when a short one will answer your purpose.
-Richard Penn=
Craftspersons are not opposed to innovation and change, but
they tend to take a more cautious attitude towards trying to make
something entirely new. Craftspersons who are unwilling to inno-
vate may become stagnant. Quilter Nancy Crow warns that when
"[q]uilt after quilt is made employing some singular technique until
the body of quilts takes on the look of the technique[,] each quilt [is]
so like the previous one that the only adjectives that apply are
'repetitious' and 'boring.' "866 Perhaps the quiltmaker becomes
"stuck in formula quilts that are easier to sell in direct relationship
to their unobtrusiveness?"36 7 When this happens, "[i]t seems the
quiltmaker is afraid to move on, unable to move on, or does not
want to move on, while, unfortunately, the technique has become
redundant and the quilts have no 'soul.' "36 In a review of Nancy
Crow's work, one critic noted that her "brave and refreshingly mod-
ern creations prove that quilting, indeed all craft forms, can remain
true to their traditions while continuing to reflect the contemporary
world."369
Speaking of the law, Sidney A. Shapiro and Richard E. Levy
maintain that "[c]raft reflects the values of consistence with consti-
tutional and statutory provisions and continuity with prior caselaw,
364. DAmE JULIANA BERNERS, TREATYSE (1496), quoted in JAIES ROBB, NOTABLE ANGLING
LITERATURE 19 (London, Herbert Jenkins Ltd. n.d.) (footnotes omitted).
365. RICHARD PENN, MAXIMS AND HINTS FOR AN ANGLER 10 (Philadelphia, F. Bell 1855).
366. Crow, supra note 276, at 45.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Susan Tamulevich, Nancy Crow: Improvisational Quilts at the Renwick Gallery,
FIBERARTS, Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 62, 62. Tamulevich opines, "What Nancy Crow does, almost better
than any of her contemporaries, is to build upon the best practices of traditional quilting with
the sensibilities of a contemporAry artist." Id.
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but permits interstitial evolution and, in exceptional cases, overrul-
ing precedent."370 Benjamin Cardozo observed that the judge "is not
a knight-errant roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty
or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated prin-
ciples. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and un-
regulated benevolence.
371
4. Craft's Tripartite Gaze
But, besides the past, it is well to look to the future. We, too, shall grow out of date.
Fishers of a hundred years hence will cast an easy smile on ourselves and on our
methods which we think so delicate and so final. Our tackle and our dress, our
practice and our appearance, will seem to belong to the dark ages .... And yet [the
fishermen in an old picture] were great fishers ... and great men too, picked men,
the best of their time. Is it possible that we shall ever be like that? Not only shall we
be, but we are: we are, to the eye of futurity a century hence. We are just as antique,
as obsolete and as far away.
-John Waller HiIls
372
The trout fly of today grew out of the trout fly of yesterday.
-John McDonald
373
Former Yale Law School Dean Guido Calabresi often chal-
lenged students who were struggling with a legal question to "imag-
ine the past, remember the future." The charm, and the puzzle, lies
in the fact that the formulation seems to get it backwards-should
we not remember the past and imagine the future? This inversion of
expectations was, of course, intentional. When students were trying
to reconstruct what had happened in a particular case, Dean
Calabresi would incant: "Imagine the past!" When we were trying to
predict how a proposed rule for today's case would be interpreted
and applied tomorrow, he would thunder: "Remember the future!"
One purpose of Dean Calabresi's challenge was to sensitize
students to the unique posture that law has towards the past, the
370. Sidney A- Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in Sub.
stantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1053 (1995). Shapiro and Levy
contrast the "craft' component of judicial behavior with an "outcome" component, which "focuses
on the result in a given case and its implications for the parties and society as a whole; it reflects
the values of justice and social utility as filtered through a judge's worldview." Id.
371. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 141 (1921). Rather, the
judge is to "exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by
system, and subordinated to the 'primordial necessity of order in the social life.' " Id. (citation
omitted).
372. JOHN WALLER HILLS, A SUMMER ON THE TEST, at ix (2d ed. 1924).
373. John McDonald, Introduction to THEODORE GORDON, THE COMPLETE FLY FISHERMAN:
THE NOTES AND LETTERS OF THEODORE GORDON, at x (John McDonald ed., 1947).
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present, and the future. Law looks backwards, seeking fit, consis-
tency, and fidelity with what has been done before; at a minimum,
justice demands that like cases be treated alike. Law is also ineluc-
tably rooted in the present; today's case will result in somebody los-
ing life, liberty, or property. In addition, law also focuses an eye on
the future; we must worry about how the rules we adopt today will
be applied by our posterity who may not yet be born to situations
that we may be unable to imagine. The nature and demands of
law's tripartite gaze seem to be different from any other form of
human endeavor or social practice.
The dictate, "imagine the past," reminds us that the past is
not just a simple, objective fact, easily retrieved, represented, and
remembered. This is a truth that is obvious to historians, who in-
tuitively grasp the myriad ways in which the past can be created,
recreated, and mythologized. It also reminds us of the importance of
empathy, the capacity and inclination imaginatively to seek to un-
derstand the varied perceptions and recollections that different in-
dividuals will have. The dictate, "remember the future," focuses our
minds upon the gravity of our obligation to the future. It is not
enough for lawyers and judges simply to "imagine" what might
happen tomorrow; imagination can be fanciful, even frivolous. An
obligation to remember is much more solemn, perhaps even sacred.
In looking to the past, the craft is mindful of, but not be-
holden to, tradition. Speaking of the potter's craft, Seonaid Mairi
Robertson observes that "[tlradition enshrines the knowledge and
the satisfactions of generations of a community. It is 'more than one
man deep.' Tradition respects the natural limits of the material,
and embraces its richness; acceptance of a tradition sustains and
protects the craftsman while leaving him freedom to be wholly him-
self within its range."374 Tradition even reserves a place for the oc-
casional genius, who comes along "once in many years," and who,
"having served and understood his material, suddenly by an act of
faith extends these limits, and shows us that this material is capa-
ble of uses undreamed of."375 Again, one can almost imagine that
Robertson was speaking of a lawyer or judge's use of tradition and
precedent in her work.3
76
374. ROBERTSON, supra note 33, at 23.
375. Id.
376. For a defense of the role of tradition in the law, see, for example, Kronman, supra note
111; Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029 (1990); Michael J. Perry,
The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional "Interpretation," 58 S.
CAL. L. REV. 551 (1985); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987).
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Seonaid Mairi Robertson has observed that "in an age which
has almost lost its craft traditions a much greater responsibility is
put on the individual craftsman, to draw strength from the past and
yet be alive to the needs of the present. Men and women today who
devote their lives to any aspect of art or craft must resolve their
relationship to the past.
377
E. Judgment
The skills, the responsibility for making judgments, the satisfaction of seeing some-
thing produced .. .which are apart of even the simplest jobs in ... a craft-centered
community ... [are lost when] [s]ome men are become all brain, and some all hand;
neither are whole men.
-Seonaid Mairi Robertson 378
[Craftsmanship] depends on the judgement, dexterity and care which the maker ex-
ercises as he works. The essential idea is that the quality of the result is continually
at risk during the process of making ....
-David Pye37
In sum, each of the characteristics I have described contrib-
utes to the elusive and difficult to define attribute of good judg-
ment.3 80 Ultimately, good judgment is the primary (or summary)
craft virtue of the lawyer and judge.3 81 The importance of good
judgment is probably self-evident in the case of judges, as is the
intrinsic satisfaction that comes to a judge from exercising judg-
377. ROBERTSON, supra note 33, at 43. Craftsmen, Robertson notes, "may race ahead, excited
by the intricacies of contemporary structural developments, as architects or engineers, or move
in a steady flow between the past and the present as workers or advisers in rural industries, or
accept the slower pace of practical rediscovery which is the way children learn, or even turn their
gaze backward as art historians, who also are needed if they will interpret our past to us. We
need all of them .... Id. at 43-44 (emphasis omitted).
378. Id. at 37-38.
379. DAVID PYE, THE NATURE AND ART OF WORKMANSHIP 7 (1971). Pye calls the craftsman's
workmanship the "workmanship of risk." Id.
380. In a forum discussion of his book, The Lost Lawyer, Dean Kronman reflected upon the
difficulty of defining what constitutes good judgment.
I have to say that [judgment] is the most difficult concept that I've wrestled
with. Though I wrote a book about it, I felt in the end-and I'm being candid
with you about this-I felt in the end that I hadn't touched the nerve of it. That
I'd skirted around the question but not put my finger on it. And it may be, in
the end, that it isn't something which is easily capturable in theory, being itself
a non-theoretical, pre-theoretical or post-theoretical virtue. The virtue of sound
judgment may not be the kind of thing that a theory can ever adequately cap-
ture or express. But I tried in the book.
Anthony T. Kronman, The Second Driker Forum for Excellence in the Law, 42 WAYNE L. REV.
115, 126 (1995).
381. See KRONMAN, supra note 3, at 97; see also Kronman, supra note 380, at 121 (discussing
the exercise of judgment as the most important and satisfying aspect of practicing law).
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ment well. 38 2 The importance of judgment may be less evident in
the case of practicing lawyers. But exercising judgment well, on be-
half of clients who may be in great need or otherwise vulnerable,
may be the activity most likely to bring satisfaction and profes-
sional fulfillment to lawyers. 383 Opportunities for exercising judg-
ment exist when counseling a troubled client about options for vin-
dicating her rights;384 in advising a client whether to accept a set-
tlement or to proceed to trial;3 85 in devising a trial strategy;86 and
in crafting the wording of the issue presented in an appellate
brief,3 87 to mention but a few examples.
As Anthony Kronman has argued, however, trends in the le-
gal profession in the past generation have significantly undermined
the opportunities for lawyers, especially young lawyers, to learn
and experience exercising good judgment.38 These trends have been
382. Indeed, saying good judgment is the definitive quality of the good judge comes close to
being a tautology. Nevertheless, giving an account of what contributes to the quality of good
judgment is very difficult.
383. See, e.g., ARTHUR L. LIfAN, LAWYER: A LIFE OF COUNSEL AND CONTROVERSY 63-64
(1998) ("Behind my desk hangs a nineteenth-century Old Testament sampler that [my wife]
Ellen found for me in a flea market. It is from the Book of Isaiah, and it reads Tear Thou Not,
For I Am With Thee.' To me, the quotation expresses perfectly what every lawyer should strive
for in the lawyer-client relationship, but oddly, the very idea--of the lawyer as counselor-is
today rejected in certain professional quarters."); Kronman, supra note 380, at 121 ('I believe
that it is in the exercise, the cultivation and exercise of this capacity [of judgment or prudence],
that the true source of satisfaction in the doing of the craft [of being a lawyer] itself consists. It is
in the acquisition of judgment and its exercise on behalf of one's clients that the sense of oneself
as an accomplished craftsman rests.").
384. "The lawyer, when acting as a counselor... minimizes the likelihood of conflict between
parties by stabilizing relationships and promoting understanding and cooperatior .... It is the
counselor's function to help clients make informed and rational choices among alternative
courses of conduct .... In the performance of this function of counseling, the lawyer must main-
tain a certain detachment so that an objective decision may be made." Edward D. Re. The Law-
yer as Counselor and the Prevention of Litigation, 31 CATH. U. L REV. 685, 690-92 (1982) (em-
phasis omitted).
385. See, e.g., Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refine-
ment, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501, 507-11, 589-94 (1990); Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Law-
yer as Effective Negotiator: A Systematic Approach, 2 CLINICAL L REV. 73, 73-76 (1995); Steven
Zeidman, To Plead or Not to Plead: Effective Assistance and Client-Centered Counseling, 39 B.C.
L REV. 841, 841-49 (1998).
386. See Lynn M LoPucki & Walter 0. Weyrauch, A Theory of Legal Strategy, 49 DUKE LJ.
1405, 1407-13 (2000).
387. "Issue statements can make or break a lawyer's credibility.... Once you determine your
strongest arguments, you must frame your issues concisely and accurately. As you draft the
argument, continue to edit and refine the issue statements. Judges and clerks usually read issue
statements first... I cannot over-emphasize the importance of well-crafted issue statements."
Sherri Adelkoff IRAC: Twelve Tips for Better Brief Writing. LAW. J., June 2, 2000, at 5, 5.
388. See KRONMAN, supra note 3, at 271-314 (discussing recent trends in law firms); see also
Kronman, supra note 380, at 121 C[A]s the opportunities and occasions for the development and
expression of judgment began to shrink in [large] firms as a result of their growth in size, their
internal bureaucratization, the division of legal labor into ever finer narrower specialities, the
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particularly acute for practicing lawyers, especially those working
in large metropolitan firms. But similar trends are evident in other
parts of the legal profession, including the judiciary. For practitio-
ners, forces contributing to these trends include the treatment of
associates as interchangeable producers of billable hours, increased
specialization, the explosion in the length, complexity, and redun-
dancy of legal documents such as contracts, indentures, and pro-
spectuses, and most importantly the ascension of salary as the pri-
mary metric for evaluating professional stature. 389 For judges, these
forces include increased .case loads,390 judgment-limiting statutes
and rules such as the federal sentencing guidelines, 8 91 increased
automation leading to longer and more technical opinions, 92 and an
increased reliance upon law clerks for drafting opinions. 393 The pro-
loss, the collapse of the traditional long-term relationship between firm and outside client and its
replacement with episodic one-on-one transactional encounters that had no life beyond the mo-
ment of the deal, all of that created a situation in which occasions for the development and exer-
cise of judgment began to shrink. And so it was no wonder ... that work in these firms should
have become less and less satisfying to the young people going into them.").
389. See, e.g., Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Un-
happy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871, 888-906 (1999). At a forum
discussing his book, The Lost Lawyer, Kronman elaborated: "America's large firms have become
explicitly, candidly, without shame in the last twenty years unembarrassedly commercialistic in
their outlook and practice. The bottom line has become the only line for them, and the older
ethos of craftsmanship which was nourished and reinforced in a very deliberate and careful way
by lawyers in these firms a half century ago has disappeared, and has been replaced by an ethos
of moneymaking which puts the exclusive stress mark on the number of billable hours that you
put in and the number of dollars those billable hours produce." Kronman, supra note 380, at 121-
22.
390. See, e.g., Thomas E. Baker & Denis J. Hauptly, Taking Another Measure of the "Crisis of
Volume" in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 97, 101-05 (1994); John A. Mar-
tin & Michelle Travis, Defending the Indigent During a War on Crime, 1 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 69, 93-97 (1992); Charles W. Nihan & Harvey Rishikof, Rethinking the Federal Court Sys-
tem: Thinking the Unthinkable, 14 MISS. C. L. REV. 349, 350-52 (1994); Stephen Reinhardt, A
Plea to Save the Federal Courts: Too Few Judges, Too Many Cases, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 52,
52.
391. See Joseph B. Treaster, Two Judges Decline Drug Cases, Protesting Sentencing Rules,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1993, at Al (reporting U.S. District Judges Jack B. Weinstein's and Whit-
man Knapp's refusals to hear any more drug cases in protest of mandatory federal sentencing
guidelines for drug crimes).
392. In the words of U.S. Circuit Court Judge Abner J. Mikva, it "is no longer a court secret"
that "judicial opinions have become less luminous and more voluminous." Abner J. Mikva, For
Whom Judges Write, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1357, 1357 (1988). Speaking of the craft of creating work-
ing drawings, Lewis F. Day makes an observation that might just as easily be said of the judicial
opinion. In 999 out of 1,000 cases, Day maintains, over elaboration "implies either that, having
little to say, a man fills up his time in saying it at unnecessary length, or that he is working for
exhibition." Lewis F. Day, Of Designs and Working Drawings, in ARTS AND CRAFTS ESSAYS: BY
MEMBERS OF THE ARTS AND CRAFTS EXHIBITION SOCIETY 249, 260 (William Morris ed., photo.
reprint 1996) (1893).
393. See KRONMAN, supra note 3, at 347-51 (discussing recent trends in courts).
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fession's elevation of remuneration as the primary measure of pro-
fessional standing has probably also contributed to the dissatisfac-
tion of judges, who understandably might feel undervalued when
their neophyte clerks depart to earn salaries as second- or third-
year associates higher than those earned by judges. 39
These trends in the profession have not eliminated the need,
nor opportunities, for exercising good judgment. But it is difficult to
examine the state of the legal profession and not conclude that
something has gone deeply and fundamentally awry.395 And I have
a nagging suspicion that reduced opportunities for lawyers-
especially for incomers to the legal profession-to view themselves
as belonging to a craft tradition, and to be nurtured and coaxed in
the development of their craft skills, has contributed in a signifi-
cant way to the erosion of professional satisfaction among lawyers.
If lawyers and judges were to develop, renew, or remember a
vision of their professional life as being guided by craft virtues, as
they seek and cultivate opportunities to exercise their craft-
especially craft judgment-the likelihood that they will find satis-
faction in their professional life is much greater.396 For judges the
opportunities for-indeed the necessity of-exercising judgment are
unavoidable. My impression is that this may be part of the reason
why levels of professional dissatisfaction are lower among judges
than among other lawyers. In other areas of the profession, pursu-
ing the craft vision in today's climate and professional culture
might be very difficult. In some areas of the profession, I fear, con-
cern for the professional development and well-being of associates
394. See Robel, supra note 202, at 904 n.62 (quoting Survey of the United States Circuit
Judges, in 2 WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOmMIttEE REPORTS (Federal Courts Study Comm. ed.,
1990) (quoting one federal judge who responded to the survey that "the biggest problem we have
is salary. The top lawyers simply have no interest in our jobs. You cannot educate your children,
take any meaningful trips or pay normal living expenses. Congress has taken away most of our
prestige by making us 'the laughing stock' of the legal community.")).
395. See, e.g., Schiltz, supra note 389, at 872-88 (cataloguing evidence of lawyers' lack of well-
being).
396. This is likely to be true both for those on the giving and receiving end of mentoring rela-
tionships. "In today's profession, lawyers have the opportunity, indeed the obligation, to lead by
example, to give back to the profession by mentoring junior colleagues as wise and trusted coun-
selors, teachers and guides." Kathy Morris, C'nwn You Can Do It-entor, Mentored It's Not
Easy, But It's Worth It, BUS. L. TODAY, July-Aug. 1999, at 29, 29. The mentoring relationship
gives a seasoned lawyer or judge the opportunity to pass on the accumulated wisdom and skill of
his or her craft, thus preserving tradition, culture, and ethics, and creating a sense of camarade-
rie and shared responsibility for the betterment and refinement of the craft. In the process, both
mentor and mentee can experience a renewed and deepened commitment and enthusiasm for
their work. See Bill Brooks, The Art of fentoring: 'Listen, Listen, Listen,' RES GESTAE, Nov.-Dec.
1998, at 32, 32; Dianne Molvig, Mentoring: Reaching Out, GivingBack, WIS. LAW., Mar. 1998, at
10, 12-13; Morris, supra, at 29.
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is so low that the suggestion that significant firm resources should
be expended creating opportunities for the development of judg-
ment and other craft virtues by young associates, for example, by
taking seriously the obligation to mentor novice lawyers, will be
viewed as ridiculous or-perhaps worse-as quirky or quaint. 97
1. Deliberation, Choice, and Action
Closely related to the exercise of good judgment is the legal
craftsperson's love of deliberation. Kronman criticizes judges who
value efficiency more than deliberation, relying too much on staff,
including inexperienced law clerks, adopting a case management
rather than a deliberative state of mind, transforming the work of
judging from "statesmanship [to something] requiring only admin-
istrative skill instead."398
2. Character and Temperament
Good judgment, Aristotle maintains, rests upon deliberative
excellence. But Aristotle is notoriously cryptic about what is re-
quired to be skilled at deliberation. 399 He does, however, emphasize
the importance of experience and moral virtue"' in making right
the ends towards which practical deliberation aims. 40 1 Yale Law
School Dean Anthony T. Kronman has given perhaps the most com-
pelling account of what virtues of character are required for one to
excel in practical reasoning, particularly in the context of the law.
In his book, The Lost Lawyer, Dean Kronman argues that the two
most important virtues of character for the exercise of good judg-
ment are sympathy and detachment.40 2 Sympathy, Kronman ex-
397. In his article, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profes-
sion: A Postscript, Judge Harry T. Edwards of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia laments that "[niot only are young lawyers expected to become fungible billing units for
their firms, they are expected to become cash cow alumni for their alma maters." 91 MICH. L.
REV. 2191, 2212 (1993) (quoting a student who wrote to Judge Edwards in response to his origi-
nal article on this topic).
398. KRONMAN, supra note 3, at 342.
399. See, e.g., REEVE, supra note 99, at 79-84.
400. The Greek term is arete ethike, sometimes translated as "excellence of character."
401. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 96, at VI.13.1144b30-1145a2. In this regard, Aristotle distin-
guishes phronesis from cleverness (deinotes). Cleverness is the capacity "to do the things that
tend towards the mark we have set before ourselves, and to hit it." Id. at VI.12.1144a23-6. In
contrast, phronesis involves not only being clever, but also having the correct ends, which rests
upon moral virtue. Id. at VI.12.1144a8-9, VI.12.1144a29-36.
402. See KRONMAN, supra note 3, at 66-74.
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plains, involves taking competing options seriously by "strain[ing]
to feel the force of those internal norms that are the source of what-
ever appeal" the option presents, and by striving to see values asso-
ciated with a particular choice "in their most appealing light."
403
Kronman characterizes sympathy "as an attitude midway between
observation, on the one hand, and identification or endorsement, on
the other."4 4 The second habit of character Kronman believes is
important to exercising good judgment is detachment: "[I]f sympa-
thy goes beyond mere observation, it also falls short of outright ac-
ceptance." 40 5 Detachment enables one to "entertain a point of view
without making it one's own, in the sense of giving the values asso-
ciated with that point of view one's full endorsement."40s Detach-
ment is important because, in making practical choices, oftentimes
more than one alternative must be sympathetically considered be-
fore a judgment is made. To this list I would add humility.
407
Others have identified a number of other traits or habits of
character that would be distinctive of the judicial craftsperson.
John Q. Barrett has argued that "at the level of craft, good judging
includes maintaining an even temperament, taking hands-on re-
sponsibility for the work, communicating effectively, and generally
seeking to embody propriety in all aspects of one's life on and off
the bench."408 In his article, Reflections on the Art and Craft of
Judging, William A. Bablitch identifies "principled decision-
making" as the most important element in the judicial craft, an
element which he defines as the ability to be "free from personal
bias and prejudice," a responsiveness to well-developed values and
principles, restraint in decisionmaking, and having an "intelligent
heart."4 9 Bablitch also emphasizes that such judges will know their
place within the constitutional system and within society, will be
intellectually humble, and will be aware of the value judgments
they make on a daily basis. 41
0
Paul Gewirtz has argued that candor and sincerity are par-
ticularly important aspects of the judicial craft: "Candor and sincer-
ity are part of the distinctive process that legitimates judicial
403. Id. at 70.
404. Id. at 71.
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. See Scharfis, supra note 107, at 135-57.
408. Barrett, supra note 224, at 4-5. Barrett continues, "These are not matters that can he
decreed through the Code of Judicial Conduct. They exist in the judge who can, and who remem-
bers to try to, summon them from within." Id.
409. Bablitch, supra note 7, at 40.
410. Id. at 40-41.
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power-a process of decisionmaking and discourse whose require-
ments include writing opinions and giving reasoned justifications.
These constraints help to promote the public accountability of
judges and to stimulate judicial reflection and self-control. Without
a requirement of candor, the constraints would be meaningless.
Thus, misreading and other dishonesties in judicial opinions are
generally more than craft flaws; candor in judicial reasoning is part
of the morality of craft."
41'
III. BECOMING A CRAFTSPERSON
Nemo nascitur artifex [no one is born a craftsman].
-Sir Edward Coke42
In the future the role of the craftsman will be more important than ever before.
-Marshall McLuhan
413
How does one become a craftsperson? Assuming that one is
intrigued by the idea of viewing one's professional development as a
lawyer or judge as learning a craft, what should one do next? Once
again, the best way to answer these questions is to look at other
craft traditions that still view themselves self-consciously and
proudly as crafts.
Crafts are learned first and foremost by observing and fol-
lowing the example of others. In 1898, Fred Miller observed, "[N]o
student can afford to ignore the work of other days and peoples, not
for imitation, but to widen his sympathies and to cultivate the criti-
cal faculty, which as a student he is probably wholly without.
414
The philosopher Michael Polanyi notes that "[t]o learn by example
is to submit to authority. You follow your master because you trust
his manner of doing things even when you cannot analyse and ac-
count in detail for its effectiveness. '415 Polanyi explains that learn-
ing a craft involves learning rules, but not simply being told those
rules by the master: "By watching the master and emulating his
efforts in the presence of his example, the apprentice unconsciously
picks up the rules . . . including those which are not explicitly
411. Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 667 (1983) (footnote omitted),
412. SIR EDWARD COKE, THE FIRsT PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND §
138, at 97 (Garland Publ'g 1979) (1628).
413. Five Decades: American Craft Council, supra note 57, at 87 (quoting Marshall McLuhan
(1966)).
414. MILLER, supra note 185, at 4.




known to the master himself. These hidden rules can be assimilated
only by a person who surrenders himself to that extent uncritically
to the imitation of another. A society which wants to preserve a
fund of personal knowledge must submit to tradition."416
The suggestion that learning a craft requires submission to
authority and tradition cuts against much of the grain of contempo-
rary American culture. Nonetheless, the submission described by
Polanyi is neither blind nor unthinking. Writing about the visual
arts, Peter Dormer has observed that "[a] common assumption is
that craft skills are mechanically learned and exercised; and that
they are thu§ obviously unthinking and uncreative."417 Dormer also
notes that "[t]his modern prejudice goes hand in hand with an atti-
tude, perhaps peculiar to the latter half of the twentieth century in
Western culture, that one can learn skills as and when one thinks
one needs them."418
Dormer maintains that in general there are "three stages in
the intellectuals' sleight of hand when it comes to craft issues. The
first is to begin by trying to take the learning of the craft seriously.
The second is the realization that learning the craft is going to re-
quire much more time (and humility) than first envisaged. The
third stage, because their own efforts are, understandably, not very
good, is to dismiss the craft element as 'sterile and rule-bound' and
claim as more expressive their 'freer' efforts. 419
I will discuss four aspects of becoming a craftsperson, focus-
ing first upon the role of rules and theory in craft, next upon the
ubiquity and necessity of uncertainty in craft, then upon the role of
apprenticeship and failure in learning to become a craftsperson,
and finally upon the craftsperson's attitude toward money as a re-
ward for his or her work.
416. Id.
417. DORMER, supra note 40, at 40.
418. Id.
419. Id. at 65.
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A. The Role of Rules and Theory: Constraint and Responsibility
Fishing is not an exact science.
-Larry Cotter
42
Craft knowledge is genuine knowledge. To possess it in any form is to see the world
in an enriched way compared with someone who does not possess it. There is noth-
ing magical about this. If you are a dentist.., you cannot help noticing the shape




[I]n flye-fishing for a Trout, the Angler must observe his twelve several flies for the
twelve months of the year; I say, he that follows that rule shall be as sure to catch
fish, and be as wise, as he that makes Hay by the fair dayes in an Almanack, and
no surer; for those very flyes that use to appear about and on the water in one
moneth of the year, may the following year come almost a moneth sooner or later, as
the same year proves colder or hotter .... [A/nd for Winter flie.fishing, [general
rules are] as useful as an Almanack out of date. And of these, (because as no man is
born an artist, so no man is born an angler) I thought fit to give thee notice.
-Izaak Walton
422
Craft knowledge involves both rules and theory, but cannot
be completely expressed in terms of either. An understanding of the
role and place of rules and theory in craft is an important element
in understanding how crafts are learned. Craft knowledge is often
described by craftspersons as involving neither rules nor theory,
but rather a kind of working technique, know-how, or tacit knowl-
edge.
420. Magnuson.Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act: Hearing Before the Sub.
comm. on Oceans and Fisheries of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 106th
Cong. 7 (2000) (testimony of Larry Cotter, CEO, APICDA Joint Ventures, Inc.), available at
http://www.senate.gov/-commerce/issues/ocfishloo.html.
421. DORMER, supra note 40, at 68.
422. WALTON, supra note 173, at 23.
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1. Rules
As the English are methodical even in their recreations, and are the most scientific
of sportsmen, [fishing/ has been reduced among them to perfect rule and system.
-Washington Irvingm5
It is the physicality of the crafts that pleases me; I learn through my hands and my
eyes and my skin what I could never learn through my brain.
-MC. Richards 424
Practical reason and craft are similar in that neither is gov-
erned by a set of rules, no matter how nuanced or complex. 425 As
Sarah Broadie has observed, "[R]ules of a craft are developed with-
out recourse to preestablished rules; yet surely it belongs to the
craft itself, not to any other kind of ability, to develop its own rules.
And in this the craftsman shows himself more artful and more ad-
mirable than if he merely follows rules." 426 One advantage of learn-
ing at the foot of a master is that the master can help "reveal to the
novice the possibilities that exist for extending the craft," in short,
"they cannot help [but] demonstrate the principle of 'rules are there
to be broken' (but only if you fully understand them in the first
place)."427
This is not to say that learning the rules is unimportant;
rather, it is to say that no set of rules will be complete, and the
most skillful craft work will be done by master practitioners who
are not consciously thinking about the rules. A craftsperson will
thus be guided by rules, but may not be conscious of those rules
while in the midst of practicing his craft.428 Michael Polanyi ex-
plains that "the aim of a skilful performance is achieved by the ob-
servance of a set of rules which are not known as such to the person
following them."4 9 Peter Dormer observes that there are two differ-
423. WASHINGTON IRVING, The Angler, in THE VOYAGE AND OTHER ENGLISH ESSAYS FROM
THE SKETCH BOOK 29, 36 (Boston, Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1891).
424. Five Decades: American Craft Council, supra note 57, at 88 (quoting M.C. Richards
(1964)).
425. See supra Part I.C.1.
426. BROADIE, supra note 97, at 203.
427. DORMER, supra note 40, at 50.
428. An artist, in contrast with a craftsperson, may have contempt for rules, finding them
unduly constraining of creativity. Peter Dormer has observed that "some artists and art students
believe that the only purpose of a rule is to be questioned. Questioning convention is the ortho-
doxy of the avant-garde." Id. at 42. The notion of an avant-garde craftsperson is quixotic if not
oxymoronic.
429. POLANYI, supra note 415, at 49 (emphasis omitted).
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ent ways in which rules can be "unknown." The first, which would
seem to be inapplicable to the law, is that rules are always un-
known. 430 The second, which does seem applicable to the law, "is
that rules are learnt and then, as one becomes expert, 'forgotten'
(they become second nature and we take them for granted).
'431
Ludwig Wittgenstein offers a basis for understanding the
general nature of craft knowledge. 432 Peter Dormer describes Witt-
genstein's basic insight as follows: "All craft activity is organized
activity: it follows rules, conventions and patterns. The goal of a
craft is not the practice of rules for their own sake but the success-
ful accomplishment of a task-ideally, new, surprising and wonder-
ful tasks."433 Wittgenstein's concept of constitutive rules is helpful
in understanding the type of knowledge that we call craft knowl-
edge. Dormer explains that "[t]he 'constitutive rules' that govern a
particular kind of craft activity are not external to it: they are that
craft activity. The rules that enable us to draw or paint or ride a
bike are not separable from the activity. Rules, in the sense now
under discussion, are the components of an activity which together
add up to a body of knowledge. They cannot be divorced from that
activity: if they are then you destroy that activity. To paint a por-
trait (a coloured likeness of a living model) is to obey the rules of
portrait painting-not in the sense of obeying an order from some-
one else, but obeying the internal logic of an activity."4 34 In para-
graph 199 of Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein explores
the kind of rules that constitute craft activity. He writes, "'To un-
derstand a sentence means to understand a language. To under-
stand a language means to be a master of a technique.' "43 Dormer
elaborates: "One of the observable characteristics about learning
language or using it is that we do not consciously set out to learn by
being taught rules, at least not explicitly. A young child does not
learn to speak and understand what Mother or Father is saying by
430. As an example of rules that are unknown, Peter Dormer, suggests riding a bicycle. 'lViii.
lions of people can ride a bike, yet no one knows how they ride a bike, nor can they tell anyone
else how to ride a bike, although plenty of people can tell a cyclist how to improve after conquer-
ing the essentials of moving forward, maintaining a balance, and avoiding obstacles. One does
not learn to ride a bike by looking at the rules." DORMER, supra note 40, at 20. The accuracy of
Dormer's observation is confirmed by recollecting how you learned to ride a bike, or how you
taught your child to ride. It is unlikely, to say the least, that you began by consulting a rulebook
or instruction manual.
431. Id.
432. See id. at 60-69.
433. Id. at 60.
434. Id.
435. Id. at 61 (quoting LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (1968)).
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learning the explicit rules of grammar; these explicit rules demand
an understanding of language in the first place. The child learns
from people speaking to him and picks up the rules of speech with-
out being aware that they are rules."
436
Socrates is credited with the view that an expert is a person
who can state the rules from which he or she proceeds. 43 7 Hubert L.
Dreyfus has argued that this formulation gets it backwards. Ex-
perts, Dreyfus argues, do not reason from rules. Rules are for be-
ginners. Dreyfus argues that a novice at driving a car or playing
chess will be acutely aware of the rules governing driving or play-
ing chess. 3 8 Some crafts involve only a few straightforward rules.
May Morris, speaking of the craft of embroidery, notes that "[t]here
are no mysteries of method beyond a few elementary rules that can
be quickly learnt; no way to perfection except that of care and pa-
tience and love of the work itself."43 9 As one progresses through suc-
cessive stages-from an advanced beginner, through competence
and proficiency, and even on to expertise-awareness of rules de-
creases. Dreyfus argues that "[i]f one asks an expert for strict rules
one will, in effect, force the expert to regress to the level of a begin-
ner and state the rules he still remembers but no longer uses."440
Dreyfus concludes that "no amount of rules and facts can capture
the knowledge that an expert has when he has stored his experi-
ence of the actual outcomes of tens of thousands of situations. The
Socratic slogan 'If you can't explain it, you don't understand it'
should be reversed: anyone who thinks he can fully explain his
skill, does not have expert understanding."441
Peter Dormer suggests that Wittgenstein's and Dreyfus's
thinking "supports the thesis that 'real' knowledge includes tacit
knowledge and that practice often precedes theory and that theory
is embedded in and inferred from practice."442 "The constitutive
rules of a craft are only learned by actually doing the activity. In-
436. Id. at 61. Dormer comments, "I believe that Wittgenstein means that rules are embed-
ded in and are inferred from practices-from events and experiences, from living-and not the
other way around." Id. Dormer also notes that "one of the mistakes the beginners make in prac-
tice-as distinct from Wittgenstein's theory-is to begin by trying to interpret the rule. You
think about it. You are prickling all over with self-awareness and puzzlement before committing
brush to canvas or bow to string." Id. at 62.
437. See Hubert L. Dreyfus, Is Socrates to Blame for Cognitivism?, in ARFIFCAL
INTELLIGENCE, CULTURE AND LANGUAGE: ON EDUCATION AND WORK 219, 225 (Bo Goranzon &
Magnus Florin eds., 1990).
438. Id. at 221.
439. Morris, supra note 237, at 212.
440. Dreyfus, supra note 437, at 227.
441. Id.
442. DORMER, supra note 40, at 64.
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deed, they are the activity. This is a fundamental point about craft
knowledge. You cannot understand it or know it until you can do it.
Reading about it is not the same as understanding it.
"44s
2. Theory
Any judge, one might suppose, would find it easy to describe the process which he
had followed a thousand times and more. Nothing could be farther from the truth.
-Benjamin N. Cardozo" 4
Craft knowledge can also be contrasted with theoretical
knowledge. 445 Peter Dormer explains that "[c]raft knowledge is of-
ten difficult or even impossible to translate into theory or to encode
(for the purposes of computing) into mathematical or logical lan-
guages."44
6
Carla Needleman, speaking of the craft of pottery, maintains
that "[s]peculative imagination is useless. If it were possible to
learn through speculative analogy, the craft would not be neces-
sary. The craft teaches precisely through bypassing the self-
indulgent speculative part of the mind that would rather think
about working than work. The craft provides experience. I can learn
through the order of experiences contained in a craft if I am willing
not to be hasty in drawing conclusions and if I am willing not to
think I know better and can manipulate the order of experiences.
The craft will lead me if I am able to put aside my impatience and
follow."447
Similarly, the craft of the law is not reducible to or repre-
sentable by theory. Linda Ross Meyer has suggested that while
looking at judicial decisionmaking as a craft "cannot give us a theo-
retical or normative account of a good judge, it resonates with and
reminds us of what we already know: a thoughtful judge is one who
listens (a court proceeding is called a 'hearing,' after all), who re-
sponds to possibilities opened by past practices, who is more silent
than loquacious, who is focused on the case, who is humble, and
who is not trying to apply any theory of adjudication, grind any po-
litical axes, or control the future. The thoughtful judge, like the
443. Id. at 42.
444. CARDOZO, supra note 371, at 9.
445. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (describing Aristotle's distinction between
phronesis (practical wisdom) and techne (craft), each of which is a subset of praktikos (practical
knowledge), with sophia (theoretical wisdom)).
446. DORMER, supra note 40, at 11.
447. NEEDLEMAN, supra note 58, at 23.
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thoughtful craftsman, looks for the shapes of justice that are slum-
bering in the case."44
Douglas Lind maintains that judges do not and should not
pay much attention to prevailing theories of adjudication because
"the interpretive claims and normative considerations of externalist
theory are simply irrelevant and unnecessary" to the "craft-bound
excellence" to which judges aspire. 449 In contrast, Llewellyn believes
that there is a place for academic lawyering because it brings "out
for observation lines of function and method in the craft," which
"sharpens the eye for the work" of judging.450 Kronman, echoing
Llewellyn, notes that "[w]ithout displacing the practical know-how
that constitutes the core of the craft of judging, critical reflective
thought can in this way become an element or ingredient in it, help-
ing to ensure the craft's integrity and increasing its effective-
ness."451
Kronman argues that law professors must use their class-
rooms "to combat the idea that law becomes interesting or intelligi-
ble only when seen from the standpoint of another field; to discredit
the claim that one cannot participate in its culture without having
first mastered the idiom and techniques of some more rigorous
nonlegal discipline, such as philosophy or economics; to discourage
the belief that behind the surface chaos of the law there are simple
organizing structures that it is the chief object of law study to de-
scribe in an abstract way[; and].., to stress the importance of indi-
vidual cases."452
3. Tacit Knowledge and Working Techniques
We also explain hundreds of little tricks toward better work, tricks we've learned
from daily experience.
-The Carpenter's Manifesto'm
448. Meyer, supra note 7, at 665. Meyer prefers the word "handiwork" to craft. See id. at 654
n.43.
449. Lind, supra note 7, at 357. Lind suggests that as craftsmen, judges are involved in a
"fundamentally different cognitive approach" to the law, that they must "develop a working
knowledge of the conditions of excellence for [their] craft in order to try to accommodate them in
practice." Id. at 357-58. These conditions require decisions to "be arrived at impartially, rest on
reasoned explanation, and satisfy objectives of coherence and workability .... . Id. at 369-70
(footnote omitted).
450. LLEIVELLYN, supra note 8, at 266.
451. KRONLAN, supra note 3, at 220.
452. Id. at 375.
453. EHRLICH & MANNHEIMER, supra note 31, at 8.
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[Technique] is not some fetishistic obsession on the part of [the craftsman], but an
essential feature inherent in traditional craft practice.
-Howard Risatti
454
Any project, no matter how complex, is put together with a lot of simple techniques
.... You can learn techniques. Some you learn instantly, just by watching or being
told how, such as turning a screwdriver to drive a screw. Some take a little more
time, such as hammering without bending the nail or hitting your thumb. Other
techniques, like planing, take years to perform skillfully, although you can do them
adequately with a little practice .... The point is they all can be learned.
-The Carpenter's Manifesto4
Tacit knowledge or 'know-how' is immensely powerful: it gets things built.
-Peter Dormer 4w
In contrast to theory and rules, much of a craftsperson's
knowledge can be described as involving working techniques or
tacit knowledge. 457 Peter Dormer explains the relationship between
theoretical knowledge and tacit knowledge as follows: "To build an
engine demands the practical knowledge of the engineer and the
machinist-which is complex; much of it defies description in
words. It is... 'tacit' knowledge .... But it is also slowly acquired.
If we had to rely on discovering ideas through craft, through plod-
ding empiricism, then we might never have progressed as far as
steam engines, let alone beyond them. The power of theoretical
knowledge is that it provides general insights into how fields of ac-
tion work and how we might improve our practice. Theoretical
knowledge has been described as a springboard."
458
Craftspersons often describe their work as involving tacit,
experience-based knowledge. For example, the potter Carla Nee-
dleman describes the technique of "centering" clay on a potter's
wheel as follows: "Centering can easily be done with the eyes
closed. I close my eyes now and sense the clay riding true between
my hands. I have a deep sense of well-being, a kind of joyful seri-
ousness, a potentiality. ' 459 For the craftsperson, Howard Risatti ex-
454. Risatti, supra note 54, at 40.
455. EHRLICH & MANNHEIMER, supra note 31, at 142.
456. DORMER, supra note 40, at 10.
457. See supra Part II.A4 (discussing difficulties of articulation when dealing with tacit
knowledge).
458. DORMER, supra note 40, at 10.
459. NEEDLEMAN, supra note 58, at 8. Needleman explains the act of centering further:
When the wheel is going quite fast I stop kicking, place my foot on the support
to the right, and wet my hands. The two hands squeeze the clay at the base of
the mound, forcing it up. The palms then push on the top of the clay, pushing it
[Vol. 54:22452330
plains, "Technique... is directly related to material, and material
is directly related to function. To know which materials to use for a
specific object requires a keen knowledge of their physical proper-
ties-which materials will withstand prolonged use, which are im-
permeable or pliable, what is their tensile strength, and so forth."416
In addition, "the maker of traditional craft must also know how to
work the material into the desired object."461 Often, this will be nei-
ther simple nor straightforward. On the contrary, "[o]ne must first
select the proper material, then work the material through several
stages before beginning to form the object."462 Being able to under-
take skillfully the stages of producing the craft object "is still a very
difficult and sensitive procedure, requiring a great deal of intellec-
tual and practical knowledge as well as motor skill."
463
Howard Risatti notes that working techniques are closely re-
lated to the objects created by craftspersons: "We commonly speak
of weaving cloth, of blowing glass, of throwing pots, of smithing
metals, of turning, bending, or joining wood. In traditional craft
practice material is something to work with in the effort to create
meaning."464
Tacit knowledge or working know-how is not simply a compi-
lation of numerous "tricks of the trade." As Peter Dormer notes,
"There is a great difference between acquiring a small number of
tricks and acquiring a grasp of a body of practical knowledge." 46 In
fact, one who is overly concerned with tricks misunderstands craft.
James Elkins has argued that "[c]raftsmanship is perverted by the
obsession for techniques and strategies--'tricks of the trade.' Al-
though these strategies and tricks are contained in the notion of
craftsmanship ... they are not the container itself-they are not
craft."16
Carla Needleman describes the relationship between thought
and feeling in the potter's craft as follows: "Thought, so much
slower than feeling, enters in and, finding something precious no
down again. My hands are steady, not riding the irregularities of the clay
mound, but mastering the clay with steady pressure.
Id.
460. Risatti, supra note 54, at 40-41.




465. DORMER, supra note 40, at 56. Dormer adds, "You can acquire fragments of skill; but if
you limit yourself to the techniques, then you may forfeit expertise in a variety of skills within
the same discipline." Id.
466. Elkins, supra note 90, at 965.
2001] LAWAS CRAFT 2331
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
longer there, attempts to reconstruct in words so as to salvage the
experience by remembering it. Many intellectually stimulating
ideas about craftsmanship, full of interesting connections, have
their genesis in such a moment. But, looking back upon such verbal
constructions of my own, I find that not one of them ever helped me
to become a better craftsman.
''467
Understanding of the law likewise cannot be reduced to a set
of rules or sufficiently represented by a theory. This is what Lle-
wellyn had in mind when he described the skillful lawyer's knowl-
edge as akin to "situation sense," or "horse-sense," by which, as An-
thony Kronman explains, Llewellyn meant the "ability to see be-
yond the details of the case at hand coupled with a resistance to the
kind of theoretical extravagance that leads only to abstractions of
unhelpful generality."468 Kronman, reflecting upon Llewellyn's craft
ideal, describes the "true judicial craftsman" as one who "knows
that his work is constrained even in its most creative aspects and
regards the iconoclastic bogey of an utterly free judicial prerogative
as a fantasy or myth. He knows that his craft is not a science and
cannot be made into one ... [that] his craft is not blind habit, and
that invention is ingredient in it, though his thinking is at every
step guided by professional dispositions that precede and shape
it."469
B. Craving Certainty and Tolerating Uncertainty
The fact of our lives is uncertainty, and we crave certainty.
-Carla Needleman 470
A craftsperson must have a high tolerance for uncertainty.
Speaking of the potter's craft, Carla Needleman has observed that
"[t]he fact of our lives is uncertainty, and we crave certainty."47'
Needleman notes that when she "extend[s]" herself into her craft,
she becomes "willing to sacrifice any of [her] opinions that experi-
ence proves false." 472 Oliver Wendell Holmes expressed a similar
belief when he said, "If I were dying, my last words would be: have
467. NEEDLEMAN, supra note 58, at 9.
468. KRONMAN, supra note 3, at 223.
469. Id. at 224.
470. NEEDLEMAN, supra note 58, at 3.
471. Id. Needleman adds, "I don't know what to feel when I look at a pot I've made. The rela.
tionship between myself and this object, my production which now exists independently of me, is
ambiguous and unsure." Id.
472. Id. at 12-13.
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faith and pursue the unknown end."473 Indeed, lawyers and judges
must deal with greater uncertainty than their counterparts in other
crafts such as carpentry. Speaking of what he learned about being a
judge from his work as a carpenter, Judge Robert Satter notes that
whereas a "carpenter deals in lengths, widths, angles," and "has to
be accurate," in contrast a judge "deals in uncertainty."4 4 The judge
"cmust muddle through ambiguous statutes and conflicting prece-
dents when drafting an opinion; he must rely on his intuitions
about human nature when sentencing a felon, or awarding custody
of a child."475 As Llewellyn put it, craft does not usually generate
"certainty," but rather "reasonable regularity."476 In her discussion
of Heidegger's account of practical wisdom, Linda Ross Meyer sug-
gests that when we stop expecting certainty and control from over-
arching theories, "we see that the better and perhaps the best role
of thinking is in keeping questions open, lingering in enlightened
confusion, so that we do not miss the next insight when it comes."
477
473. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Dr. John C.H. Wu (Apr. 10, 1924), reprinted in
JUSTICE OIVER WENDELL HOLiES: His BOOK NOTES AND UNCOLLECTED LETTERS AND PAPERS
175, 175 (Harry C. Shriver ed., 1936).
474. Satter, supra note 2, at 104.
475. Id. Judge Satter follows this comparison with another contrast between judging and car-
pentry. "The difference between the two callings simply confirms the wisdom of Aristotle that
'one should not demand more exactitude than the subject matter permits.' From the precision
required in carpentry, I came to appreciate the complexities of judging." Id.
476. LLEWELLYN, supra note 8, at 215-17. "If there is regularity, there is continuity enough;
and be it noted that sharp, sudden upset is almost never needed, ifthere has been no prior piled-
up logjam to block the passage of the prior needed small adjustments. The reasonable aspect of
the regularity, on the other hand, holds out full room to adjust any complex of tension to the
hugely variant needs of whatever the relevant type-situations may be. .. ." Id. at 216.
477. Meyer, supra note 7, at 652. Meyer concludes, "The openness of practical reason is cause
for celebration, not devaluation." Id. For a contrasting account of practical reason inspired by
Heidegger, see Leiter, supra note 108, at 267-71 (arguing that practical know-how does not ad-




C. Learning and Transmitting Craft
Our main goal... is to communicate to you a way of thinking, of seeing-a method
of approaching and solving carpentry problems.
-The Carpenter's Manifesto
478
I think it is a mistake to try to cram a technical knowledge of fishing down a
youngster's throat. Not only may it sour him on the whole deal, but it will deny him
the fun of learning through trial and error. No boy enjoys 'doing as he's told,' but




How does a craftsperson learn her craft? She does so slowly,
patiently, and ideally at the knee of a master craftsperson. Perhaps
it is not surprising that the place in the law where the ideal of ap-
prenticeship still has some professional resonance is in the judicial
clerkship. The judge, as master, guides the novice lawyer, as ap-
prentice, through the early stages of developing professional compe-
tence. If judging is a craft, then in the clerkship we should find evi-
dence of the ideals of apprenticeship. Like apprentices in other
crafts, the judicial clerk gives up the possibility of earning much
more money for the experience of working at the elbow of a master
craftsperson. A judge who is committed to the idea of viewing her
work as a craft will treat her clerks as apprentices, and will see in
the relationship the opportunity to pass on to succeeding genera-'
tions the knowledge and skills pertaining to the craft of the law.
478. EHRLICH & MANNHEIMER, supra note 31, at 8. The authors of The Carpenter's Manifesto
note that the
notion that carpentry is something mysterious or beyond the nontechnical mind
is wrong. We've found that the two types of carpentry books usually available
haven't helped to dispel that prejudice. First there are the heavy technical
tomes for the professional. Some are excellent, but they assume you have five
years of fundamentals behind you, and they are therefore incomprehensible to
most people. Then there are the light-reading crafts books, the how-to books,
which may tell you how to build certain projects . . . . but little else. When
you're done, you still have no idea what carpentry is about, how to design and
build something on your own.
Id.




Apprenticeship is the birth of a new craftsman.
-Gerry Wilhiamsm
Historically, the way a craftsperson learned her craft was by
apprenticing herself to a master craftsperson. 481 Over a period of
years, and for very little compensation, the apprentice would learn
the craft, beginning with mundane and menial tasks-cleaning the
floor, sharpening tools, cutting and preparing materials-and
slowly moving on to other work. Much can be said about the nature
of learning through an apprenticeship. Nonetheless, I will focus on
but four aspects of apprenticeship: the potential for exploitation
and tough love;482 craft as learning how to work, as opposed to
merely creating objects; 48 3 the role of theory, practice, and repeti-
tion in learning a craft, and the pace at which craft learning takes
place;484 and the role of mimicry and copying, and the implications
for creativity.48 5
a. Exploitation and Tough Love
The idea of apprenticeship is dangerously close to master-and.servant, and in this
sense UnAmerican.
-John Reeve4w
Apprenticeship is fraught with hazard, the primary one be-
ing the exploitation of the apprentice by the master. Apprentices
have often been required to work long hours, forced to perform
repetitious and mind-numbing work under oppressive conditions.
Potter John Reeve observes that the master-servant relationship "is
an exploitive relationship: in the short term, the master exploits
480. Gerry Williams, Introduction, in APPRENTICESHIP IN CRAFT 13, 13 (Gerry Williams ed.,
1981).
481. John Glick defines a master as "a craftsman who has achieved a level of expressive
and/or technical expertise combined with a depth of experience, who is capable of guiding an-
other person through exploration in the chosen medium." Glick, supra note 177. at 25. An ap-
prentice "is a person actively involved in a working studio, under the direct guidance and influ-
ence of a master," and is distinct from an employee, who "is a worker who has specified jobs to
perform, jobs which usually vary little in scope from day to day." Id.
482. See infra Part II.C.l.a.
483. See infra Part 1II.C.l.b.
484. See infra Part IlI.C.l.c.
485. See infra Part III.C.l.d.




the apprentice by using his labor and paying little for it; and in the
long term, the apprentice exploits the master by getting his train-
ing free. '
'4" 7
Gerry Williams, a potter, writes that "[tihe goal of a success-
ful craft apprenticeship should be twofold: to provide the master
with assistance in the working environment, and to train the ap-
prentice in professional practices. ' 488 John Glick, also a potter, ad-
vises would-be apprentices to exercise care in choosing an appren-
ticeship: "The master (role model), the studio environment, and the
aesthetic climate present are some basic factors that will matter
greatly."' ' 9 Glick suggests that for a would-be craftsman, having no
apprenticeship is preferable to "one in which the apprentice is
never exposed to broad human experiences and values, as well as
meaningful studio activity. '490 If one joins a studio that is really
involved in mass production, Glick warns, the "philosophies of any
such enterprise are doomed to mimic a poor model and end up by
watering down further an already malnourished set of values."
491
Glick suggests that in choosing an apprenticeship, the ap-
prentice should give appropriate attention to the master's reputa-
tion, 492 working philosophy, 493 the type of work done, 494 and such
practicalities as studio time,495 space, 496 duties, 497 and compensa-
487. Id.
488. Williams, supra note 480, at 14.
489. Glick, supra note 177, at 26.
490. Id. In contrast, "[a] prolonged contact with a lifeless job, doing drudgery work for ox-
perience, is of questionable value." Id. The mere fact that one works in a studio is not enough, if
the studio "is identified with a poor quality, mass-produced, 'handmade' ware geared for a whole-
sale marketing system." Id. Glick continues, 'Usually, a line of products and a catalogue are part
of the scheme of things." Id.
491. Id.
492. Glick urges apprentices to "[t]ry not to be swayed by the reputation of the master (or the
lack of it), because a reputation grows not only from a response to the work of the master, but
also from hearsay, rumor, jealousy, misunderstanding, and excess praise. In other words, judge
and see for yourself by getting close to the person behind the reputation." Id. at 27. Identical
advice could be given to a young lawyer evaluating law firms.
493. Glick asks, "Does the working philosophy you sense in the studio revolve around a lov-
ing relationship with the entire craft process? This can be the most beautiful of all possible in-
troductions to the life of the studio artist. Or is the thinking in terms of pounds, inches, and
hours?" Id.
494. Glick notes, "Major clues about the master come from a thoughtful contact with the
work he or she does. Look beyond productivity alone. Try to discern and measure the values
expressed in the work." Id. at 28.
495. Glick encourages the would-be apprentice to ask such questions as, "What is the ratio of
time spent doing studio work to time available for your own pursuitsT' and "[w]hat about time
together with the master?" Id.
496. "Would you have a separate space and your own equipment.. . ?' Id. at 29.
2336
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tion.498 The following advice by Glick about selecting an apprentice-
ship could just as easily be given to a young lawyer looking for a
first job:
If you accept my premise that there are very few really well-rounded apprentice-
ship opportunities, the situation may seem even more extreme .... Obviously, no
one can detail a foolproof plan to land the ideal apprenticeship. I know that part of
the entire apprenticeship concept necessarily involves compromise. The trick is to
identify your priorities well enough that when you assess the compromises in a
given instance, you can see your chances for survival clearly and then act accord-
ingly. Remember also that while the master you seek has abundant problems of
his own, there is still likely to be a continual stream of willing individuals knock-
ing on his studio door who want to relate in any way possible. If you decline to ap-
ply to or accept a position, you deny the master little of value, really. If you take
on the responsibility of a position without a deep conviction that it is right for you,
then you not only cheat yourself of your own growth, but you offer less than an
honest person to the master as a pupil. 39
Apprenticeship is not an ideal about which we should become
starry-eyed or romantic; it is about tough love. Apprentices are
likely to chafe under the exacting standards and disapproval of
their masters. Thomas L. Shaffer, speaking as a law professor on
the obligations of "elders" to newcomers to a profession, observes
that "[p]rofessional craftsmanship entails coleagueship that comes
from learning, at the hands of an elder, demanding standards and
relatively rigid attention to telling the truth about our work."5 00
In today's legal environment, one reason the ideals of ap-
prenticeship are under siege is because in order to compete for the
best law school graduates, starting salaries of first-year associates
are very high.501 Given the high degree of mobility of lawyers, firms
are less willing to take a long-term view of the young attorney's de-
velopment, and are more likely to expect young lawyers to be reve-
nue generators immediately. This leaves no room for apprentice-
ship, and may contribute to widespread associate dissatisfaction.z
497. "Even though the role you fill will change as your skills become more useful, it is best to
have a good grasp of the general expectations on the master's part." Id.
498. "How would you survive financiallyT' Id.
499. Id. at 26.
500. Shaffer, supra note 352, at 632.
501. Patricia M. Schnegg, An Embarrassment of Riches, LOS ANGELES LAW., May 2000, at 11,
11-12.
502. See, e.g., Schiltz, supra note 389, at 881-88.
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b. Learning How to Work
Crafts are about one thing: the secret of how to work.
-Carla Needleman=
Becoming a craftsperson is not primarily about receiving in-
struction about how to make a certain type of object; rather, it is
about learning how to work. Potter Carla Needleman describes her
relationship with an apprentice as follows: "My young friend has
come to me to learn a thing I have no intention of teaching her. She
imagines that a craft is the objects it produces and has come to me
to do what she thinks of as the craft of pottery-to make pots .... I
am tempted to give in, to give her the instruction she wants and let
it go at that .... Pottery is not about making pots .... Crafts are
about one thing: the secret of how to work."0 4
For a craftsperson, learning how to work is seldom, if ever,
acquired exclusively from books. Carla Needleman notes that
"[a]lmost everyone who works at a craft today was taught it, had
formally or informally some or a great deal of instruction. Whether
or not he read about the craft, tried to teach himself from books,
almost everyone has had at least one human instructor, another
craftsman, because as good as many of the books are, and some of
them are excellent, there is no substitute for the help that can be
given by another person." 0 5
Needleman goes on to observe that "[t]he actual working re-
lationships in the course of teaching a craft are so different from
what I would express as my intention. Nothing ever proceeds in a
straight line, and it is all so slow, so blundering and so slow." 50 6 A
law professor teaching first-year students, an experienced practi-
tioner dealing with a first-year associate, or a judge interacting
with her clerk, could each express similar feelings.
503. NEEDLEMAN, supra note 58, at 122.
504. Id. at 121-22.
505. Id. at 112.
506. Id. at 128.
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c. Theory, Practice, and Repetition
Learning a skill is not the same as being expert. Being an expert in a body of craft
knowledge means living that knowledge.
-Peter Dormerw
Crafts are not learned exclusively by studying books. It is
unlikely that one could become skilled in the various aspects of be-
ing a lawyer-be they advocacy, counseling, drafting, writing briefs,
researching-exclusively by reading case books and treatises.
Rather, craft learning is based upon the experience of trial and er-
ror. Carla Needleman asks, "What is the craft of weaving and
where does it begin? If craft is a process of learning, learning from
inside oneself through having been through it, nothing one can
learn from books or from being told, how can I know if this or that
modern technique, apparatus, or shortcut cuts me off from an es-
sential ingredient of experience?" 508 Voicing a similar sentiment,
the nineteenth-century craftsperson Fred Miller argued that "[t]he
only training worth anything is working under a practical man, for
technique cannot be imparted successfully by written directions
"509
One consequence of craft learning being based upon experi-
ence is that crafts are learned slowly. Peter Dormer has remarked
that "[a]cquiring a body of practical knowledge takes time: it is a
slow empirical process." 510 Similarly, Carla Needleman has ob-
served that "[a] craft is, can be, an education'in failure, an educa-
tion in the attitude toward failure, an education in and transforma-
tion of my attitude toward failure."8 1' Echoing this view, Seonaid
Mairi Robertson notes that "[h]aving chosen her craft, a student
should pursue it for some years .... Being rooted securely in the
traditions and practice of one craft, in a knowledge of the relation-
ship between materials and method and the finished product, she
will much more rapidly appreciate the qualities of the materials
and methods of another craft."5 12
507. DORMER, supra note 40, at 40.
508. NEEDLEMAN, supra note 58, at 64.
509. MILLER, supra note 185, at 35.
510. DOInMER, supra note 40, at 56. Dormer adds, "Intellectual leaps via theoretical insights
are useful, but only after practice." Id.
511. NEEDLEMAN, supra note 58, at 15. Needleman calls coping with failure an essential part
of becoming a craftsperson. "I fail and I go on. Failure is a beginning, failure is the springboard
of hope.! Id.
512. ROBERTSON, supra note 33, at 90.
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Practice and repetition are necessary to develop the con-
stituent skills of a craft. Speaking of calligraphy, Peter Dormer
notes that "[i]t helps to watch and then to mimic the elan with
which the tutor draws the letter-mimicry and demonstration make
the learning task much easier."513 Peter Gullers, a photographer,
describes the general character of craft apprenticeship as follows:
"Many people would like to acquire skills, but the long and arduous
years of apprenticeship are a deterrent."5 14 And Peter Dormer ex-
plains, "[T]he rules that make up practical knowledge-the consti-
tutive rules-cannot be apprehended intellectually until one begins
to be able to do them. 515
As a result of the long time it takes to become adept at a
craft, there is often a mismatch between judgment and practical
ability when one is learning a craft. Peter Dormer observes that
sometimes judgment or "discrimination can often outgrow ability,"
which results in frustration for a student who sees the many flaws
in his work as "a reminder of [his] incompetence." 516 On the other
hand, sometimes judgment does not surpass what one can practi-
cally accomplish. As Dormer notes, "I have in the past been shocked
at how, having completed a drawing and thinking it quite good, I
have discovered a few weeks later that it is really quite bad. What I
saw then and what I see now are not the same."51 7 Many law stu-
dents, I suspect, have experienced both sides of this mismatch be-
tween judgment and practical ability when they look back on an
early effort to brief a case, or when they review their performance
on an exam some time after taking it.
Although there may be incongruence between judgment and
practical ability, their development is interconnected. As Peter
Dormer observes, "[T]he very acquisition and practice of craft
knowledge is woven in with judgment and ideas about what you are
doing and learning. Practical work is not independent of your men-
tal grasp of it: they are inextricably bound in with one another."5 18
513. DORMER, supra note 40, at 45.
514. Id. at 41 (citing S. Gullers, Automation-Skill-Apprenticeship, in KNOWLEDGE, SKILLAND
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 35 (B. Goranzon & I. Josefson eds., 1988)). Gullers also notes that in
order to learn a craft "[b]oth self-control and, to some extent, physical and intellectual subjection
are needed." Id.
515. Id. at 56.





d. Mimicry and Creative Expression
The student who does not surpass the master, fails the master.
-Attributed to Leonardo da Vinci 51'
Craft knowledge is handed down from generation to genera-
tion and is learned through mimicking the work of one skilled in a
craft.520 Fred Miller noted that "[t]he student can be helped.., by
being shown good examples of old and modern work in which the
resources of the particular craft are developed on right lines." 521 Pe-
ter Dormer argues that "[iln learning a craft, the role of mimicry is
probably essential. This means one needs to work alongside a
skilled practitioner."52 2 And Harry Collins, a sociologist of science,
likewise maintains that "[s]kill-like knowledge travels best (or only)
through accomplished practitioners."5 23
Watching and imitating-mimicry-plays an important role
in developing craft skills. In describing his experience of learning
the craft of calligraphy, Peter Dormer notes that "[t]he early stages
can be described as copying."524 But copying is not as easy as it
might seem: "One must understand how the forms are constructed.
This understanding is greatly helped by teaching and demonstra-
tion."525 Nevertheless, the imitation of the master by the student is
not slavish. Among other things, the novice must learn to distin-
guish the relevant from the irrelevant in the way the master goes
about accomplishing a task. In learning calligraphy, Peter Dormer
ccrecognized that it was helpful to imitate the way my teacher held
the pen, her wrist movement, the placing of the wrist of her draw-
519. Maloof, supra note 330, at 146.
520. Potter John Glick notes that masters must also be aware of their intergenerational obli-
gations.
We owe each new generation of craftsmen our skills, our philosophies, and an
exposure to our lives as whole, if fallible, human beings. We cannot afford to
halt the needed transfer of knowledge and feelings by denying contact because
of pride or inconvenience. If we are not willing to give of ourselves, we have no
right to criticize nor be indignant at conditions in the crafts which we wish
were otherwise.
Glick, supra note 177, at 30.
521. MILLER, supra note 185, at 27-28.
522. DORMER, supra note 40, at 47. Dormer adds an important qualification "that some peo-
ple can infer the essentials of a craft from past examples. Id. at 56. He states that
"[tiraditionally, most painters and sculptors studied work from the past (and from their peers) to
learn new ways of doing things" Id.
523. Id. (citing HARRY COLLINS, CHANGING ORDER (1985)).
524. Id. at 44.
525. Id. at 45.
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ing hand upon the board, but not that she pursed her lips or
squinted her eyes."
526
This is not to say that mimicry is mindless copying. Martin
Heidegger compares thinking and craft as follows:
A cabinetmaker's apprentice, someone who is learning to build cabinets and the
like, will serve as an example. His learning is not mere practice, to gain facility in
the use of tools. Nor does he merely gather knowledge about the customary forms
of the things he is to build. If he is to become a true cabinetmaker, he makes him-
self answer and respond above all to the different kinds of wood and to the shapes
slumbering within wood-to wood as it enters into man's dwelling with all the hid-
den riches of its nature. In fact, this relatedness to wood is what maintains the
whole craft. Without that relatedness, the craft will never be anything but empty
busywork, any occupation with it will be determined exclusively by business con-
cerns. Every handicraft, all human dealings are constantly in that danger.A
Woodworker Sam Maloof likewise notes that an apprentice natu-
rally "is strongly influenced by the master craftsman with whom he
works. This often presents a problem in that the apprentice tends to
imitate the work of the designer/craftsman. A strong student, how-
ever, will seek his own direction.
5 28
Fred Miller, a nineteenth-century craftsperson, recollected,
"I worked for a designer whose style captivated me, and I became a
weak reflection of him when I attempted original work. It is as
natural as it is common that a young man should become enam-
oured of the work of a particular artist, and consciously or uncon-
sciously copy it: no harm follows this if the tendency is kept in
check by other influences at work, but to become the pupil of one
man, however clever he may be, is harmful."529 H. Wilson, a nine-
teenth-century silversmith and jewelry maker, warned students not
to copy the designs of another: "Not only is deliberate copyism dis-
honest, it checks the development of the student's native powers
and stunts his individuality."530
An important question is whether the learning of skills "by
rote and constant practice which seems such a burden-
constitute[s] a long-term brake on expression and creativity."5 31
Learning a skill is "hard business: doing a skill badly when wanting
to create something excellent is a demoralizing experience. This is
526. Id. at 47.
527. MARTIN HEIDEGGER, WHAT Is CALLED THINKING? 14-15 (Fred D. Wieck & J. Glenn Gray
trans., 1968); see also Meyer, supra note 7, at 654-55 (providing an interesting reflection upon
the implications of Heidegger's view for thinking and practical reason).
528. Maloof, supra note 330, at 145-46.
529. MILLER, supra note 185, at 10-11.
530. WILSON, supra note S0, at 11-12.
531. DORMER, supra note 40, at 40.
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why learning is not and cannot always be fun. Learning a skill is
not a mechanical activity but an emotional as well as intellectual
and physical process." 53 2 Indeed, Fred Miller noted that "[h]abit and
custom largely govern taste, because so few of us think independ-
ently and act for ourselves. Yet it is in the breaking away from the
established order of things that our personality finds expression,
and an original turn is given to work. You use tradition and are
guided by precedent, but are not bounded by it.
"
533
As Aristotle observed, craft involves both a knowledge of
universals and particulars. 5 4 Carla Needleman voices a similar
sentiment, suggesting that a craftsperson must strike a "proper
balance or blend of the universal and the particular."535 She urges
that "[w]e need to see the universal in the particular. If we long
only for the universal, it is imagination, not vision, and if we lose
ourselves in the particular, it is a waste."536 At the intersection of,
or in "communication" between, the two, Needleman says, we find
"vision."53 7 The craft of the law similarly reflects a concern with,
and an ability to, work with both universals-such as general rules
and principles-and particulars-the specific, highly detailed, and
often singular facts of a case or situation.
2. Failure and Disillusionment
Almost all beginners, learning the craft of pottery, make the same errors ....
-Carla Needleman=
a. Mistakes
Making mistakes is a necessary part of learning a craft. Of
his experience learning calligraphy, Peter Dormer writes that
"[s]eeing mistakes, gaining the ability to discriminate, is the key to
becoming an expert."5 3 9 In his discussion of what he learned about
judging from his work as a carpenter, Judge Robert Satter re-
counted an experience of having to use a crowbar to take out a
532. Id.
533. MILLER, supra note 185, at 28-29.
534. ARISTOTLE, supra note 96, at X.9.1180b7-22.
535. NEEDLEMAN, supra note 58, at 81.
536. Id.
537. Id.
538. Id. at 133.
539. DORMER, supra note 40, at 45.
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crooked nail. A skilled carpenter with whom he was working, reas-
sured him, "It]hat's OK, Bob. The measure of a good carpenter is
how he corrects his mistakes."540
Carla Needleman, in her study of the craft of pottery, dis-
cusses the ubiquity and importance of failure to being a craftsper-
son: "There are times when the clay is too hard or too soft, wedging
tires me, there's a draft from somewhere on my feet, and I seem to
have forgotten how to throw."541 When facing such difficulties, she
responds by becoming "aggressive, I attack the clay, can't do any-
thing right, get tired, dirty, and miserable, produce two pots I know
then and there I'm going to break up tomorrow, and stop for the
day."542 Potter John Glick notes that "[c]onstructive failure is a term
I would apply to much of my own early learning in the studio. In
fact, I can hardly confine the notion to early experiences, since to
this day I occasionally bang my head against my inadequacies."
43
Any craftsperson, including the lawyer, will have such days
when nothing seems to work. For the judge, she may realize that
the day's draft will need to be discarded, even as she works on it.
Furthermore, the missteps and miscues are often a necessary part
of the process of getting it right. Days filled with failure "are emba-
rassing," says Needleman, but they are part of the truth of any
craft. 54
James Elkins maintains that as lawyers, "[w]hen we pay at-
tention to ourselves at work and imagine ourselves as craftsmen,
we begin to see and experience the failures integral to craft." 45 El-
kins believes we pay too little attention to failure in the profes-
sional work of lawyers, relegating failure "to the study of profes-
sional negligence and the sanctioning of professionals who violate
prescribed ethical rules or who engage in criminal conduct." 546 The
reality is that the craftsperson "always fails in some degree. De-
spite his experience, despite the sureness that he sometimes is able
to reach and briefly hold, there is within him, as he works, a hesita-
540. Satter, supra note 2, at 104.
541. NEEDLEMAN, supra note 58, at 10.
542. Id. at 11.
543. Glick, supra note 177, at 30-31.
544. NEEDLEMAN, supra note 58, at 11. Reflecting upon Needleman's description of failuro,
James Elkins notes, 'These days of failure make for honesty in a craft. They take us back to the
beginning, show us how little we know, and bring a sense of humility, an attitude which is
needed to offset the arrogance so common to professional work." Elkins, supra note 90, at 962.
545. Elkins, supra note 90, at 960.
546. Id. Elkins continues, "A sense of craftsmanship begins with humility, limitation and
failure." Id. at 961.
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tion a doubt, a fear .... This unsureness is necessary for the
growth of both him and his craft."
547
b. Disillusionment
A related but seldom articulated aspect of craftsmanship is
disillusionment. As potter Carla Needleman reflects, "Crafts-
manship begins with disillusion. And leads, not all at once but after
many experiences, to a valuation, a respect, for the state of disillu-
sion. Disillusion begins to be seen as a positive state, dividing-it's
true-my dreams but beyond that having the effect of bringing
about in my whole organism a quiet and a seriousness that unite
me as nothing else has power to, and I like it." 548 Disillusion is an
emotion not unknown to the law student, lawyer, or judge.
D. For the Love of Money
Given the character and characteristics of craft, and what is
involved in becoming a craftsperson, it is not surprising that
craftsmen are not driven primarily by a pursuit of money. When a
craftsperson becomes preoccupied with the bottom line, he is on the
way to being a manager or mass producer.
This is perhaps the single greatest obstacle for lawyers view-
ing their work as a craft. For a profession that has always had to
fight the tendency to equate professional success with remunerative
rank, the trends of the last several decades seem to have exacer-
bated the difficulty of resisting measuring our professional success
primarily in terms of the "bottom line."
547. Harry Remde, Close to Zero, in A WAY OF WORKING 49, 55 (D.M. Dooling ed., 1979). Due
to the ubiquity of failure, a craftsperson necessarily remains "both master and apprentice in his
work." Id. at 54.




If there is a name which I would like to copyright, it is "craftsman." It is a name
which places a tremendous responsibility on those who claim it .... And believe
me, in our world and in our time, we are deeply in need of the values which come
under the head of "craftsmanship."
-Charles Eames54
I believe the right question to ask, respecting all ornament, is simply this: Was it
done with enjoyment-was the carver happy while he was about it? It may be the
hardest work possible, and the harder because so much pleasure was taken in it;
but it must have been happy too, or it will not be living.
-John Ruskin 'w
When reflecting upon the character and characteristics of
craftsmen, it is impossible not to be struck by how rarely this ideal
is realized in real life, even among people involved in the useful
trades, such as carpentry. The ideal of craft and craftsmanship
seems very old fashioned and out of style in a culture that seems to
value getting rich quick as the highest mark of success. Perhaps
some solace can be found in the fact that it is easy to imagine the
past as an ideal and idyllic time,. and compare our current situation
unfavorably with it. In point of fact, concern about the deterioration
of the craft ideal is very old. Bemoaning the current state of affairs,
and comparing it unfavorably with a distant and romanticized past,
is a temptation not easily resisted. In addition, it must be acknowl-
edged that the lives and lots of many craftspersons were, and are,
cramped and limited. In traditional societies, children often had no
choice or prospects but to follow their fathers or mothers and learn
their trades. These aspects of craft hardly represent an ideal to-
wards which we should aspire or hope to return.
Nevertheless, as I study craft traditions I cannot help but be
moved. Further, I cannot help but be struck by the implications for
lawyers. For me, it is in immersing myself in the details of other
craft traditions that I see the connections and commonality between
those endeavors and the work of a lawyer. The role of craftsman-
ship and craft virtues may be most easily seen in the work of the
judge-indeed being called a master craftsperson might be the
549. Five Decades: American Craft Council, supra note 57, at 82 (quoting Charles Eames
(1957)).
550. JOHN RUSKIN, THE SEVEN LAMPS OF ARCHITECTURE 218 (E.T. Cook & Alexander Wed-
derburn eds., 1903) (footnote omitted).
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highest compliment a judge can be paid. But I believe it is evident
in other practices of the law as well.
As I have worked to find meaning and fulfillment in my life
in the law-as a law clerk, big-firm attorney, and professor-I have
found guidance and sustenance in the notion that what I should be
aspiring to become is a craftsperson. I find it difficult not to be in-
spired by a discussion of craftsmanship, anachronistic and out of
fashion as it may seem. It is encouraging to view myself as part of
an enterprise that should value experience and age, which holds out
the possibility that over time I can become better at what I am do-
ing. When discussing and reflecting upon what it means to be a
craftsperson, part of me wants to loosen my tie and take a furniture
building class, work with my hands, and make something real and
solid, which stands a chance of outlasting me and being used by un-
born generations. I feel a little like Judge Learned Hand, speculat-
ing whether I might accomplish more by constructing a boat or
building a house.
But inevitably I remind myself that I don't have to head to
the carpenter's workbench, the potter's wheel, or the weaver's loom
to develop craftsperson's skills; I can do it in my practice and teach-
ing as a lawyer, if I choose to do so. If I choose to treat my vocation
as a craft.
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